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 Abstract 
 
It is within highly integrated technology environments that information security is 
becoming a focal point for designing, developing and deploying software applications. 
Ensuring a high level of trust in the security and quality of these applications is crucial 
to their ultimate success. Therefore, information security has become a core requirement 
for software applications, driven by the need to protect critical assets and the need to 
build and preserve widespread trust in computing.  
 
However, a common weakness that is inherent in the traditional software development 
methodologies is the lack of attention given to the security aspects of software 
development. Most of these methodologies do not explicitly include a standardised 
method for incorporating information security into their life cycles. Meaningful security 
can be achieved when information security issues are considered as part of a routine 
development process, and security safeguards are integrated into the software 
application throughout its life cycle. This, in turn, will lead to users being more 
confident to use software applications, and to entrust today's computer systems with 
their personal information. 
 
To build better or more secure software, an improved software development process is 
required. Security of a software application must be based on the risk associated with 
the application. In order to understand this risk, the relevant information assets need to 
be identified together with their threats and vulnerabilities. Therefore, security 
considerations provide input into every phase of the Software Development Life Cycle 
(SDLC), from requirements gathering to design, implementation, testing and 
deployment.  
 
This research project  presents a Secure Software Development Model (SecSDM) for 
incorporating information security into all phases of the SDLC, from requirements 
gathering to systems maintenance. The SecSDM is based on many of the 
recommendations provided by relevant international standards and best practices, for 
example, the ISO 7498-2 (1989) standard which addresses the underlying security 
services and mechanisms that form an integral part of the model. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Many people are reluctant to entrust current computer systems with their personal 
information. The main reason for this mistrust is that they are concerned about the 
security, reliability and ultimately the quality of the software applications associated 
with these systems (Mundie, de Vries, Haynes & Corwine, 2002).  
 
Several models of software quality factors have been suggested over the years. Galin 
(2004) refers specifically to the factor model of McCall. This model classifies all 
software requirements into eleven software quality factors. These factors are grouped 
into three categories as follows: 
· Product operation factors which include correctness, reliability, efficiency, 
integrity and usability; 
· Product revision factors which include maintainability, flexibility and testability; 
· Product transition factors which include portability, reusability and 
interoperability. 
 
Aspects of software quality such as portability and flexibility, according to Wang and 
Wang (2003),  are crucial to the study of overall software quality, but security threats 
and risks specifically target the software operational capabilities of correctness, 
reliability, efficiency, integrity and usability. 
 
IBM is in agreement with this and summarises quality as the tangible and intangible 
sum of functionality, usability, reliability, performance, scalability, supportability, 
security and other factors. IBM states that quality results can only be attained if quality 
is strived for throughout all phases of the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC).  
This will facilitate innovation and lower costs by increasing predictability, reducing risk 
and eliminating rework (Bessin, 2004). 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
2 
A general past trend in software development in the past has been to invest heavily in 
adding functionality and delivering new capabilities that customers ask for. This is still 
a key focus for software developers and it is not surprising that major developers such 
as Microsoft are assigning a higher priority to security improvements. 
 
Mundie et al (2002), in the White Paper on Trustworthy Computing by Microsoft, refer 
to four main goals that any Trustworthy Computing approach has to meet. These goals 
are summarised as follows: 
· Security: the user can expect that systems are resilient to attack and that the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system and its data are protected; 
· Privacy: the user is able to control data about themselves, and other parties using 
such data adhere to fair information principles; 
· Reliability: the user can depend on the product to fulfil its functions when 
required to do so; 
· Business Integrity: the vendor of a product behaves in a responsive and 
responsible manner. 
 
Experience gathered about the security of real-world software, has led to a set of high-
level principles for building more secure software. Microsoft specifically refers to the 
following principles in their discussion of the Trustworthy Computing Development 
Life Cycle (Lipner and Howard, 2005): 
· Secure by Design: The software should be architected, designed and 
implemented to protect itself and the information it processes and to resist 
attacks; 
· Secure by Default: The default state of software should promote security. For 
example, software should run with the least necessary privilege. Services and 
features that are not widely needed should be disabled by default or accessible 
only to a small population of users; 
· Secure in Deployment : Tools and guidelines should accompany software to help 
end users and/or administrators use it securely. Any update should be easy to 
deploy; 
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· Communications: Software developers should communicate openly and 
responsibly with end users and/or administrators on the discovery of product 
vulnerabilities to help them take protective action.  
 
Wang and Wang (2003) further suggest that software developers need to select 
protection mechanisms via the application of appropriate security technologies and 
approaches to provide necessary safeguards. This can be achieved through considering 
the security risks and threats, and their impact on the quality of the target application. 
Therefore, the security of a software application must be based on its risk. The relevant 
information assets need to be identified together with their threats and vulnerabilities to 
understand this risk.  
 
The large number of vulnerabilities identified in software applications today is due, in 
part, to the incredible complexity of modern systems. Each software application is 
unique with its own particular set of risks. An application is deemed secure when it is 
protected from both human and non-human threats, including accidental or intentional 
damage, destruction, theft, unintended or unauthorised modification (Whitman and 
Mattord, 2003).  
 
1.2 Description of Specific Areas of Interest 
In a climate where the protection of information is increasingly tied to the integrity of 
an organisation, security must be strongly coupled with the software development 
process to ensure that the desired level of security is achieved (Tipton and Krause, 
2006). It is necessary to develop an improved software development process to build 
better or more secure software. Therefore, security considerations must provide input 
into every phase of the SDLC, from requirements engineering to design, 
implementation, testing and deployment.  
 
It is important to acknowledge the recommendations provided by the relevant 
international standards and best practices to ensure that the proposed model conforms to 
best practices. For example, the international code of practice for information security 
management, ISO/IEC 17799 (2005) was examined and it was found that it specifically 
addresses issues relating to software development and maintenance. The 
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implementation of ISO/IEC 17799 (2005) involves establishing a cost-effective 
execution plan that includes appropriate security controls for mitigating identified risks, 
and that protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information assets of 
the organisation. 
 
It is important to consider that most software applications, developed currently, operate 
in a networked environment. The ISO 7498-2 (1989) standard describes the Basic 
Reference Model for Open Systems Interconnections (OSI). It provides a framework for 
coordinating the development of existing and future standards for the interconnection of 
systems. The security requirements for a particular software application can be 
described in terms of the five security services as defined in the ISO 7498-2 (1989) 
standard. However, the extent to which each of these services may be implemented, is 
determined by the security objectives of the envisaged application and that of the 
organisation. 
 
The ISO 7498-2 (1989) standard provides the basis of information security in software 
systems through five basic security services, including:  
· Identification and authentication which refers to the ability to identify the 
identity of all users of the system; 
· Authorisation/access control which refers to the ability to admit or prohibit users 
from accessing the information assets of the organisation; 
· Confidentiality which refers to the ability to ensure that information assets are 
only available to those who are authorised to access them; 
· Integrity which refers to the ability to ensure that information has not been 
altered in any way by an unauthorised party; 
· Non-repudiation/non-denial which refers to the ability to ensure that users do 
not deny their actions. 
 
It is necessary to note the distinction between a security service and a security 
mechanism. Whereas a security service is a measure which can be incorporated to 
address a threat (for example, the provision of confidentiality), a security mechanism is 
a means to provide the security service (for example, encryption). 
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The five security services, according to the ISO 7498-2 (1989) standard, are supported 
by eight security mechanisms, namely: 
· Encipherment mechanisms, are known as encryption or cipher algorithms. These 
mechanisms can help provide confidentiality of data and traffic flow 
information. They provide the basis for some authentication and key 
management techniques; 
· Digital signature mechanisms can be used to provide non-repudiation, origin 
authentication and data integrity services; 
· Access control mechanisms provide a means for using information associated 
with a client entity and a server entity to decide whether access to the resource 
of the server is granted to the client, for example, access control lists and 
security labels; 
· Data integrity mechanisms are used to provide data integrity and origin 
authentication services; 
· Authentication exchange mechanisms, known as authentication protocols, can be 
used to provide entity authentication; 
· Traffic padding describes the addition of ‘pretend’ data to conceal the volumes 
of real data traffic. It can be used to help provide traffic flow confidentiality but 
is only effective if the added padding is enciphered; 
· Routing control mechanisms can be used to prevent sensitive data from using 
insecure communications paths. For example, routes can be chosen to use only 
physically secure network components, depending on the properties of the data. 
Data carrying certain security labels may be forbidden entry to certain network 
components; 
· Notarisation mechanisms can be used to guarantee the integrity, origin and/or 
the destination of transferred data. A third party notary, which must be trusted 
by the communication entities, will provide the guarantee typically by applying 
a cryptographic transformation to the transferred data. 
 
These mechanisms are normally implemented by tools and components inherent in the 
particular development environment (for example, the .Net framework), or written 
specifically by the developer. Different security tools and components are available in 
the various development environments. Many of these tools and components may be 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
6 
commercially available or obtainable as shareware,  depending on the development 
environment. These tools and components help developers implement the various 
security mechanisms. This means that developers are no longer required to necessarily 
code the security components from scratch. 
 
1.3 Description of Problem Area 
It is argued that building secure software begins with the effective education of the 
software developers. These professionals need to be educated to put security at the heart 
of software design and at the foundation of the development process. In the software 
industry, the key to meeting current demand for improved security, is to implement 
repeatable processes that reliably deliver measurably improved security. This requires a 
more stringent software development process that focuses on security. Such a process 
should minimise the number of security vulnerabilities present in the SDLC and detect 
and remove these vulnerabilities as early in the life cycle as possible (Lipner and 
Howard, 2005). Tryfonas and Kiountouzis,  (2002) is in agreement and suggests that 
new ways of addressing and resolving security issues, early within the SDLC, must be 
introduced in the software development arena.  
 
The SDLC is a methodology for the design and implementation of an information 
system within an organisation. A methodology is a formal approach to solving a 
problem, based on a structured sequence of procedures. There are many representations 
of the SDLC (for example, the incremental model, the prototyping model and the spiral 
model), all illustrating a logical flow of activity from the identification of a need 
through to the final software product. These methodologies encompass all the standards 
and procedures affecting the planning, requirements gathering, analysis, design, 
development and implementation of a software application. However, an apparent  
weakness in the methodologies studied, is the lack of attention given to the security 
aspects of software development. It is in the opinion of the author, that each phase 
should result in a “security deliverable” that aims at minimising risk by employing entry 
and exit criteria to determine how to proceed from phase to phase. This would help 
ensure that security be viewed as an integral part of the SDLC, and not just as an add-on 
or after-thought at the end of the development process. 
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1.4 Problem Statement 
Software developers generally ignore the idea of security. This typically leads to their 
applications having many security weaknesses. Jurjens (2002) argues that  software 
developers rely mostly on their intuition in developing secure software, and do not use 
much systematic help or guidance. Therefore, it is not surprising that security breaches 
continue to occur in software applications. 
 
One of the main flaws of typical software development methodologies, is that security 
is not considered until the operational requirements have been defined and the system is 
into its implementation stage. This approach poses a problem, since it normally results 
in late and expensive attempts to incorporate security into the work in progress. It is 
seldom possible to provide a good level of security on a retrofit basis. The security 
aspects associated with the development of a software application need to become an 
integral part of the entire development process, to overcome this problem (Booysen and 
Eloff, 1995). 
 
From the literature studied, it is evident that software developers tend to neglect security 
issues when developing software applications. The main reason for this neglect, is that 
most of the existing software development methodologies do not provide any guidance 
for integrating security into the SDLC.  
 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The primary research objective is to present a Secure Software Development Model 
(SecSDM) for incorporating security into all phases of the SDLC, from requirements 
gathering through to implementation and system maintenance. The SecSDM is based on 
the ISO 7498-2 (1989) standard, which addresses the underlying security services and 
mechanisms that form an integral part of the model. 
 
The secondary research objectives are to: 
· Provide an introduction to software quality and Trustworthy Computing and 
how these relate to information security and software development; 
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· Discuss the various internationa l standards and best practices pertaining to 
information security and software development, with a specific focus on ISO 
7498-2 (1989), ISO/IEC 17799 and ISO/IEC TR 13335; 
· Provide an understanding of the SDLC, the existing software development 
methodologies, and discover any inherent weaknesses in terms of providing for 
security; 
· Discuss risk analysis as the first and most critical stage of the SDLC. This will 
be based on ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998); 
· Provide evidence that the SecSDM is practical. 
 
1.6 Research Philosophy 
The understanding of the research philosophy of a research project is essential, since it 
provides the reader with a certain viewpoint of how the project should be interpreted. 
This ensures that the reader is aware of what to expect when examining the project, 
especially with regards to its limitations and scope of the project. For example, research 
philosophy in the computer sciences tends to be very positivistic-oriented but the study 
of information systems tends to lean more towards the social sciences where people are 
involved, and is therefore normally more phenomenological-oriented. The development 
of an information system is thus viewed as a social activity. 
 
This research project mainly involves information systems, and therefore, may engage 
people in one or another way. Therefore, it forms part of a social phenomenon. This 
implies that the emphasis is more on the meaning of what is being researched, rather 
than on its actual measurement. Therefore, this research project is more qualitative- 
oriented, which results in a phenomenological, or interpretive-oriented research 
philosophy. 
 
1.7 Research Methodology 
The research methods used in this research project are literature studies, modelling,  
arguing and questionnaires. The results of this study support the argument that the 
SecSDM will provide a solution for integrating security into the SDLC.  
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This research project began with a literature study. Its purpose was to determine the 
extent of the problem, as stated in Section 1.4. This was followed by further literature 
study that focussed on the various standards and best practices that could support the 
development of a secure software development model. It was important to develop an 
understanding of the existing software development methodologies whilst developing 
the SecSDM. 
 
The main sources of information included digital libraries for example, 
Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery and Emerald, 
proceedings from various international conferences, and other relevant publications. A 
number of international standards for example, ISO/IEC 17799, ISO/IEC TR 13335 and 
ISO 7498-2, and best practices, provided primary information in support of the 
SecSDM. Secondary sources of information included textbooks written by experts in 
the relevant fields of interest for example, Information Security, Risk Analysis, 
Software Quality, Systems Analysis and Design. 
 
The various standards and best practices studied were used to argue towards an 
improved software development model for integrating security into the SDLC. It is 
always necessary, for any new model, to determine whether it does actually facilitate 
the achievement of the primary goal for which it was established. In this case, the 
development of more secure software applications. A questionnaire was created that 
addressed each phase of the development life cycle, to establish the effectiveness of  the 
SecSDM. Results were gathered from both 2005 and 2006 third year IT project 
students. These results were analysed and reported in Chapter 7. 
 
1.8 List of Chapters  
Table 1.1 describes the list of chapters developed for the successful completion of this 
research topic, while Figure 1.1 provides a graphical view of how these chapters relate 
to one another. 
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Chapter Title  Brief Description 
Chapter 1  
 
Introduction Introduces the research topic , highlighting the problem area 
together with the research objectives, philosophy and 
methodology used. 
Chapter 2  
 
Secure Information 
Systems 
Discusses the importance of information security and its 
relevance to systems development, software qua lity and 
Trustworthy Computing. 
Chapter 3  
 
Standards and Best 
Practices Relating to 
Information Security 
and Software 
Development 
Addresses the various standards  and best practices for 
example, ISO/IEC 17799, ISO/IEC TR 13335, ISO 7498-2 
and NIST SP 800-14 (1996) that provide primary 
information in support of the SecSDM. 
Chapter 4  
 
The Software 
Development Life 
Cycle 
Briefly discusses the most common software development 
methodologies. The focus is on understanding their 
similarities and differences and their strengths and 
weaknesses as far as security is concerned.  
Chapter 5  
 
Risk Analysis Addresses risk analysis as the first and most critical stage 
of the SDLC. ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998) forms the basis 
of this discussion.  
Chapter 6  
 
The Secure 
Software 
Development Model  
Describes the Secure Software Development Model 
(SecSDM).  It is a ten-step process for integrating security 
into the five phases of the SDLC. Each of these steps is 
described in detail. 
Chapter 7 
 
Secure Software 
Development in 
Practice 
Reports on the results gathered from 2005 and 2006 third 
year Information Technology (IT) project students at a 
tertiary institution. 
Chapter 8  
 
Conclusion Provides a summative conclusion and describes how the 
research objectives, as stated in Section 1.5, have been 
addressed. It suggests further research with respect to this 
particular research topic. 
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1.9 Conclusion 
Meaningful security is easier to achieve when security issues are considered as part of 
the routine development process and security safeguards are integrated into the 
application during its design. Security safeguards that are integral to a system are 
usually easier to use and less visible to the user. It is generally more expensive to 
retrofit security than to integrate it into a software application. 
 
It is evident that information security is becoming a focal point for designing, 
developing and deploying software applications.  However, security features alone do 
not necessarily increase the quality of the software, because they still need to be 
properly implemented.  The education of software developers is therefore crucial to 
creating secure software products.  
 
The primary focus of this research project is the development of the SecSDM  that aims 
to ensure the secure development of software applications, whilst instilling security 
awareness and discipline at each stage of the SDLC. 
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Chapter 2 
Secure Information Systems 
 
2.1  Introduction 
An Information System (IS) is broadly defined as the entire set of software, hardware, 
data, people and procedures necessary to use information as a resource within an 
organisation. Each of these components have their own security requirements. Software, 
however, is in all likelihood the most difficult component to secure. There are daily 
reports warning weaknesses or other fundamental flaws in software. Hardware, on the 
other hand, is a physical asset that is typically protected from harm or theft by physical 
security, such as locks and keys. Since access to data is usually the main objective of 
intentional attacks, it is important that data which is stored, processed and transmitted is 
protected. An information system is only as strong or trustworthy as its weakest link 
which is all too frequently human. It is not surprising that people are often considered a 
major threat to information security, although not always intentionally. Education and 
training, awareness and technology need to be properly employed to reduce such risks, 
and to prevent accidental or intentional damage or the loss of information. Procedures 
are information in their own right, therefore, proper education on their protection is 
necessary. 
 
The main focus of this research is on the software component of an IS, rather than the 
system in its entirety. The aim of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of the 
context within which the research has been conducted. It provides background 
information relating to the various aspects of securing information systems, specifically 
from a software development point of view.  
 
2.2  The Importance of Software 
Software no longer simply supports back offices and home entertainment. It is the 
lifeblood of most businesses today and has become intertwined within the fabric of 
everyday life. Businesses and organisations, regardless of their size, increasingly need 
information systems to respond to the problems and opportunities of the current global 
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business environment. There is increasing reliance on computerised activities, which if 
they fail or are poorly used, can have harmful consequences.  
 
Examples of the harmful consequences can be found in both mission-critical and safety-
critical systems of organisations. Mission-critical systems are essential to the viability 
of an organisation. The organisation cannot function should the computer system fail. A 
safety-critical system is one on which human lives depend, such as an air-traffic control 
system. Should these systems fail, it will put human lives at stake. For these reasons, the 
software applications underlying these systems need to be secure. 
 
Another important issue to consider is the Internet. The Internet clearly continues to 
fundamentally and radically change the role that software plays in the business world. It 
has emerged as an unparalleled public medium for communication and commerce – and 
it is changing the  world. The growing role of electronic commerce is even changing the 
means of shopping. People are increasingly using the Internet to view and order goods 
and services online. In addition, growing numbers of people use the Internet to 
telecommute to work. Telecommuting means that employees work at home and stay in 
touch by means of computer-based communications. Internet users are increasingly 
opening bank accounts and trading stocks online. Online banking means that customers 
can use a Web browser to access their accounts, balance cheque books, transfer funds 
and pay accounts online. Online stock trading sites enable investors to buy and sell 
stocks online, without the aid of a broker. All of these online activities increase the 
number of potential threats to their users. 
 
The explosive rise of wireless computing has,  in addition to the Internet, created a need 
to protect information systems and corporate networks with refined security solutions. 
Mobile commerce may not be very different from the existing Internet. Users simply 
use cellular phones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), notebooks or touch pads to 
connect wirelessly to the Internet. A benefit of wireless connections is that they create 
new opportunities for online users but simultaneously increase the potential risk. If 
people are connected everywhere, a vast amount of information becomes available at 
any time.  
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Research has shown that many people are reluctant to entrust the current information 
systems with their personal details, because they are increasingly concerned about the ir 
security and reliability. The ability to design systems that can be used safely and 
effectively, may be increased by carefully considering the security aspects of 
information systems. Amid the social and ethical issues raised by the rapid spread of 
ubiquitous, highly-networked computers, threats to privacy and anonymity are amongst 
the most contentious. The Trusted Computing approach, for business users, reduces one 
of the largest barriers to electronic business, namely the fear that everything from 
identities to intellectual property to confidential corporate data could be stolen.  
 
The purpose of software engineering is to find ways of building quality software which 
ensures a high level of trust. The following section addresses the important issues 
relating to software quality and Trustworthy Computing.  
 
2.3  Software Quality and Trustworthy Computing 
Software quality is often viewed as a luxury – something that can be sacrificed, if 
necessary, for added functionality, faster development or lower costs. Successful 
software development organisations have found that, in practice, an organisational 
commitment to quality increases development, reduces costs, and allows new features to 
be added with greater ease. An organisation that develops poor quality software is 
essentially always looking backward, spending time and money fixing defects in 
“completed” software. On the other hand, organisations that build quality from the 
beginning are forward- looking, able to innovate, and pursue new opportunities (Bessin, 
2004). 
 
Quality software is fit for use. According to Bessin (2004), quality is a well-defined 
process for creating a useful product that adds value for both the user and the software 
developer. A high-quality process means the business does not lose time reworking, 
refactoring and rewriting. Quality must be defined in terms of the target audience, i.e. 
the software users, to create a useful product. Software quality must focus on more than 
simply eliminating software bugs. This implies that a quality application is not one that 
provides the correct results without failing. Software quality is complex because it 
includes the tangible and intangible aggregate of functionality, usability, reliability, 
Chapter 2 - Secure Information Systems 
16 
performance, scalability, supportability, security and any other factors important to the 
customer and business. Software quality improvement, like software development, is an 
iterative process which adds to the complexity. 
 
Bessin (2004) argues that  continuously ensuring software quality will consistently cost 
less than ignoring quality considerations. In effect, he further suggests that raising 
product quality costs next to nothing when done correctly. 
 
It is important to understand the attributes and characteristics that contribute to software 
quality, to improve its quality. Wang and Wang (2003) refer specifically to the factor 
model of McCall, which classifies all the software requirements into 11 software quality 
factors. These factors are grouped into three categories as follows: 
· Product operation factors which include correctness, reliability, efficiency, 
integrity and usability; 
· Product revision factors which include maintainability, flexibility and testability; 
· Product transition factors which include portability, reusability and 
interoperability. 
 
According to Wang and Wang (2003), aspects of software quality in product revision 
and transition, such as portability and flexibility are crucial to the study of overall 
software quality, however security threats and risks specifically target the product 
operation capabilities, i.e. correctness, reliability, efficiency, integrity and usability. 
These factors can be defined as follows: 
· Correctness is the extent to which a program satisfies its specification and fulfils 
the functional objectives of the customer so that the system is behaving correctly 
given the prescribed situation; 
· Reliability is the extent to which a program can be expected to perform its 
intended function with required precision and is available at the expected time 
periods; 
· Efficiency is the amount of computing resources and interactions required by a 
program to perform its function; 
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· Integrity is the extent to which access to software or data by unauthorised 
persons is controlled and that the software or data is verifiable throughout its 
lifetime; 
· Usability is the time and resources required to learn, operate, prepare input, and  
interpret output of a program. 
 
The user of a system is never able to obtain perfect knowledge of the system in use, nor 
of the external or internal threats, and is therefore unable to exactly determine its 
security. By gathering as much knowledge as possible about the system, the user will 
form an idea or belief about the security, i.e. the user will gain a certain trust in the 
system. Security can be understood as an idealistic goal for the system designers and 
developers, whereas trust represents the actual, imperfect knowledge of the user, about 
how successful the designers have been in reaching their idealistic goal. The question 
posed is, what are the methods that establish trust in information systems? These 
methods should be dynamic and take into consideration new evidence such as security 
incidents and new threats (Josang, van Laenen, Knapskog & Vandewalle, 1997).  
 
There was a response to this question from Microsoft in January 2002, when Bill Gates 
sent his Trustworthy Computing memo to all Microsoft employees. The memo outlined 
the need to deliver more secure and robust applications to users because of the increased 
threat to computer systems (Howard and LeBlanc, 2003).  
 
Mundie et al (2002) refer to the following goals that any Trustworthy Computing 
approach has to meet: 
· Security – the user can expect that systems are resilient to attack, and that the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system and its data are protected; 
· Privacy – the user is able to control data about themselves, and those using such 
data adhere to fair information principles; 
· Reliability – the user can depend on the product to fulfil its functions when 
required to do so; 
· Business integrity – the developer of a product behaves in a responsive and 
responsible manner. 
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The Microsoft development teams have been helped to meet their short and long-term 
security goals through their Secure Windows Initiative (SWI) team adopting a simple 
set of strategies called SD3 – secure by design, secure by default and secure in 
deployment. This means that steps have been taken to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of data and systems at every phase of the software 
development process – from design to delivery and maintenance. 
 
Similarly, IBM and IBM Rational have developed a comprehensive software 
development and deployment solution that helps teams innovate and deliver higher 
quality results by simplifying, automating and integrating the software development and 
deployment process. This process, referred to as Rational Unified Process (RUP), is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Information security is a subset of software 
quality as will be discussed in the following section.  
 
2.4  Information Security  
The protection of information is a topic that has existed since the earliest of times. It is 
not surprising that, some of the strongest developments in information security have 
come from the military. The traditional purpose of information security is to prevent 
breaches of confidentiality, integrity and availability by implementing threat 
countermeasures expressed as technical aspects of the  information system. The purpose 
of the countermeasures is to generate trust which is a human and social phenomenon. 
This trust allows users to use a system in ways which they otherwise would  avoid, so 
that in practice it becomes more valuable and a more powerful tool (Josang et al, 1997).  
 
The task of information security professionals is to protect the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of information and information systems, whether in the state of 
transmission, storage or processing. According to Whitman and Mattord (2003), 
information security can be defined as the protection of information and the systems and 
hardware that use, store and transmit that information. Certain tools are necessary such 
as policy, awareness, technology, education and training to protect the information and 
its related systems. 
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The value of information arises from the characteristics it possesses. Should any one of 
these characteristics be compromised, the value of the information is equally 
compromised. For example, the timeliness of information is a critical factor to users 
since information often loses its value if delivered late. The critical characteristics, as 
defined by Whitman and Mattord (2003), are as follows: 
· Availability: the availability of information enables authorised users who need 
access to information to do so without interference or obstruction, and to receive 
it in the correct format; 
· Accuracy: information is accurate when it is free from mistakes or errors and it 
has the value that the end user expects; 
· Authenticity: information is authentic when it is the information that was 
originally created, placed, stored or transferred; 
· Confidentiality: confidentiality of information is ensuring that only those with 
the rights and privileges to access a particular set of information are able to do 
so. This is especially important when involving personal information about 
employees, customers or patients; 
· Integrity: the integrity of information is the quality or state of being whole, 
complete and uncorrupted; 
· Utility: information has utility when it serves a particular purpose; 
· Possession: information is said to be in possession if one obtains it, independent 
of format or other characteristic. 
 
The transaction and accounting data that is used by the information systems of an 
organisation, is used to illustrate these characteristics. An example of confidentiality, is 
that hackers should be prevented access to the credit card data of the customer. 
Integrity, on the other hand,  is related to employees having the ability to modify their 
payroll records to change their pay rates. The availability of information is equally 
important, as this relates to one being denied access to the information assets needed to 
make business decisions, for example, the latest inventory levels required to decide on 
reorder purchases.  
 
The privacy and confidentiality of information is an increasingly important and 
controversial issue in this technology-driven society. Several serious privacy violations 
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have been reported by government agencies. For example, some law enforcement 
officers used the national computer systems to run background checks for private 
agencies. Wireless applications offer even more potential invasions of privacy. Many 
proposed mobile commerce methods use the location of the consumer to offer 
information and advertisements (Post and Anderson, 2003). 
 
The Internet and electronic commerce add further complications to protecting the  
information assets of a company. An online company may need to give their customers 
access to important company information to provide the best electronic commerce site. 
For example, customers may like to know if an item is in stock before placing an order. 
This will entail connecting the customer to the inventory system of the company.  
Anytime a connection from the Internet to company data is opened, the interaction 
needs to be carefully controlled. This trade-off between user access and information 
security is an ongoing problem which often arises because the security tools used are 
not sophisticated enough (Post and Anderson, 2003). 
 
A further difficulty with providing information security lies in identifying the user. In a 
manual security system, a guard can be used to physically identify each person by 
asking to see identification. The most common method of identifying users to 
information systems is with a password. Passwords, however, are not the perfect 
solution to identifying users. No matter how well they are chosen, or how often they are 
changed, there is always a chance that someone could guess the password. In fact, 
passwords are deemed so risky that top-secret information of the American government 
is stored on computers that cannot be connected to phone lines or the Internet. There is a 
smaller chance that the information could be compromised, by physically preventing 
outsiders from accessing the computers. This approach to information security, 
however, is not feasible for most business applications, because it would render these 
systems unusable. 
 
Denial of service attacks have gained importance in the last few years, especially since 
the essence of an electronic commerce site is the ability to reach customers 24 hours a 
day. The flooding of the site with meaningless traffic means  no one can use the service 
and the company may go out of business.  
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It is important to realise that attackers are highly skilled and very clever. They have the 
time and energy to probe and analyse software applications for security vulnerabilities. 
The consequences of compromised systems are many and varied, including loss of 
production, loss of customer faith and loss of money. Information security should be 
considered a balance between protection and availability. The level of security must 
allow reasonable access but protect against potential threats,  to achieve such balance 
(Whitman and Mattord, 2003). 
 
The immediate need for organisations to protect critical information assets continues to 
increase. These organisations will rely on the next generation of professionals to possess 
the correct mix of skills and experiences to develop more secure computing 
environments. There is a need to prepare software developers to recognise the potential 
threats and vulnerabilities in existing systems and to learn to design and develop secure 
systems needed presently and into the future. 
 
Microsoft has discovered that convincing designers, developers and testers of the 
importance of security is reasonably easy, since most people care about the quality of 
their product. These professionals,  although specialists in their own right, require a 
broad range of security knowledge. For example, in addition to understanding 
cryptography, they need to understand vulnerabilities, prevention, accountability, 
authentication, authorisation and real world security requirements that affect users. 
Many people have the ability to recognise and complain about bad security and 
subsequently offer remedies that secure the system in a manner which renders it  
unusable. There is a fine line between secure systems and usable secure systems that are 
useful for the intended audience (Howard and LeBlanc, 2003). 
 
Information security,  as expected by the author,  is becoming a focal point for 
designing, developing and deploying software applications.  However, it is important to 
determine the security needs and requirements of the specific application domain. 
Security features alone do not necessarily increase the quality of the software, because 
they need to be properly implemented.  Education is crucial in creating secure software 
products. The questions posed are, what is secure software development and how could 
security awareness and discipline be instilled at each stage of the SDLC? 
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2.5  Secure Software Development 
Currently, the Internet has brought millions of unsecured computer networks into 
communication with each other. No longer are computers islands of functionality with 
little, if any, interconnectivity. In the past, most people did not care about information 
security, as long as an application performed its task successfully. However, times have 
changed. In the current Internet era, virtually all computers are interconnected. These 
computers include servers, desktop personal computers, cellular phones and other 
mobile devices. The problem is that these interconnected computers can be attacked at 
any point. The ability to secure the stored information of each computer is now 
influenced by the security on every other computer to which it is connected.  
 
The smooth operation of communication and computing systems becomes vital as 
global networks expand the world. However, recurring events such as virus and worm 
attacks and the success of criminal attackers clearly illustrate the weaknesses in current 
information technologies and the need for heightened security of these systems.  
 
It is important to consider some of the reasons why people choose not to build secure 
systems, to understand the need for secure software development. Some of the reasons, 
according to Howard and LeBlanc (2003),  include the following: 
· Security is boring; 
· Security is often seen as a functionality disabler; 
· Security is difficult to measure; 
· Security is usually not the primary skill or interest of the designers and 
developers creating the product; 
· Security means not doing something exciting and new. 
 
These reasons illustrate why security is considered as something that “gets in the way” 
and costs money, while offering little or no financial return. However, there are many 
arguments that show that secure applications are good for business. First and foremost, 
secure products are quality products. It can be argued that a product designed and 
developed by security-aware professionals is likely to exhibit fewer security defects 
than one developed by more undisciplined professionals. However, the need for security 
and its strength are context-driven. This means that different situations call for different 
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solutions. The key when developing secure software products, is to design and build 
them so that they are sufficiently secure for the environment in which they will operate 
(Howard and LeBlanc, 2003).  
 
However, there are many reasons for building secure software whether viewed from an 
organisational, a software developer or an end-user perspective. The failure to design 
and build secure software,  from the perspective of the software developer,  leads to 
more work in the long run and a bad reputation. This, in turn, can lead to the loss of 
sales for an organisation as customers switch to a competing product perceived to have 
better security support. Users, on the other hand, demand applications to work as 
expected. They do not want their systems to be infected by viruses, their credit card 
information posted on the Internet or their medical data stolen. Software applications 
are expected to securely manipulate, transmit and store confidential user and corporate 
information. Users demand secure applications and they see such systems as a right and  
not a privilege. Although most users require secure environments, security should be 
hidden so that it does not “get in the way”. 
 
An important part of delivering secure systems is raising awareness through security 
education. This implies educating the end users, the software designers, developers and 
all the stakeholders involved in the software development process. According to 
Howard and LeBlanc (2003), many software developers understand how to build 
security features into software, but many have never been taught how to build secure 
systems. A reason for this may be that it is far easier to teach people about security 
features than to train them to think with a security mindset. A simple understanding of 
how features work will not help build a secure system. It is necessary to know how to 
alleviate security threats when building secure systems . This is achieved by identifying 
such threats and the ir associated risks before being able to alleviate them. 
 
Education is critical to delivering secure systems. Software developers cannot be 
expected to understand how to design, build, test, document and deploy secure systems. 
They may know how various security features work, however, that is not enough to 
ensure a secure system. The teaching of these professionals needs examination. They 
clearly need more education about secure requirements analysis, secure design and 
secure coding to build secure software. Additionally, Howard and LeBlanc (2003) 
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suggest that the ultimate, and most important goal of security education is to teach 
people not to introduce security flaws into the product in the first place.  Software 
developers need to be taught to design security into every aspect of their applications. 
This means that all product functional specifications should include a section outlining 
the security implications of each feature. 
 
It is important that software developers understand the processes involved in designing 
and building secure systems that can withstand attack. It is recognised that software will 
always have vulnerabilities, regardless of how much time was spent designing and 
building it. However, software developers should strive at reducing the overall number 
of vulnerabilities and making it substantially more difficult to find and exploit 
vulnerabilities. 
 
It is important to adopt a disciplined process that incorporates all aspects of software 
development to secure software applications. There exists a need to update and improve 
the software development process itself. Process improvements should be added at 
every step of the SDLC, regardless of the particular methodology chosen, to better focus 
on security issues. Innovations that will add more accountability and structure in terms 
of securing the software development process are required.  
 
2.6  Conclusion 
It is within highly integrated information technology environments that information 
security is becoming a focal point for designing, developing and deploying software 
applications. The ensuring of a high level of trust in the security and quality of software 
systems is crucial to their success. Although software programs are the vessels that 
carry the lifeblood of information through an organisation, they are often created under 
the demanding constraints of project management. This means that security is usually 
applied as an afterthought, rather than being integrated from the very beginning. 
Organisations can no longer afford to consider security issues after the application has 
been constructed.  
 
Information security can be regarded as a trust enabler. Securing information is about 
identifying, measuring and managing the various risks that threaten the confidentiality, 
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integrity and availability of information assets. Integration of security into software 
development is necessary to build secure systems. Confidentiality ensures that there is 
no deliberate or accidental disclosure of sensitive information. Integrity protects against 
the deliberate or accidental corruption of information. Availability protects against 
deliberate or accidental actions that cause information resources to be unavailable to 
users when needed. 
 
Information systems literature fails to present a comprehensive methodology  for 
integrating security into systems development. Security of information is of particular 
importance and must be considered throughout the software development lifecycle. The 
entire project team must commit to improving quality throughout the software 
development process, including post-deployment, and that commitment must be driven 
from the top by business leadership. 
 
The business benefits of including quality-oriented activities in all phases of the 
software development cycle are both broad and deep. These measures facilitate 
innovation and lower costs by increasing predictability, reducing risk and eliminating 
rework and they will differentiate a business from its competitors. 
 
Secure systems contribute to quality systems. Code designed and built with security as a 
prime feature is more robust than code written with security as an afterthought. It is not 
possible to have quality without security (Howard and LeBlanc,  2003). 
 
The following chapter addresses some standards and best practices relating to 
information security and software development. These standards and best practices form 
the basis of the Secure Software Development Model (SecSDM), as described in 
Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 3 
Standards and Best Practices Relating to Information 
Security and Software Development 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed the importance of secure information systems with a 
particular focus on information security, secure software development, software quality 
and Trustworthy Computing. This chapter discusses a number of internationally 
recognised standards and best practices that need to be considered when examining 
secure software development. 
 
Standards consist of a specific set of rules, procedures or conventions that are agreed 
upon between parties to perform business operations more uniformly and effectively 
(Killmeyer, 2006). Standards can be viewed as a set of predetermined guidelines in 
which the issues, considerations and effects of doing something have already been 
analysed by someone authorised, experienced and qualified in the specified area. This 
implies that standards reflect industry best practices. This implies that security and 
software development standards reflect industry best practices. When standards are not 
taken into consideration, they have a definite impact on both the cost and the amount of 
risk an organisation is exposed to. 
 
A number of best-practice frameworks exist to help organisations assess their security 
risks, implement appropriate security controls and, comply with governance 
requirements, and privacy and information security regulations. It must be noted, 
however, that best practices are a moving target. For example, something that worked 
well two years ago may be completely worthless against current  threats. Information 
security has to keep abreast of these new threats, together with the methods, techniques, 
policies, guidelines, educational and training approaches and technologies used to 
combat them. Similarly, the software development community should consider 
standards and best practices as the basis for software planning, design and deployment.  
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Standards are normally prescriptive, contain requirements for conformance and 
generally employ the verb “shall”.  Best practices, on the other hand, present 
recommended approaches and usually employ the verb “should”. Guidelines often 
suggest several alternative approaches to good engineering practice and traditionally 
employ the verb “may” (Schultz, 2000). 
 
The following sections discuss various information security and software development 
standards and best practices, and introduce many of the organisations and institutions  
responsible for the setting of such standards. This chapter concludes by proposing a set 
of criteria for secure software development, based on the specific standards and best 
practices studied. 
 
3.2 Key Role-Players 
Standards committees have a vital role to play in protecting telecommunications and 
information technology systems, firstly, by maintaining an awareness of security issues; 
secondly, by ensuring that security considerations are a fundamental part of system 
specifications; and thirdly, by providing guidance to assist implementers and users in 
the task of making information systems and services sufficiently robust (Bertine, 
Chadwick, Euchner & Harrop, 2004). 
 
Many organisations are the sources of software development and information security 
standards. The Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), the National 
Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), the International Standards 
Organisation (ISO), the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the American 
Department of Defense (DoD), the British Standards Institute (BSI), the Common 
Request Object Broker Architecture (CORBA) and the Object Management Group 
(OMG) are all sources of these standards.  
 
The IEEE regularly publishes software development standards. ISO standards cover 
design and description  in the ISO 6593; documentation in the ISO 9127; and software 
quality management in the ISO 9000 series. ISO/IEC JTC1 SC7 has released 
international standards for software quality and software engineering. ANSI works 
closely with the IEEE in developing industrial software development standards. The 
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DoD publishes military standards for software, however, the BSI serves as a rich source 
of standards concerning every aspect of software development. 
 
The main international standards bodies relevant to information security are the ISO, the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). Their main function is the production of base 
standards. In addition,  governments around the world are reacting with legislation and 
regulations that seek to establish requirements for information security. For example, 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the EU Data Protection 
Directive outline specific security and privacy requirements that share common themes. 
The GLBA was signed into law in 1999. Its primary purpose is to provide for the 
privacy of customer information by financial services organisations. It requires financial 
institutions to (Peltier, 2005): 
· Ensure the security and confidentiality of customer records and information; 
· Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of 
such records; 
· Protect against unauthorised access. 
 
Similarly, the HIPAA, passed in 1996 by President Clinton, includes strict rules for the 
privacy and security of health information, giving individuals more control over how 
their information is used. It impacts virtually every aspect of health care in America. 
The privacy and security rules within HIPAA govern the use, disclosure and handling of 
any identifiable patient information (Peltier, 2005).  
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, on the other hand, deals with effective internal 
controls within public corporations. It is not prescriptive with respect to security, but  
does outline that both general controls and application- level security controls are 
required.  
 
Companies and organisations in America have devoted significant time and resources to 
achieve compliance with many facets of legislation, such as HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley 
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and GLBA. These are not legislation in other countries but many organisations have 
taken note of these acts in establishing their own standards and best practices. 
 
Jones and Rastogi (2004) argue, however, that the information security-related actions 
of government, private and public organisations do not directly address the critical 
problem that is at the root of most security and privacy breaches. This is the failure of 
software developers to take a security view of their products from inception through 
deployment and beyond. 
 
The following section introduces the main standards, best practices and guidelines that 
were used to establish a set of criteria for secure software development. 
 
3.3 Standards and Best Practices 
Some best practices that facilitate the implementation of security controls include 
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT), ISO/IEC 17799, 
ISO/IEC TR 13335, Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) and 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE).  
 
It is the opinion of the author that the focus on the ISO/IEC 17799 (2005) standard and 
the ISO/IEC 13335 technical reports is warranted because they provide the most 
comprehensive approaches and guidelines to information security management. The 
other best practices focus more on IT governance, in general, or on the technical aspects 
of information security. 
 
3.3.1 ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
One of the most widely referenced and discussed security models is the “Information 
Technology – Code of Practice for Information Security Management”, which was 
originally published as the British Standard BS 7799. In 2000, this Code of Practice was 
adopted as an international standard framework for information security by the ISO and 
IEC committees as ISO/IEC 17799 (Whitman and Mattord, 2003). It provides best 
practice recommendations on information security management for use by those who 
are responsible for initiating, implementing or maintaining information security 
management systems. It was last updated in 2005. 
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The 2005 version addresses the security of information in its broadest sense, providing 
best business practice, guidelines and general principles for implementing, maintaining 
and managing information security in any organisation, producing and using 
information in any form. The ISO/IEC 17799 (2005) standard recognises that the level 
of security that can be achieved purely through technical means is very limited. The 
required level of security – established through assessing the levels of risk and 
associated costs from breaches of security, measured against the costs of implementing 
security – should always be driven by appropriate management controls and procedures. 
Information security management requires, at a minimum, participation by all 
employees within an organisation. It can also require participation by other 
stakeholders, for example shareholders, suppliers, third parties and customers. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
It was found,  in considering the ISO/IEC 17799 (2005) standard, that it specifically 
addresses issues relating to systems development and maintenance. This occurs in 
Section 12 as follows: 
· Section 12.1 (Security Requirements of Information Systems) aims to ensure 
that security is built into information systems and states that “Security 
requirements should be identified and agreed prior to the development and/or 
implementation of information systems”; 
· Section 12.2 (Correct Processing in Applications) aims to prevent errors, loss, 
unauthorised modification or misuse of information in applications and states 
that “Appropriate controls should be designed into applications. Additional 
controls may be required for systems that process, or have an impact on 
sensitive, valuable or critical information. Such controls should be determined 
on the basis of security requirements and risk assessment”; 
· Section 12.3 (Cryptographic Controls) aims to protect the confidentiality, 
authenticity and integrity of information by cryptographic means and states that 
“A policy should be developed on the use of cryptographic controls”; 
· Section 12.4 (Security of System Files) aims to ensure the security of system 
files and states that “Access to system files and program source code should be 
controlled, and IT projects and support activities conducted in a secure manner. 
Care should be taken to avoid exposure of sensitive data in test environments”; 
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· Section 12.5 (Secur ity in Development and Support Processes) aims to maintain 
the security of application system software and information and states that 
“Managers responsible for application systems should also be responsible for 
the security of the project or support environment. They should ensure that all 
proposed system changes are reviewed to check that they do not compromise the 
security of either the system or the operating environment”; 
· Section 12.6 (Technical Vulnerability Management) aims to reduce risks 
resulting from exploitation of published technical vulnerabilities and states that 
“Technical vulnerability management should be implemented in an effective, 
systematic, and repeatable way with measurements taken to confirm its 
effectiveness. These considerations should include operating systems and other 
applications in use”. 
The implementation of the  ISO/IEC 17799 (2005) standard involves putting in place a 
cost-effective execution plan that includes appropriate security controls for mitigating 
identified risks and protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
information assets of an organisation. 
 
The ISO/IEC 27001 standard was published in November 2005 and complements the 
ISO/IEC 17799 (2005) code of practice for information security management. It defines 
an Information Security Management System. The objective of the standard is stated as 
“to ensure the selection of adequate and proportionate security controls that protect 
information assets and give confidence to interested parties including an organisation’s 
customers”. The standard itself has been harmonised to align with other management 
systems standards, such as ISO 9000. It is this standard, rather than ISO/IEC 17799 
(2005), against which certification is achieved.  
 
3.3.2 ISO/IEC TR 13335 guideline  
A further guideline to be considered is ISO/IEC TR 13335. This technical report, 
entitled “Information Technology – Guidelines for the Management of IT Security” 
(GMITS), provides further guidelines for the management of IT security. It consists of 
five parts, namely: 
· Part 1: Concepts and Models - introduces a series of concepts and models for IT 
security; 
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· Part 2: Managing and Planning IT security – presents the issues that an 
organisation must tackle before establishing or altering its IT security program; 
· Part 3: Techniques for the Management of IT security – pays particular 
attention to the complex topic of IT security risk assessment; 
· Part 4: Selection of Safeguards – provides pointers to readily available 
safeguard catalogues; 
· Part 5: Safeguards for External Connections – looks at the problem of crossing 
the “trust boundary”. 
 
An important part of the IT security management process is the assessment of risks and 
how they can be reduced to an acceptable level. It is necessary to take into account the 
specific needs and risks of each information system and to align these with the business 
objectives, organisational and environmental aspects. It is important to perform a risk 
analysis, to determine the security requirements of a particular system. For the purposes 
of this proposed risk analysis approach, it is assumed that the application being 
developed is at high risk. It is necessary to follow the guidelines of the detailed risk 
analysis approach, as determined by ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998), are followed. Figure 
3.1 clearly highlights the various elements that need to be considered when performing 
a detailed risk analysis. It requires the careful consideration of assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities which will ultimately facilitate the selection of effective safeguards 
appropriate to the assessed risks. 
 
A detailed risk analysis involves the identification and valuation of assets, the 
assessment of threats to those assets, and an assessment of the associated vulnerabilities. 
The results from these activities are used to assess the risks and consequently identify 
justified security safeguards. By implementing this approach it is more likely that 
appropriate safeguards will be identified. Additionally, the results of the detailed 
analysis can be used in the management of system changes. The disadvantage, however, 
is that it normally requires a considerable amount of time, effort and expertise to obtain 
such detailed results. It is important that a simplified approach is used, but not to the 
detriment of the results achieved, to educate software developers in risk analysis. A 
good approach may be to find a balance between minimising the time and effort spent in 
identifying the safeguards, while still ensuring that the high risk assets are appropriately 
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protected. The incorporation of an initial quick and simple approach is likely to gain 
greater acceptance and therefore be more widely used. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Detailed Risk Analysis (ISO/IEC TR 13335-3,1998) 
 
Many of the guidelines provided by GMITS are used in the proposed risk analysis 
approach and may also assist in educating software developers. This approach is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.  
 
3.3.3 NIST security models  
A number of security models are described in the many documents available from the 
Computer Security Resource Centre (CSRC) of the NIST institute. The NIST special 
publication SP 800-14 (1996), entitled Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for 
Securing Information Technology Systems is of specific interest. This publication 
provides principles that a security team should integrate into the entire information 
security process, in addition to providing best practices and security principles.  
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Principles for Securing Information Technology Systems 
NIST SP 800-14 Generally Accepted Principles and Practices 
for Securing Information Technology Systems  
Principle 1 Establish a sound security policy as the foundation for design. 
Principle 2 Treat security as in integral part of the overall system design. 
Principle 3 Clearly delineate the physical and logical security boundaries governed by 
associated security policies. 
Principle 4 Reduce risk to an acceptable level. 
Principle 5 Assume that external systems are insecure. 
Principle 6 Identify potential trade-offs between reducing risk and increased costs and 
decrease in other aspects of operational effectiveness. 
Principle 7 Implement layered security (ensure no single point of vulnerability). 
Principle 8 Implement tailored system security measures to meet organisational security 
goals. 
Principle 9 Strive for simplicity. 
Principle 10 Design and operate an IT system to limit vulnerability and to be resilient in 
response. 
Principle 11 Minimise the system elements to be trusted. 
Principle 12 Implement security through a combination of measures distributed both 
physically and logically. 
Principle 13 Provide assurance that the system is, and continues to be, resilient in the face of 
expected threats. 
Principle 14 Limit or contain vulnerabilities. 
Principle 15 Formulate security measures to address multiple overlapping information 
domains. 
Principle 16 Isolate public access systems from mission critical resources (e.g. data, 
processes, etc.). 
Principle 17 Use boundary mechanisms to separate computing systems and network 
infrastructures. 
Principle 18 Where possible, base security on open standards for portability and 
interoperability. 
Principle 19 Use common language in developing security requirements. 
Principle 20 Design and implement audit mechanisms to detect unauthorised use and to 
support incident investigations. 
Principle 21 Design security to allow for regular adoption of new technology, including a 
secure and logical technology upgrade process. 
Principle 22 Authenticate users and processes to ensure appropriate access control decisions 
both within and across domains. 
Principle 23 Use unique identities to ensure accountability. 
Principle 24 Implement least privilege. 
Principle 25 Do not implement unnecessary security mechanisms. 
Principle 26 Protect information while being processed, in transit and in storage. 
Principle 27 Strive for operational ease of use. 
Principle 28 Develop and exercise contingency or disaster recovery procedures to ensure 
appropriate availability. 
Principle 29 Consider custom products to achieve adequate security. 
Principle 30 Ensure proper security in the shutdown or disposal of a system. 
Principle 31 Protect against all likely classes of “attacks”. 
Principle 32 Identify and prevent common errors and vulnerabilities. 
Principle 33 Ensure that developers are trained in how to develop secure software. 
Table 3.1: Principles of NIST SP 800-14 (NIST, 1996) 
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This publication lists 33 principles as indicated in Table 3.1, however, the following 
principles are of particular importance in developing a model for secure software 
development: 
· Principle 2: Treat security as an integral part of the overall system design; 
· Principle 4: Reduce risk to an acceptable level; 
· Principle 7: Implement layered security (i.e. ensure no single point of 
vulnerability); 
· Principle 14: Limit or contain vulnerabilities; 
· Principle 19: Use common language in developing security requirements; 
· Principle 25: Do not implement unnecessary security mechanisms ; 
· Principle 32: Identify and prevent common errors and vulnerabilities; 
· Principle 33: Ensure that developers are trained in how to develop secure 
software. 
 
The following sub-section discusses the interconnection standards that are 
particularly important in the current networked environment  and must therefore be 
considered when examining secure software development.  
 
3.3.4 Open systems security (interconnection standards) 
Security has become a concern to almost everyone with the rapid and widespread 
growth in the use of data communications, particularly the Internet. Most software 
applications developed today operate in a highly networked environment. The operation 
of the Internet and these networked environments rely primarily on interconnection 
standards. 
 
Open Systems Security Architecture (X.800) was developed during the eighties to 
address elements of security architecture. This was the first stage in the development of  
a suite of standards to support security services and mechanisms (Bertine et al, 2004). 
X.800 provides a general description of security services and the related mechanisms 
that can be used to provide these services. The X.800 standard was developed 
specifically as the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) security architecture but the 
underlying concepts of X.800 have been shown to have much broader applicability and 
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acceptance. This standard represents the first internationally agreed consensus on the 
definitions of the five basic security services, namely: 
· Authentication; 
· Access Control; 
· Data Confidentiality; 
· Data Integrity; 
· Non-Repudiation. 
The X.800 standard defines, in terms of the seven- layer OSI Basic Reference Model, the 
most appropriate location for implementing the security services. 
 
The ISO 7498-2 (1989) standard describes the Basic Reference Model for OSI. It 
presents a framework for coordinating the development of existing and future standards 
for the interconnection of systems. Additionally, the ISO 7498-2 (1989) standard 
provides the basis of information security in software systems through the five basic 
security services as determined by X.800, namely:  
· Identification and authentication: this is the ability to identify and uniquely 
authenticate all users of a system; 
· Authorisation/access control: this is the ability to allow or prohibit users from 
accessing the information assets of an organisation; 
· Confidentiality: this is the ability to ensure that information assets are only 
available to those who are authorised to access them; 
· Integrity: this is the ability to ensure that information is complete and 
uncorrupted and that it has not been altered in any way; 
· Non-repudiation/non-denial: this is the ability to ensure that users do not deny 
their actions. 
It is important to note the distinction between a security service and a security 
mechanism. A security service is a measure which can be put in place to address a threat 
(e.g. provision of confidentiality) and a security mechanism is the means to provide a 
service (e.g. encryption). 
 
The five security services referred to by the X.800 and ISO 7498-2 (1989) standards are 
supported by eight security mechanisms, namely: 
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· Encipherment mechanisms, commonly known as encryption or cipher 
algorithms. These mechanisms can help provide confidentiality of data and 
traffic flow information. They provide the basis for some authentication and key 
management techniques; 
· Digital signature mechanisms can be used to provide non-repudiation, origin 
authentication and data integrity services; 
· Access control mechanisms provide a means for using information associated 
with a client entity and a server entity to decide whether access to the resources 
of the server is granted to a client, for example, access control lists and security 
labels; 
· Data integrity mechanisms are used to provide data integrity and origin 
authentication services; 
· Authentication exchange mechanisms, also known as authentication protocols, 
can be used to provide entity authentication; 
· Traffic padding describes the addition of ‘pretend’ data to conceal the volumes 
of real data traffic. It can be used to help provide traffic flow confidentiality but 
is only effective if the added padding is enciphered; 
· Routing control mechanisms can be used to prevent sensitive data from using 
insecure communications paths. For example, depending on the properties of the 
data, routes can be chosen to use only physically secure network components. 
Data carrying certain security labels may be forbidden to enter certain network 
components. 
· Notarisation mechanisms can be used to guarantee the integrity, origin and/or 
the destination of transferred data. A third party notary, who must be trusted by 
the communication entities, will provide the guarantee typically by applying a 
cryptographic transformation to the transferred data. 
 
The ITU-T Recommendations Report X.805 in support of the X.800 and ISO 7498-2 
(1989) standards, as cited by Bertine et al (2004), refers to eight security dimensions  
that have been defined to address end-to-end security in networked applications. In 
addition to the five basic security services already mentioned, X.805 identifies a further 
three dimensions, namely:  
· Privacy;  
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· Availability; 
· Communication Security. 
 
The functionalities of the five basic security services of X.800 (authentication, access 
control, data confidentiality, data integrity,  non-repudiation) match the functionalities 
of the corresponding security dimensions of X.805, as shown in Figure 3.2. The 
privacy, availability and communication security dimensions of X.805 offer new types 
of network protection. These eight security dimensions are summarised as follows: 
· Authentication serves to confirm the identities of the communicating entities; 
· Access Control protects against unauthorised use of network resources; 
· Data Confidentiality protects data from unauthorised disclosure. Data 
confidentiality ensures that the data content cannot be understood by 
unauthorised entities; 
· Data Integrity ensures the correctness or  accuracy of  data. The data is protected 
against unauthorised modification, deletion, creation, and replication and 
provides an indication of these unauthorised activities; 
· Non-repudiation provides the means for preventing an individual or entity from 
denying having performed a particular action related to data by making available 
proof of various network-related actions (such as proof of obligation, intent or 
commitment; proof of data origin, proof of ownership, proof of resource use); 
· Privacy provides for the protection of information that might be derived from 
the observation of network activities; 
· Availability ensures that there is no denial of authorised access to network 
elements, stored information, information flows, services and applications due to 
events impacting the network; 
· Communication security ensures that information flows only between the 
authorised end points. 
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Figure 3.2: Security Architectural Elements in ITU-T Recommendation X.805 (Bertine et al, 
2004)  
 
3.3.5 Quality standards  
A principal factor in the performance of an organisation is the quality of its products or 
services. Information security is definitely a contributing factor to quality and should 
therefore be covered by the ISO 9000 umbrella. ISO 9001 is part of the ISO 9000 
family of quality standards and as such applies to both manufacturing and software 
development (Tipton and Krause, 2006).  
 
The ISO committee has developed a collection of standards for software processes 
called Software Process Improvement and Capability Determination (SPICE). These 
standards support ISO 9000 quality standards. ISO 9000 was not developed initially 
with software development in mind. Software and information systems developers are 
advised to use ISO 9000-3, entitled “Guidelines for the Application of ISO 9001 to the 
Development, Supply and Maintenance of Software”, due to the specificity of software 
as a product. ISO 9000-3 is a set of guidelines that relate directly to software 
preparation but is still not ideal in terms of information security. However, ISO 9000 
does force the organisation to identify the control measures that ensure the quality of 
products is maintained. This could be related to a type of risk analysis, where all risks 
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affecting the information systems of the organisation are identified. Additionally, ISO 
9000 forces the organisation and its top management to state their policy regarding 
quality and to adhere to it. Information security will gain a lot more attention if the 
information security policy were included in this quality document (Von Solms and 
Meyer, 1995). 
 
The ISO 9001 standard is not specifically aimed at software products, but it is possible 
to apply this standard to software quality control. Since software development projects 
have specific characteristics (for example, frequent changes in requirements during the 
development process and the invisible nature of the product during its development), 
there is a need for quality assurance procedures which are tailored towards software 
development. The purpose of Software Quality Assurance (SQA) is to ensure that work 
gets done the way it is supposed to be done. More specifically, Van Vliet (2000) 
summarises the goals of SQA as: 
· To improve software quality by appropriately monitoring the software and its 
development process; 
· To ensure full compliance with the established standards and procedures for the 
software and the development process; 
· To ensure that any inadequacies in the product, the process, or the standards are 
brought to the attention of management to ensure inadequacies can be fixed. 
 
3.3.6 Software development standards and best practices 
The ISO/IEC 12207 (1995) standard defines a framework for software life cycle 
processes. It contains a hierarchy of processes, activities and tasks to be applied in an 
environment where software is being developed, supplied, acquired, operated and 
maintained. The standard was first published in 1995 as ISO/IEC 12207:1995, 
“Information Technology – Software Life Cycle Processes”. 
 
Three principle processes are identified in the IEEE 1074 (1995) standard for software 
development, namely (Peters and Pedrycz, 2000): 
· Requirements, i.e. decide what a system must do, its activities, risks and testing 
plan; 
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· Design, i.e. determine how a system computes, its specific functions and 
structure; 
· Implementation, i.e. produce source code, documentation and tests; validate and 
verify. 
 
The Rational Unified Process (RUP) describes how to effectively deploy commercially 
proven approaches to software development for software development teams. It 
captures many of the best practices in modern software development in a form that is 
suitable for a wide range of projects and organisations. They are typically referred to as 
“best practices” because they are used in industry by many successful software 
development organisations. The following six best practices are of significant 
importance, namely: 
· Develop software iteratively. This is of particular importance because it is not 
possible to sequentially define the entire problem, design the entire solution, 
build the software and test the product at the end. An iterative approach is 
required that allows for successive refinements and promotes that high risk items 
be addressed at every stage of the lifecycle; 
· Manage requirements. A software application is more likely to fulfil user needs 
if the functional requirements and constraints have been elicited, organised and 
documented in such a way that they drive the design, implementation and testing 
of the application; 
· Use component-based architectures. Components are non-trivial modules or 
sub-systems that fulfil a clear function. The use of component-based 
architectures promotes more effective software reuse; 
· Visually model software. Visual abstractions help to communicate different 
aspects of the software; understand how the elements of the system fit together; 
ensure that the building blocks are consistent with the code; maintain 
consistency between a design and its implementation and promote unambiguous 
communication within the software development team; 
· Verify software quality. Quality is not treated as an afterthought but rather built 
into the process, in all activities and involving all participants;  
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· Control changes to software. This involves the ability to manage change, 
through making certain that each change is acceptable and being able to track 
changes. 
 
Microsoft (2005) presents an overview of information security at Microsoft in a 
TechNet report. Some of the lessons learned and best practices relating to applications 
include: 
· Apply basic security principles at the earliest design stages to create reliable, 
security-enhanced applications; 
· Create awareness and a high priority for security by establishing education 
programmes for internal application development and for sharing best practices. 
 
Microsoft authors, Howard and LeBlanc (2003), in support of developing secure 
software, stress that software developers should avoid adding security as an afterthought 
for the following reasons: 
· Adding any feature (including security) as an afterthought, is expensive; 
· Adding security later may change the way features have been implemented. 
This, too, is expensive; 
· Adding security later involves wrapping security around existing features, rather 
than designing features with security in mind; 
· Adding security as an afterthought may change the application interface, which 
may in turn break the code that has come to rely on the current interface. 
 
One of the security best practices, as identified by Howard and LeBlanc (2003), is to 
perform threat modelling first. Their motivation is that the threat modelling process 
allows developers to determine which parts of the envisaged product are most at risk 
and should, therefore, be evaluated more deeply.  
 
3.4 Criteria for Secure Software Development 
A high- level analysis of the key information security and software development 
standards and best practices shows a considerable amount of overlap. Such an overlap 
reinforces the fact that those activities found in multiple approaches can surely be 
regarded as essential or core best practices. 
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The following set of criteria, based on the standards and best practices studied, has been 
established to ensure secure software development : 
· Ensure that developers are trained in how to develop secure software (NIST SP 
800-14, Microsoft TechNet Report); 
· Information security must be integrated into the software development life cycle. 
It is vital that security be a well- thought-out process at all stages, from system 
inception and design through implementation and deployment (Jones and 
Rastogi, ISO/IEC 17799, BS 7799, NIST SP 800-14, RUP, Microsoft TechNet 
Report); 
· Some form of risk analysis, risk assessment and threat modelling must be carried 
out during the initial phase of the software development lifecycle (Howard and 
LeBlanc, 2003; BS 7799, ISO/IEC 17799, NIST SP 800-14, ISO/IEC TR 13335-
3); 
· Security requirements must be identified early in the development lifecycle 
(ISO/IEC 17799, BS 7799, NIST SP 800-14, RUP); 
· Relevant security services must be determined (ISO 7498-2,  X.800, X.805); 
· Design appropriate security controls and mechanisms into application systems to 
meet the security requirements (ISO 7498-2, ISO/IEC 17799, BS 7799, NIST SP 
800-14). These information security controls and mechanisms should be selected 
as a result of some risk-based approach; 
· Ensure that any system changes do not compromise the security of the 
application (ISO/IEC 17799, BS 7799, RUP). 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Computing and networking are now such an important part of life and the need for 
effective security measures to protect the information systems of governments, industry, 
commerce and consumers is imperative. An increasing number of countries have data 
protection legislation that requires compliance with demonstrated standards and best 
practices to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of their information 
systems. Many organisations recognise their ability to create a more secure, trustworthy 
environment by implementing and enforcing an internal set of best practices, together 
with achieving legislative compliance. 
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The most comprehensive approach, of the best practice frameworks available, is based 
on the implementation of the international information security management standard 
ISO/IEC 17799 (2005). The NIST institute provides a number of best practices and 
security principles that security teams can integrate into the entire information security 
process.  
 
Most software applications developed currently operate in a highly networked 
environment, therefore, some of the key interconnection standards were considered 
together with quality and software development standards and best practices. 
 
A set of criteria, based on the various standards and best practices studied, has been 
established to ensure secure software development. These criteria, as listed in Section 
3.4,  are addressed in the following chapters. Chapter 4 specifically addresses the 
software development life cycle and the extent to which the various models currently 
incorporate information security issues. 
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Chapter 4 
The Software Development Life Cycle  
 
4.1  Introduction 
Chapter 3 discussed the standards and best practices to be considered when studying 
secure software development. This chapter expands on this issue by addressing a 
number of alternative software development models and the typical phases of the 
SDLC.  
 
Software plays a key role in the modern world. The value of software is derived from its 
ability to increase productivity and efficiencies, its resiliency to attack, and its ability to 
perform at the required levels during times of crisis and normal operations.  
 
The development of successful software applications require an engineering approach. 
This approach is characterised by the application of scientific principles, methods, 
models, standards and theories that make it possible to manage, plan, analyse, model, 
design, implement, maintain, measure and evolve a software system (Peters and 
Pedrycz, 2000).  
 
Software development typically follows a life cycle. This can be defined as an orderly 
set of activities conducted and managed for each software development project 
(Maciaszek, 2001). It identifies the phases along which the software product moves, 
from initial inception to maintenance and eventual replacement. The development of 
software has always been regarded as a difficult task. For this reason, many different 
methodologies have been proposed by various researchers to guide the software 
development process as a whole.  
 
In the early years of business computing, information software development was a 
disorganised, ad-hoc process that frequently produced unsatisfactory results. Software 
was typically delivered late, went over budget and importantly, did not provide the 
services and requirements that users expected. The SDLC approach was developed to 
improve the quality of information systems. The SDLC has proved to produce much 
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better quality information systems, by encouraging an organised approach to problem-
solving (Pfaffenberger, 2002). 
 
The SDLC is a methodology for the design and implementation of an information 
system within an organisation. A methodology is a formal approach to solving a 
problem, based on a structured sequence of procedures. The use of a methodology 
ensures a rigorous process and avoids missing any steps that could lead to 
compromising the end goal. It  can, therefore, be argued that using a methodology 
increases the probability of success. Once a methodology has been adopted, the key 
milestones corresponding to each of the phases are established, and a team of 
individuals is selected and made accountable to accomplish the project goals (Whitman 
and Mattord, 2003).  
 
The methodology can be referred to as the SDLC or Software Life Cycle (SLC). Peters 
and Pedrycz (2000), define the SLC as “the period of time beginning with a concept for 
a software product and ending whenever the software is no longer available for use”. 
They state that a Software Life Cycle Model (SLCM) represents the activities, their 
inputs and outputs (for example, documents, tables and measurements) and any 
interactions during its life cycle. Examples of software life cycle models include the 
waterfall, incremental, spiral, prototyping, evolutionary, object-oriented and agile 
models. These models are discussed in Section 4.3. 
 
The number of phases may vary from one model to another, or even the names of the 
phases may differ, but  the general objectives remain the same. The term “software 
development life cycle” is used in terms of this research, because the focus is more on 
software development than on information systems development at large.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the extent to which quality, and specifically 
security, is currently integrated into the SDLC. This is achieved by examining the most 
common software development models, and the typical phases of the SDLC. The 
following section addresses traditional software development. 
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4.2  Traditional Software Development 
The waterfall model is the oldest, known SDLC model. It was first identified in 1970 as 
a formal alternative to the code-and-fix software development method prevalent at the 
time. It was the first model to formalise a framework for software development, placing 
emphasis on up-front requirements and design activities, and on producing 
documentation during the early stages of development. It describes a sequence of 
activities that begins with concept exploration and concludes with maintenance and 
eventual replacement. Peters and Pedrycz (2000) refer to it specifically as the forward 
engineering of software products. An understanding of its strengths and weaknesses 
improves the ability to assess other, possibly more effective life cycle models that are 
based on this traditional approach. 
 
The waterfall model was created to control large, complex development projects. 
Therefore, it does not work well for small projects that require rapid development or 
heavy user involvement with many changes. This model has been highly criticised but, 
it does have a number of advantages. Post and Anderson (2003) refer specifically to the 
increased control and the improved ability to monitor large projects that it provides. It is 
able to tolerate changes in staffing, and the resulting system is normally easier to 
maintain owing to the strong emphasis on documentation. It identifies a fixed set of 
documents that are produced as a result of each phase in the life cycle. However, 
generating such detailed specifications and signing-off documents is costly and time-
consuming, and may delay the installation of a system for extended periods of time. 
 
A further criticism of the waterfall model is that the notions of rapid prototyping and 
incremental development are absent from this model. Many critics refer to it as being 
very rigid and inflexible. It encourages the freezing of specifications early in the 
development process. Changes can be made later on in the process, but they become 
very costly. Additionally, it does not prescribe how to reverse engineer an existing 
system. 
 
Maciaszek (2001) suggests that such a structured approach to analysis and design is 
characterised by a number of features, some of which, however, are not well aligned 
with modern software engineering. These features include: 
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· The tendency to be sequential and transformational, rather than iterative and 
incremental. This means that it does not facilitate a seamless development 
process through iterative refinement and incremental software delivery; 
· The tendency to deliver inflexible solutions that satisfy a set of identified 
business functions, but which can be difficult to scale up and extend in the 
future; 
· The assumption that development takes place from scratch, and that it does not 
support reuse of pre-existing components. 
The application of the waterfall model, because of its inherent weaknesses, should be 
limited to those situa tions in which the ir requirements and the ir implementation are well 
understood. Large mainframe or complex client-server systems, and systems with 
highly complex technical requirements, may continue using this traditional approach. 
However, since it not practical for most of the current applications which are running on 
highly networked PCs and workstations, a number of alternative software development 
models have emerged over recent years. Section 4.3 addresses some of these models. 
 
4.3  Alternative Software Development Models 
Various software development models have evolved from attempts to optimise the 
waterfall model. Modern software development processes are invariably iterative and 
incremental. This means that details are typically added in successive iterations 
allowing for changes and improvements to be introduced as needed. Incremental 
development allows for a number of releases of software modules, thereby maintaining 
user satisfaction and providing important feedback to modules still under development 
(Maciaszek, 2001). 
 
A software development process determines the activities and procedures to enhance 
collaboration in the development team to ensure that a quality product is delivered to 
the customer. According to Maciaszek (2001), a process model should: 
· State an order for carrying out  the activities; 
· Specify what development artefacts are to be delivered and when; 
· Assign activities and artefacts to developers; 
· Offer criteria for monitoring the progress of the project, for measuring its 
outcomes, and for planning future projects. 
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Maciaszek (2001) argues that software development processes cannot be standardised to 
be automatically embraced by an organisation. Each organisation has to develop its own 
process model or customise it from a generic process template, such as the template 
provided by the Rational Software Corporation, known as the Rational Unified Process 
(RUP). 
 
There are many representations of the SDLC to choose from, all illustrating a logical 
flow of activity from the identification of a need through to the final software product. 
These methodologies use all the standards and procedures which will affect the 
planning, requirements gathering, analysis, design, development and implementation of 
a software system.  Each SDLC model has its own strengths and weaknesses and may, 
therefore, be better suited to certain types of projects within an organisation. The 
expected size and complexity of the system, development schedule, and lifespan of a 
system will affect the choice of which SDLC model to use. 
 
4.3.1 The incremental/evolutionary model 
A common problem with software development is that the software is needed quickly, 
but takes time to fully develop. One solution is to form a compromise between 
timescales and functionality, providing “interim” deliveries of software. Each delivery 
has reduced functionality, but serves as a stepping stone towards the fully functional 
software. It is possible to use such an approach as a means of reducing risk. 
 
The product is said to evolve within the incremental/evolutionary life cycle model 
because it consists of the planned development of multiple releases. Generally, 
increments become smaller and implement fewer requirements each time. It typically 
entails the continual overlapping of development activities and produces a succession of 
software releases. However, it can be costly if it is assumed that a current release is 
superseded by an improved version of the software later. 
 
The incremental/evolutionary approach to software development reduces costs, controls 
the impact of changing requirements and produces an operational system more quickly 
by developing the system in a building-block fashion (Futrell, Shafer & Shafer, 2002). 
The main criticisms of this model are that it is does not allow for iterations within each 
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increment, and that the definition of a complete, fully functional system must be done 
early in the life cycle to allow for the definition of the increments. 
 
4.3.2 The prototyping model 
Prototyping is the process of building a working replica of a system. This approach 
focuses on producing software products quickly. Prototyping makes it possible for 
clients and developers to see how a particular module works in the early stages of a 
software development process. Prototyping is  thus viewed as a means of reducing risk 
since potential problems may be discovered before committing to a fully-fledged 
system.  
 
Prototyping solves the waiting problem of the waterfall model. It is said to aid the 
understanding of a system. It is effective for smaller applications, and when user 
requirements are unclear. However, it cannot easily be applied to large  mainframe-
based systems with complex processing instructions and calculations; in these cases the 
traditional approach is more appropriate (Laudon and Laudon, 1998). A major criticism 
is that it usually ignores quality, reliability, maintainability and safety requirements. 
 
4.3.3 The spiral model 
The spiral life cycle  model, introduced by Boehm in 1986, combines many good 
features of other software development models. These include the idea of baseline 
management (i.e. the documents associated with cycle phases), apparent in the waterfall 
model, the overlapping phases which are found in the incremental model, and early 
versions of a software application from the prototyping model. These software 
development models can be coupled with the spiral model in a natural way (Van Vliet, 
2000).  
 
A number of problems have to be solved during the development of a software 
application. Problem-solving normally means the most difficult parts are tackled first, or 
the parts that have the highest risks with respect to its successful completion. Each 
convolution of the spiral gives rise to the following activities (Van Vliet, 2000): 
· Identify the sub-problem which has the highest associated risk; 
· Find a solution for that problem. 
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The basic assumption of the spiral model is that the form of software development 
cannot be completely determined in advance (Peters and Pedrycz, 2000). Each phase of 
the spiral model has four principle activities, including: 
· Elaborating software entity objectives, constraints and alternatives; 
· Evaluating alternatives relative to objectives and constraints and identifying any 
major sources of risk; 
· Elaborating the definition of software entities for a project; 
· Planning the next cycle, terminating the project if too risky and securing 
management commitment. 
 
The original spiral methodology developed by Boehm serves as the basis for Booysen’s 
Automated Secure Systems Development Methodology (ASSDM) (Booysen and Eloff, 
1995). This methodology refers specifically to a security spiral,  divided into four 
quadrants, namely: 
· A “Determine objectives, alternatives, constraints” quadrant that helps to define 
the security requirements needed by the system; 
· An “Evaluate alternatives, identify, resolve risks” quadrant to help in selecting 
the best security development strategy, while considering the security risks 
associated with the requirements; 
· A “Develop, verify next-level product” quadrant that describes the phases 
involved in system development; 
· A “Plan next phases” quadrant that combines the deliverables from the other 
quadrants to assist the project team and developer in planning the next spiral. 
 
The driving force behind the spiral model is a strategy for minimising risk. It is evident 
that it encompasses the strengths of the waterfall model, while including risk analysis, 
risk management and support and management processes. The risk analysis activity is 
used to show the beginning of a new spiral. The main advantage of the spiral-type 
model is that it is possible to return to previous spirals during any stage of the 
development process.  This approach, however, has the unwanted side-effect of 
increasing development costs (Peters and Pedrycz, 2000). It does not specifically 
address the issue of how developers specify, design and test the conceptual construct of 
software being developed. 
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4.3.4 The object-oriented model 
The Object-Oriented (OO) approach to software development was popularised in the 
nineties. The Object Management Group approved a standard for it called the Unified 
Modelling Language (UML). The OO approach follows the iterative and incremental 
process. It is more data-centric when compared to the structured approach since it 
evolves around class models. The development of classes supports multiple instances of 
objects and encapsulation, which leads to reuse. This means that it simplifies software 
development by hiding much of the complexity. The OO model prescribes software 
development in terms of a synergy between abstraction, modularity, encapsulation, 
hierarchy, typing, concurrency and persistence.  
 
Developers currently  tend to use the OO approach because of the many associated 
technical advantages, namely abstraction, encapsulation, reuse, inheritance and 
polymorphism. Maciaszek (2001) further suggests that these technical properties may 
lead to many benefits, including greater reusability of code and data, shorter 
development times, increased programmer productivity, improved software quality and 
greater understandability.  
 
4.3.5 Rapid application development 
Companies, in their never-ending quest to design software applications with greater 
speed, started to entertain the idea of Rapid Application Development (RAD). It allows 
developers to code on the fly in contrast to the waterfall model. Its supporters subscribe 
to the theory that delivering a functional product as quickly as possible is of the utmost 
importance. They can upgrade the software later if the demand arises. They believe that 
the sooner the end-users see a result, the more confident they are that the application 
will meet their expectations (Laudon and Laudon, 1998).  
 
A RAD approach is characterised by the quick turnaround time from requirements 
definition to completed system. It fo llows a sequence of evolutionary system 
integrations or prototypes that are reviewed with the customer, discovering 
requirements along the way (Futrell et al, 2002). 
 
Microsoft, as a commercial software vendor developing highly complex systems used 
by millions of people, has developed its own methodologies for quickly creating code. 
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The have been a proponent of RAD to reduce the time it takes to complete large 
projects. This methodology is designed to segment the code so that hundreds of 
programmers can work on it simultaneously. It relies on creating code that can be 
modified later for improvements and patches (Post and Anderson, 2003). 
 
4.3.6 The rational unified process  
The Rational Unified Process (RUP) of IBM, embodies many of the best practices of 
software development, including an iterative development approach, managing change, 
modelling visually and ensuring quality. 
 
The iterative phases of RUP (i.e. analysis, design, development, testing and 
deployment) emphasize one or more core process disciplines. In each phase and each 
discipline, an attention to quality is emphasized to identify problems earlier in the life 
cycle, when they are typically easier to solve. Bessin (2004) refers to the various quality 
issues to be addressed at each phase of the SDLC as follows:  
· Analysis – Meta Group reports that up to 80% of the issues leading to customer 
dissatisfaction can be traced to poor understanding of requirements. Quality 
starts with analysis of the business to ensure that system requirements accurately 
reflect, with clarity, the business or customer needs. Managing requirements is 
the cornerstone of success. These requirements must be written in a manner that 
is understandable to software developers; 
· Design – during design, the primary focus is on architecture. Poor architecture 
causes a wide array of quality problems including fragility, lack of scalability 
and resistance to modification; 
· Development – it is estimated that developers make 100 to 150 errors for every 
thousand lines of code. There is now a stronger emphasis on developer- lead 
testing and analysis, where tests are built as a precursor to code. Unit testing and 
runtime analysis have become more mainstream; 
· Test – system level functional and performance tests are an integral part of 
continuously ensuring quality; 
· Deploy and monitor – eventually business applications are implemented. 
Inevitably, functional and reliability errors will occur. Constant monitoring and 
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assessment ensure the viability of a deployed system and ensures the ability to 
rapidly detect and respond to inadequate performance. 
 
4.3.7 Agile development methods  
Traditional, heavyweight, software development models are rigid and heavily 
documentation and process-oriented. Many of these models are difficult to follow in the 
current software development environment. A new generation of lightweight 
methodologies has evolved in response to this. These lightweight models insist on far 
less documentation and specify only a few simple rules that need to be adopted. 
 
Agile software development methods are characterised by nimbleness to rapid changes, 
multiple incremental iterations and a fast development pace. Existing agile methods 
include Feature Driven Development (FDD), Internet-speed or short-cycle time systems 
development and Extreme Programming (XP). Siponen, Baskerville and Kuivalainen 
(2005) specify four requirements for security methods that are targeted to be integrated 
into agile software methods, namely: 
· Must be adaptive to agile software development methods; 
· Must be simple and not hinder the development project; 
· Should offer concrete guidance and tools at all phases of development, i.e., from 
requirements gathering to implementation and testing; 
· Should be able to adapt rapidly to ever-changing requirements owing to a fast-
paced business environment, including support for handling several incremental 
iterations. 
 
Siponen et al (2005) describe how software developers can use agile software 
development methods to build secure information systems. Developers, for competitive 
reasons, often use these methods for web and network applications where security risks 
are prominent. Agile development methods, however, have few explicit security 
features. One reason for this may stem from the misconception that security hinders 
development. Siponen et al (2005) further suggest that to seamlessly integrate security 
into agile software development methods, security techniques need to be adaptable and 
agile to operate in changing conditions. 
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Traditional development approaches create much documentation. Such records serve as 
useful artefacts for communication and the traceability of design. Agile methodologies, 
on  the other hand, encourage lean thinking and cutting down on overheads, particularly 
documentation. They are ideal for projects that exhibit high variability in tasks because 
of changing requirements, in the capabilities of people, and in the technology being 
used (Nerur, Mahapatra & Mangalara, 2005). 
 
4.3.8 Extreme programming  
Extreme programming is one of the earliest and most important agile methodologies. It 
is a relatively new concept, but is in many ways an extension of the earlier work in 
prototyping and RAD. The main premise of XP is that the SDLC and its many 
alternatives are too large and cumbersome. Many of them provide good control but  they 
typically end up adding complexity, taking more time, and slowing down programmers. 
XP simplifies the development process by focusing on small releases, similar to 
prototyping, that add value to the customer.  
 
One new aspect to XP is paired programming, whereby two programmers work together 
constantly. This aspect has been seen by many as an inefficient use of resources (Post 
and Anderson, 2003). However, although it has been empirically found that pair 
programming increases productivity by up to 15% (Kuppuswami, Vivekanandan, 
Ramaswamy & Rodrigues, 2005). The core XP practices can be summarised as pair 
programming, simple design, test-driven development and design improvement. The 
inventors of XP claim that one of the most important benefits of XP is the reduction of 
the software development effort.  
 
It is clear from the discussion in Section 4.3 that none of the software development 
models studied explicitly integrate security into their life cycle. This could be attributed 
to the fact that incorporating security is often viewed as something that decreases 
productivity and increases the cost of software development projects. Section 4.4 
addresses the typical phases of software development, thereby providing an improved 
understanding of the SDLC.  
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4.4  Typical Phases of Software Development 
An important feature of the SDLC is that it is a comprehensive method that 
encompasses the five basic phases of software development, as depicted in Figures 4.1 
and 4.2, namely investigation, analysis, design, implementation and maintenance. 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates these phases as being applied in a sequential, linear manner, an 
iterative approach, as indicated in Figure 4.2, is more common. Since an iterative 
process is essentially circular in nature, each phase receives input from and provides 
output to another. At a high level this circularity ensures the reassessment of the quality 
of each artefact.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Typical Phases of Software Development 
 
Virtually all systems development models incorporate these five phases. However, they 
do differ in how much time is spent in each phase, who does the work, and in the degree 
of formality involved (Post and Anderson, 2003).  
 
It is important to realise that all of the activities involved are highly related and 
interdependent. Therefore, in practice, several developmental activities may occur at the 
same time (O’Brien, 2002). There are several variations of the SDLC, however, the 
five-step process described in this section represents the most common practice. It must 
be noted that some versions identify more than five phases, while others may use 
different terminology for individual phases.  
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Figure 4.2: A Typical Cycle for Developing Information System Solutions (O’Brien, 2002) 
 
4.4.1 The investigation phase 
During the investigation phase, the objectives, constraints and scope of the project are 
specified. A preliminary cost-benefit analysis is performed to evaluate the perceived 
benefits and appropriate levels of cost for those benefits. It is during this phase that the 
objectives and general definitions of the requirements are established. There is an initial 
user definition activity followed by an evaluation and the initiation of necessary 
documents to formally commence the software development project. The 
documentation produced during this phase requires user involvement to define the 
project and its worth. Friedman and Wlosinski (2003) recommend that both a data 
sensitivity assessment and preliminary risk assessment take place during this initial 
phase. This phase concludes with a feasibility analysis which assesses the economic, 
technical and behavioural feasibilities of the project.  
 
A feasibility study is a quick examination of the problems, goals, and expected costs of 
the system. The objective is to determine whether the problem can be solved with an 
information system. The problem may turn out to be more complex than originally 
thought or unsolvable with current technology. It may be better to wait for  improved 
technology or lower prices (Post and Anderson, 2003).  
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4.4.2 The analysis phase 
Several basic activities of systems analysis need to be performed whether developing a 
new application quickly or developing a long-term project. The analysis phase begins 
with a study of the documentation gained during the investigation stage. However, 
systems analysis is not a preliminary study, but an in-depth study of the end-user 
information needs. This phase produces a set of functional requirements that are used as 
the basis for the design of a new or improved information system.  Assessments of the 
organisation, the status of the current systems and its capability to support the proposed 
systems are performed.  
 
It is important during this phase to determine how the existing system works and where 
the problems are located. The common technique used is to decompose the system into 
smaller, workable chunks. Analysts begin to determine what the new system is expected 
to do, and how it will interact with existing systems. At the end of the analysis phase, a 
complete description of the business requirements should be available. The problems 
and needs are typically documented with text, data flow diagrams and other figures 
depending on the methodology followed (Post and Anderson, 2003). 
 
4.4.3 The design phase 
The systems analysis phase describes “what” a system should do to meet the 
information needs of users, whereas the systems design phase specifies “how” the 
system will accomplish this objective. Systems design consists of design activities that 
produce system specifications satisfying the functional requirements developed in the 
systems analysis phase (O’Brien, 2002). 
 
The objective of systems design is to describe the new system as a collection of 
modules or sub-systems. This phase is typically divided into logical and physical design 
stages. The logical design is the blueprint for the desired solution. It is implementation 
independent, meaning that it contains no reference to specific technologies, vendors or 
products. The physical design, on the other hand, identifies specific technologies to 
support the desired solution. The system design phase will indicate how the new system 
will work by providing all the necessary details, including data inputs, system outputs, 
processing steps and database designs. The output of this stage consists of a complete 
technical specification of the new system (Post and Anderson, 2003). 
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4.4.4 The implementation phase 
Once a new information system has been designed, it must be implemented. The  
implementation phase typically involves the acquisition of hardware and software, 
software development, testing of programs and procedures, development of 
documentation, and a variety of conversion alternatives. It involves the education and  
training of end users and specialists who will operate the new system (O’Brien, 2002). 
 
Implementation is often a difficult and time-consuming process. However, O’Brien 
(2002) argues that it is vital in ensuring the success of any newly developed system, 
since even a very well-designed software application will fail if it is not properly 
implemented. 
 
During the implementation phase, any required software components are developed or 
purchased. Once all components are tested individually, they are installed, integrated 
and tested as a system.  Post and Anderson (2003) argue that although testing and quality 
control must be performed at every stage of development, a final systems test is 
required before entrusting the data of the company to the new system. A crucial stage in 
implementation is, therefore, final testing. 
 
4.4.5 The maintenance phase 
Once a system is fully implemented and is being used in business operations, the 
maintenance phase begins. Systems maintenance may be defined as the monitoring, 
evaluating and modifying of operational information systems to make desirable or 
necessary improvements (O’Brien, 2002). 
 
The maintenance and review phase is the longest and typically most expensive phase of 
any software development life cycle. The needs of the organisation change, therefore, 
the systems that support the organisation must change. The pressures for change are so 
great in most organisations today that as much as 80% of the Management Information 
System (MIS) staff is devoted to modifying existing programs. These changes are most 
often time-consuming and difficult. When a programmer makes a minor change in one 
area, it may affect another area of the program, which in turn can cause additional errors 
or necessitate more changes (Post and Anderson, 2003). 
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4.5  Software Quality in the SDLC 
Society has currently become increasingly dependant on technology, therefore, software 
applications must work. It is unsurprising that many software characteristics continue to 
grow in importance, including reliability, availability, security, safety and quality. 
 
 Software quality is a process, not a product. According to McGraw (2003), there is no 
substitute for instilling software quality as deeply into the software development process 
as possible, taking advantage of the engineering lessons software practitioners have 
learned over the years. He stresses that the particular software process followed is not as 
important as the act of thinking about reliability, security and performance throughout 
the software development process.  
 
McGraw (2003) refers to three technical trends that are aggravating the software quality 
problem and making the impacts on business both more common and more serious  than 
previous. He summarises these three key trends as follows: 
· All modern software is exposed to the Internet; 
· Extensible systems (for example, Java and .Net) are dangerous; 
· System complexity is rising. 
Quality is a key issue within the software industry. Software is expected to perform at 
high levels of reliability and security. The failure of such software can result in severe 
business consequences including (McGraw, 2003): 
· Revenue loss when software fails or key data is stolen or compromised; 
· Brand/reputation damage can destroy the market impact when software does not 
work as advertised, or security vulnerabilities impact consumer trust; 
· Liability costs when consumers cannot complete online transactions, or when 
software embedded in airplanes, automobiles, pacemakers or nuclear reactors 
causes injury or death; 
· Productivity loss when software malfunctions or ceases to function altogether. 
Defective software costs the American economy an estimated $59.5 billion each year, 
according to a report issued in June 2002 by the NIST institute. Software users incurred 
64% of the total and software developers 36%. The NIST institute suggests that 
improvements in testing could reduce this cost by about a third, but that testing 
improvements would not eliminate all software errors (McGraw, 2003). 
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McGraw (2003) suggests that the early identification of software risks is beneficial. The 
two primary reasons in support of this argument are: 
· Most software defects are introduced early in the software life cycle; 
· The earlier in the software life cycle a defect is uncovered and fixed, the less it 
costs to repair. 
These reasons are illustrated in Figure 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. 
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Figure 4.3: Percentage of Defects Introduced at Each Stage of Software Development 
(McGraw, 2003) 
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates that it is evident that errors revealed in the initial stages of the 
software development process are less costly to fix than those revealed in the later 
stages. The likelihood of errors occurring in the later stages tends to diminish in 
proportion to the effort devoted to the initial stages. Figure 4.4 illustrates that it is 
evident that the cost of repairing errors is significantly lower during the requirements 
and design stages then in the later stages, or during the coding, testing and maintenance 
phases.  
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Cost of Fixing Defects at Each Stage of Software Development
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Figure 4.4: Cost of Fixing Defects at Each Stage of Software Development (McGraw, 2003) 
 
One of the areas of software where errors can least be tolerated is that of security 
safeguards. One of the techniques employed to improve the reliability of software is 
Software Quality Assurance (SQA). The SQA process attempts to improve the quality 
of computer software products via the software development process. SQA involves the 
use of various reviews and the establishment of baselines throughout the SDLC. 
Tompkins and Rice, as early as 1985, argued that it is not sufficient to simply 
incorporate security safeguards in application systems. Safeguards should possess many 
of the software quality factors. Security concerns should be integrated into the SQA 
process in the same manner that security concerns should be incorporated into the 
SDLC process. The quality of security safeguards must be built- in, like software 
quality, and cannot be tested-in (Tompkins and Rice, 1985). 
 
Businesses that value quality, according to Bessin (2004), become more effective at 
innovation, increase their competitive differentiation and greatly reduce their total cost 
of development and ownership. Quality, however, is not only the responsibility of each 
individual on the development team, but is the responsibility of the team as a whole. 
Teams must do everything they can to integrate workflows, establish traceability and 
simplify communication. A breakdown in the chain linking team members leads to data 
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loss, rework, lack of clarity and inefficiency and ultimately lowers software quality 
(Bessin, 2004). Gong, Yen and Chou (1998) suggest that software developers should 
select an appropriate development methodology and use suitable tools to maintain a 
high quality and low-cost software design and development environment.  
 
Gong et al (1998) refer to the growing trend of adopting the Total Quality Management 
(TQM) philosophy to software development. They suggest that applying TQM to the 
software development process will help control software quality and productivity, lower 
costs and decrease cycle times. They provide through their research a way of integrating 
TQM into the software development process, and in so doing have focussed on the 
common phases of the SDLC (requirements analysis, design, development, testing and 
maintenance). Some of the major characteristics of TQM they focus on include: 
· Understandability – a software project should be well-structured, concise, 
complete and consistent and thereby be understood by analysers, designers, 
programmers and users; 
· Reliability – quality software is reliable and dependable. A reliable system 
performs correctly, completely and consistently; 
· Testability – quality software should be testable, simple and easy to execute and 
maintain; 
· Modifiability – this implies that quality software is general and flexible. A 
system of generic modules or routines should be re-used or tailored for other 
applications; 
· Portability – quality software should be hardware independent. It should 
demonstrate a consistent performance on different computers with minimal 
modifications; 
· Efficiency – a system with short turnaround time, faster response time and better 
throughput is recognised as the one with better quality; 
· Usability – simplicity or conciseness is one of the fundamental perceptions 
about good quality. 
 
Table 4.1 identifies the relationship of software quality factors to the life cycle phases in 
terms of where qua lity factors should be measured, and where the impact of poor 
quality is realised. Tompkins and Rice (1985) have not explicitly stated security as a 
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software quality factor, but this is implied through the correctness, reliability and 
integrity factors. They further suggest that software quality factors should be included in 
the functional requirements document and ultimately viewed as performance criteria 
(Tompkins and Rice, 1985). 
 
SDLC SOFTWARE 
QUALITY 
FACTORS 
Requirements 
Analysis  
Design Code and 
Debug 
System 
Test 
Operation Maintenance 
Correctness (*) # # # X X X 
Reliability (*) # # # X X X 
Efficiency  # #  X  
Integrity (*) # # #  X  
Usability # #  X X X 
Maintainability  # #   X 
Testability  # #   X 
Flexibility  # # X  X 
Portability  # #    
Reusability  # #    
Interoperability  #   X  
LEGEND 
# Where software quality factors should be measured; 
X Where impact of poor quality is realised 
* Security-related factors 
Table 4.1: Relationship of Software Quality Factors to Life Cycle Phases (Tompkins and Rice, 
1985). 
 
The business benefits of including quality-oriented activities in all phases of the 
software development cycle are both broad and deep. These measures facilitate 
innovation and lower costs by increasing predictability, reducing risk and eliminating 
rework. They can help differentiate a business from its competitors. Most important, 
continuously ensuring quality will always cost less than ignoring quality considerations. 
It is actually suggested that raising product quality costs virtually nothing if done 
correctly (Bessin, 2004). 
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4.6  Security in the SDLC 
Tompkins and Rice (1985), as far back as 1985, found that inadequacies in the design 
and operation of computer applications were a frequent source of security 
vulnerabilities associated with information systems. This lead them to state that 
“security concerns should be an integral part of the planning, development and 
operation of a software application”. Furthermore, they suggested that the SDLC 
methodology provides the structure to ensure that security safeguards are planned, 
designed, developed and tested in a manner that is consistent with the sensitivity of the 
information. 
 
Tompkins and Rice (1985), found in the research that much of what needs to be done to 
improve security is not clearly separable from what is needed to improve the usefulness, 
reliability, effectiveness and efficiency of computer applications. However, they stress 
that while security concerns should be integrated into the SDLC, steps should be taken 
to ensure that the appropriateness, adequacy and reasonableness of security safeguards 
be separately identifiable activities within each stage of the SDLC. This means that 
system planners, developers and users should accomplish a series of security-related 
actions throughout the SDLC. The process for incorporating security safeguards within 
an application, however, is not substantially different from the SDLC activities. 
 
Similarly, Jones and Rastogi (2004) state that to meet future demands, opportunities and 
threats associated with information security need to be “baked in” to the overall SDLC 
process. The reality is that information security is an afterthought for many 
organisations. This means that, most often, security is not an integral part of their 
business or information strategies, nor is it woven into their IT projects. 
 
Jones and Rastogi (2004) suggest various reasons for this neglect, including: 
· Security is not considered a business enabler or revenue generator. Its value is 
not appreciated until risks manifest themselves through attacks and 
compromises, by which time it is too late; 
· In the absence of proper support from top management, security flounders and 
has few champions in an organisation; 
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· Developers are usually hired for their development or coding expertise and have 
minimal security knowledge. They are not given the training, tools, resources, 
time or the motivation to build secure systems; 
· Software projects inevitably run up against deadlines, wherein companies focus 
their primary effort on the features of the software rather than on its security; 
· Security is often perceived as a barrier to functionality, adding constraints and 
reducing flexibility; 
· Security is often treated as a collection of tasks that can be completed at the end 
of the project, rather than as a process or a mindset employed throughout the 
project. 
The cost of these lapses, regardless of the reasons behind them, can be high. For 
example, Microsoft experienced the effects of neglecting security in 2003 when security 
holes in their products were exploited, resulting in billions of dollars in recovery costs 
and lost productivity.  
 
Jones and Rastogi (2004) are concerned that traditional firewall systems have become 
less effective in preventing or detecting Web-based attacks. They suggest that central to 
many successful system attacks currently are poorly developed systems and 
applications. Many of the security properties that are repeatedly outlined in government 
and other regulations, including accountability, unique user accounts and 
confidentiality, can be circumvented when software developers have not paid enough 
attention to security in the design, development, deployment and maintenance of their 
products. They argue that if the security considerations for systems were woven into the 
SDLC, and if the developers, project managers, and system architects were given 
adequate training, many of the security vulnerabilities that manifest themselves in 
software applications would never appear. 
 
Security in application software is usually implemented in a form of so-called security 
services which are developed without considering the security requirements of the 
application system. Booysen and Eloff (1995) argue that security requirements are 
usually added to the system after development, because it is believed that the final 
system will suffer from: 
· Loss of performance with the addition of security features; 
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· Loss of flexibility owing to restrictions and confinements in the behaviour of the 
target  system; 
· Higher costs to account for analysis of the security requirements, design and 
implementation of the security specifications, and maintenance of security in the 
application system. 
Security plays an increasingly important role within systems’ development. This can be 
attributed to the increase in the number of distributed applications. Breu, Burger, Hafner 
and Popp (2004) argue that security is a requirement that has to be considered at all 
stages of development and which needs particular modelling techniques to be captured. 
The development of secure systems clearly poses particular challenges to the 
development process. According to Breu et al (2004), these challenges include: 
· The separation of security requirements and security measures; 
· The traceability of security requirements throughout the development life cycle; 
· The correctness and applicability of the security measures taken;  
· The completeness of security requirements and measures. 
 
Breu et al (2004) suggest that these challenges may be met by: 
· Specifying the security requirements in context; 
· Gathering potential threats related to the security requirements; 
· Estimating the occurrence of every threat and its potential harm either 
quantitatively or qualitatively; 
· Designing appropriate measures, taking into account the results of the risk 
analysis; 
· Checking the chosen measures against the specified requirements. 
The steps of threats and risk analysis support the transition from requirements to 
measures by gathering the potential threats related to the security requirements and by 
estimating the occurrence of each threat and its potential harm. 
 
The NIST institute released a publication entitled “Security Considerations in the 
Information System Life Cycle” SP 800-64 (2004) which is in line with much of the 
research that has been conducted in this area. This document offers a framework for 
incorporating security considerations throughout a generic SDLC, including a 
“minimum” set of security considerations that need to be considered within each of the 
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five phases, namely the design, development, testing, operations and maintenance and 
disposal phases (Jones and Rastogi, 2004). The NIST institute states that building more 
secure systems requires: 
· Well-defined security requirements and security specifications; 
· Well-designed component products; 
· Sound systems security engineering practices; 
· Competent systems security engineers; 
· Appropriate metrics for product/system testing, evaluation and assessment; 
· Comprehensive system security planning and life cycle management. 
 
Various classes of security-related risks and threats, according to Wang and Wang 
(2003),  need to be considered during the design phase of the software development 
process. They divide the universe of software security risks and threats into three 
categories based on their target of attack, namely: 
· Application layer – a class of security risks that focuses on attacking application 
software itself; 
· Platform layer – include all risks and attacks that focus on the underlying 
platform or operating layer, such as attempts to gain unauthorised administrator 
access on Unix or Windows-based systems; 
· Network layer – these threats and risks generally deal with the underlying 
telecommunication and network elements such as routers, switches and 
gateways. 
It is important to software architects and designers that within any particular software 
project one or more of the risks may not be applicable to the particular application 
domain, hence their impact on the quality factors would need to be discounted due to 
their low likelihood of occurrence (Wang and Wang, 2003). 
 
The operational software quality factors, from a software design point of view,  are 
threatened by security risks as illustrated in Table 4.2. By taking into consideration 
security risks and threats, and their impact on the quality of the target system, software 
architects and designers need to select protection mechanisms via the application of 
appropriate security technologies and approaches to provide necessary safeguards. 
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SOFTWARE QUALITY FACTORS LAYER SECURITY 
RISKS  Correctness Reliability Efficiency Integrity Usability 
Credential 
theft 
   **  
Functional 
manipulation 
** *  * * 
Data 
theft/manipulation 
* *  ** * 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
la
ye
r 
Application DoS  ** * *  
Unauthorised 
admin. Access 
   **  
System 
DoS 
 ** *  * 
P
la
tf
or
m
 
la
ye
r 
Application 
Modification 
** * * *  
Network 
DoS 
 ** *  * 
Network exposure 
/manipulation 
* ** * **  
N
et
w
or
k 
la
ye
r 
Network Credential 
Theft 
   **  
LEGEND * = negative effect, no irreparable damage; 
**=strong negative effect, causing irreparable harm 
Table 4.2: Individual Security Risks and Their Impact on Software Quality Factors (Wang and 
Wang, 2003) 
 
Gregory (2003) argues that the failure of an organisation to involve information security 
in the life cycle will result in events that will be more costly and disruptive in the future. 
A wide variety of things can happen to information systems that lack the required 
interfaces and characteristics. Some example events include: 
· Orphan user accounts – exist because the information system does not integrate 
with an identity management or single sign-on of an organisation; 
· Defaced web sites – occur because systems were not built to security standards 
and instead include easily-exploited weaknesses; 
· Fraudulent transactions – occur because an application lacked adequate audit 
trails and/or the processes required to ensure they are examined and the 
identified issues dealt with. 
These problems are more costly to solve than the extra effort required to build, from a 
software design point of view, build the application correctly in the first place. Gregory 
(2003) further suggests that the proper use of the SDLC will contribute significant value 
in the form of software applications that are secure by design. 
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4.7  Conclusion 
Many organisations use some variation of the SDLC to ensure that a carefully planned 
and repeatable process is used to develop software, however, most do not take security 
adequately into consideration. This results in the production of insecure systems (Tipton 
and Krause, 2006).  
 
The SDLC begins with the identification of a requirement for software and ends with 
the formal verification of the developed software against that requirement. The primary 
purpose of the SDLC is to provide guidance and control over the development process. 
Security, as with quality, should be viewed as an integral part of the SDLC and not 
merely as an add-on or after-thought at the end of the development process. Most 
organisations have created their own customised versions of the SDLC. The details may 
vary from organisation to organisation, they all tend towards a common ultimate goal. 
 
Researchers argue that incorporating security within software development processes is 
the most appropriate way of introducing security in the complex context of an 
organisation. The current literature fails so far to present a comprehensive framework 
that can integrate security with development, despite the abundance of software 
development approaches that have emerged. Many of them deal with few of the 
emerging aspects or have not yet been properly evaluated in the real world. Producing 
quality software requires personnel with substantial education, training and experience 
in both software development and information security. 
 
None of the methodologies studied actually assist software developers in designing and 
building secure software applications. Small changes in the SDLC could substantially 
improve security without incurring significant overhead. There is, therefore, the need 
for a model or framework that attempts to guide the development team through the 
complete and detailed secure SDLC. It is important to get security right during the 
requirements, analysis, design and development phases. Research has shown that it 
takes ten times more time, money and effort to fix a bug in the development phase than 
in the design phase. The lesson is, therefore, to identify the security requirements and 
designs correctly as early in the SDLC as possible. 
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The security requirements associated with the development of an application system 
should be considered during the definition of user requirements and incorporated into 
the system during the design stages. Security must be at the heart of software 
specification, design and implementation to have meaningful, long-term impact. An 
expanded software development methodology is needed to provide an approach towards 
secure software development that addresses security requirements as part of the SDLC, 
while considering other functional requirements. A thorough risk analysis needs to be 
performed to determine the security requirements of a software application. This is the 
topic of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Risk Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the SDLC, including a number of alternative software 
development models and the typical phases of the SDLC. This chapter discusses risk 
analysis as a key process for the development of secure software applications. 
 
Organisations today must deal with a multitude of information security risks. Terrorist 
attacks, fires, floods and other disasters can compromise or even destroy their 
information assets. The theft of trade secrets and the loss of information due to 
unexpected computer shutdowns can cause businesses to lose their competitive 
advantage. The achieving and maintaining of the trust of their customers must be 
foremost in the strategies of most organisations, especially those that do business 
online. Successful organisations typically build this trust by establishing safe and secure 
operating environments.  
 
Security vulnerabilities in software applications render an otherwise secure environment 
insecure. Any software application, which has exploitable vulnerabilities, when added 
to a secure environment, affects the security of the total environment. Therefore, it is 
critical that application software be free from security vulnerabilities, especially in a 
networked environment. Security vulnerabilities in software arise from a number of 
development factors, but can generally be traced back to poor software development 
practices, new modes of attack, misconfigurations and unsecured links between 
systems. It has been said that the most secure computer system is one disconnected from 
the network, locked in a room and with its keyboard removed. However, such a 
machine is useless. Since perfect security is an unattainable goal with current  
technologies, producing secure software becomes a question of risk management.  
 
An important part of the information security management process is the assessment of 
risks, and how they can be reduced to acceptable levels. It is necessary to take into 
account the specific needs and risks each information system, and to align these with the  
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business objectives and organisational and environmental aspects. Security risks must 
be identified, ranked, and managed throughout the SDLC. McGraw and Verdon (2004) 
support this notion by stressing the importance of  integrating a high- level approach to 
iterative risk analysis throughout the SDLC. This, they argue, will help overcome many 
of the security vulnerabilities typically found in software applications today.  
 
This chapter addresses some of the main approaches to risk analysis, and a detailed 
discussion of the various stages of risk analysis. It introduces some fundamental 
security risk concepts and their relationships. These are described in Section 5.2. 
 
5.2 Security Risk Concepts and Relationships 
Risk can be described as a threat that exploits some vulnerabilities that could cause 
harm to an asset.  Peltier (2005) defines risk management as “the total cost to identify, 
control and minimise the impact of uncertain events”.  According to Spinellis, 
Kokolakis and  Gritzalis (1999), managing risk can follow three strategies: risk 
reduction, risk transfer and risk acceptance. Risk acceptance means that there is an 
awareness of the risk, but there is a preference to accept its consequences instead of 
applying any form of countermeasure. This will apply in cases where the cost of the 
countermeasure is significantly higher than the impact of  a security breach. Insurance is 
an example of risk transfer, where the risk is typically transferred to a third-party. This 
will apply in cases where the probability of the security breach is low, but the potential 
impact may be very high. Risk reduction can be achieved by reducing the probability of 
the threat, reducing the vulnerability, reducing the impact or effective recovering from 
the threat occurrences. Peltier (2005) advocates that effective risk management be 
totally integrated into the SDLC. This requires, however, that a risk analysis be 
performed during the initial stages of the SDLC.  
 
The terms risk analysis and risk management are often used incorrectly. However, in the 
literature, there are two main schools of thought. The first recognises these as two 
separate processes, with risk management following risk analysis. The second school of 
thought reasons that risk management includes risk analysis, and the introduction of 
security controls. This research adopts the former school of thought. However, it does 
recognise risk assessment as an essential part of risk analysis and not as a separate 
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process. The terms controls, countermeasures and safeguards are used interchangeably 
throughout this work. 
 
Risk analysis is defined by Peltier (2005) as “a technique to identify and assess factors 
that may jeopardise the success of a project or achievement of a goal”. The main 
objective of risk analysis is to identify and assess the risks to which the information 
systems and its assets are exposed, to select appropriate and justified security safeguards 
(Spinellis et al, 1999). It must be noted, however, that a risk analysis does not reduce 
risks. It merely identifies and assesses risk. The measuring of risk is not a simple task, 
since analysts are typically forced to estimate or predict future events, which are 
uncertain. Rigorous risk analysis relies heavily on an understanding of business impacts 
which, in turn, requires an understanding of laws and regulations,  and the business to 
be supported (McGraw and Verdon, 2004). They further suggest that putting the right 
people together for an analysis is important. Risk analysis is not a science and 
knowledge and experience cannot be overemphasized. A broad knowledge of 
vulnerabilities, flaws and threats is a critical success factor. An important stage of the 
risk analysis process is the assessment of risk. 
 
A risk assessment may be broadly defined as “the computation of risk”. The risk 
algorithm computes risk as a function of  assets, threats and vulnerabilities. According 
to NIST SP 800-64 (2004), a preliminary risk assessment should result in a brief, initial 
description of the basic security needs of the system. In practice, this need for 
information security protection is expressed in terms of the need for integrity, 
availability and confidentiality and other security needs that are applicable, for example, 
accountability and non-repudiation. A preliminary risk assessment should define the 
threat environment in which the product or system will operate.  
 
With an effective risk assessment process in place, only those controls and safeguards 
that are actually needed will be implemented (Peltier, 2005). These controls and 
safeguards should be relative to the security requirements of the information system in 
question. Security requirements are concerned with the extent to which assets are to be 
protected from harm. 
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Figure 5.1: Security Concepts and Relationships (source : Common Criteria) cited in Task 
Force Report, 2004 
 
Figure 5.1 provides a graphical view of some of the key security concepts and 
relationships. This diagram illustrates that information owners va lue their information 
assets. Therefore they wish to minimise any potential risk to them. Information owners 
would typically impose some kind of countermeasure or safeguard to reduce such risk. 
These countermeasures, however, may themselves possess some form of vulnerability, 
which may lead to further risk. This risk can be increased by threats that exploit existing 
vulnerabilities. Threat agents may possess certain capabilities and intentions creating 
threats. Threats utilise vulnerabilities in the system to focus their attacks. Adversaries 
use specific kinds of attacks or “exploits” to take advantage of particular vulnerabilities 
in the system. Without vulnerability, threat frequencies are immaterial, because there is 
no loss. Threats, impacts and vulnerabilities are all implicated in annualised exposures, 
therefore safeguards can lower risk by preventing, reducing or mitigating their effects 
(Anderson, 1991). 
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It is clear, from this discussion, that an important  part of the risk analysis process is to 
determine what threats exist to a specific asset and the associated likelihood or 
probability of each threat. These threats must, therefore, be prioritised. Possible 
safeguards and controls must be selected as part of the risk management process.  It is 
unwise to implement controls or safeguards simply because they seem to be the right 
thing to do. Each information system operates within a unique threat environment. It is 
recognised that information security controls must be determined, based on the risk to 
the system in the given environment (Landoll, 2006). Section 5.3 discusses various 
approaches to risk analysis. 
 
5.3 Risk Analysis Approaches 
There are a number of distinct approaches to risk analysis. However, these can be 
divided into two types: quantitative and qualitative, as discussed in Sections 5.3.1 and 
5.3.2 respectively. Both quantitative and qualitative risk analysis methods are supported 
by standards and guides, like the Common Criteria Framework, ISO/IEC TR 13335, 
ISO/IEC 17799 and NIST 800 Special Publications.  
 
5.3.1 Quantitative risk analysis 
Quantitative risk analysis methods use mathematical and statistical tools to represent 
risk. For example, the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) or the Estimated Annual Cost 
(EAC) calculations require input in the form of numeric frequencies and monetary loss 
estimates. Quantitative risk analysis makes use of a single figure produced from these 
elements. This is calculated for an event by simply multiplying the potential loss by its 
probability. The equation is : ALE = SLE × ARO, where SLE is the Single Loss 
Expectancy, and ARO is the Annualised Rate of Occurrence (or the predicted frequency 
of a loss event happening). Therefore, it is theoretically possible to rank events in order 
of the calculated risk (ALE) and to make decisions based upon this (Security Risk 
Analysis Group, 2003).  
 
The ALE-based methodologies are typically asset-driven. An asset-driven methodology 
directs most effort at compiling an inventory of data sources, destinations and modes of 
use. It commonly uses quantitative techniques and usually includes large-scale surveys. 
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Impact losses on business functions are revealed by modelling all possible paths from 
threats to assets via the vulnerabilities (Anderson, 1991). 
 
The main problem with quantitative risk analysis is usually associated with the 
unreliability and inaccuracy of the data, since probability can rarely be precise. Despite 
this drawback, however, a number of organisations have successfully adopted 
quantitative risk analysis (Security Risk Analysis Group, 2003). Karabacak and 
Sogukpinar (2005), however, argue that risk analysis methods that use intensive 
quantitative measures are not suitable for the current information security environment,  
since these methods are not able to model such complex risk scenarios. They believe 
that risk analysis methods based on qualitative measures are far more suitable.  
 
5.3.2 Qualitative risk analysis 
This is by far the most widely used approach to risk analysis. Probability data is not 
required, and only estimated potential loss is used. Qualitative analysis allows 
information users and owners to avoid committing themselves to unqualified point 
values, by using relative rankings or heuristic estimates. Users often feel more 
comfortable with qualitative output (Anderson, 1991). An important drawback of this 
approach, however, is that it tends to yield inconsistent results. These results are usually 
dependent on the ideas of the people who conduct the risk analysis (Karabacak and 
Sogukpinar, 2005). Qualitative analysis does not remove any uncertainty from the 
model, it merely distinguishes between opinion and fact. Its practical effect is to 
streamline asset evaluation and threat analysis (Anderson, 1991). 
 
5.3.3 Checklist-based approaches 
The checklist method, also known as the simple questionnaire method, uses a series of 
questions to assess risk. There are a number of sources that provide security checklists, 
such as manuals from computer system vendors and publications from security 
organisations. Examples include BS7799 parts 1 and 2 (1999), ISO/IEC TR 13335 Part 
4 (2000), IT-Baseline Protection Manual (GISA, 1997) and the NIST Handbook (1995). 
These generally list the questions and checklists by either functional areas, such as 
input, processing or output, or asset types, such as hardware, software and personnel. 
These generic checklists need to be converted to specific questions tailored for risk 
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analysis. The advantage of the checklist method is its simplicity in identifying major 
weaknesses. 
 
Cho and Ciechanowicz (2001) use an evidential network to combine answers and 
uncertainties from a checklist-based risk analysis. They argue that the checklist 
approach is still useful today in that it is relatively easier and simpler than other risk 
analysis methods.  The checklist method is a useful method in that it provides an 
overview of the security of the system in a reasonably short time period. It is the only 
applicable method to use where there is no risk analysis expertise nor organisational 
resource, such as budget and time, available to perform a detailed risk analysis. One 
concern in the checklist method, however, is how to manipulate the gathered answers to 
highlight areas that need management attention. The output of a checklist-based risk 
analysis without this capability,  tends to be a lengthy list of answers to questions, 
which has very limited use to management and prevents quick decisions being taken to 
improve security (Cho and Ciechanowicz, 2001). 
 
Checklists are used to some extent in the SecSDM, described in Chapter 6, thus it is 
necessary to highlight a number of issues and limitations with regards to their use. 
Landoll (2006) specifically refers to the following guidelines regarding the use of 
checklists: 
· Checklists are a memory aid and should be used as a guide and a reminder to 
provide a complete and accurate analysis; 
· Checklists help to ensure accuracy and completeness and can be used to simplify 
and improve various processes; 
· Checklists can, however, drive the results instead of guiding the analyst if not 
used correctly; 
· Checklists can be relied upon to the detriment of creativity; 
· An over reliance on checklists can lead to tunnel vision and a breakdown in the 
analytical process necessary for effective risk assessment. 
 
Section 5.4 briefly describes the specific risk analysis strategies, as advocated by 
ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998).  
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5.4 Risk Analysis Strategies 
The ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998), from the viewpoint of level of detail and granularity,  
refers to the following four basic options for a risk analysis strategy: 
· Baseline approach: a standard set of safeguards is applied to all information 
systems to achieve a baseline level of protection; 
· Informal approach: a pragmatic risk analysis is conducted on all systems by 
exploiting the knowledge and experience of security professionals; 
· Detailed risk analysis: refers to the detailed review of systems, including the 
identification and valuation of assets, an assessment of the levels of threats to 
those assets and associated vulnerabilities; 
· Combined approach: the baseline and detailed approaches are balanced by 
applying detailed risk analysis to important systems, while protecting less 
important systems with a baseline approach.  
 
The objective of baseline protection, according to ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998), is to 
establish a minimum set of safeguards to protect all the information assets of an 
organisation. The appropriate baseline protection can be achieved through the use of 
safeguard catalogues. These suggest a set of safeguards to protect an information system 
from the most common threats, therefore a detailed assessment of threats, vulnerabilities 
and risks is not necessary.  
 
A detailed risk analysis is done to identify the potential adverse business impacts of 
unwanted events, and the likelihood of their occurrence. The likelihood of occurrence is 
dependent on how attractive the asset is to a potential attacker, the likelihood of the 
threats occurring, and the ease with which the vulnerabilities can be exploited. A 
detailed risk analysis involves the identification and valuation of assets, the assessment 
of threats to those assets, and an assessment of the associated vulnerabilities. Its results 
lead to the identification, assessment and prioritisation of risk tha t are used to identify 
and select safeguards. This can be used to reduce the identified risks to an acceptable 
level (ISO/IEC TR 13335-3,1998). 
 
The major advantage of a detailed risk analysis is that an extensive analysis is 
conducted for the specific situation, taking all threats, vulnerabilities and impacts into 
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account. A disadvantage is that it normally requires a considerable amount of time, 
effort and expertise to obtain the detailed results.  
  
5.5 Risk Analysis Methodologies 
The established risk analysis methodologies possess distinct advantages and 
disadvantages, and most share both some good principles and limitations, when applied 
to modern software design (McGraw and Verdon, 2004). This section briefly describes 
two of the more common risk analysis methodologies, namely CRAMM and OCTAVE. 
 
5.5.1 CRAMM 
Owing to the critical role of risk analysis in security management, a number of risk 
analysis methods have been developed since the early eighties. For example the Central 
Computer and Telecommunications Agency of the British government (CCTA) 
developed the CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) in 1985. 
Spinellis et al (1999) specifically advocate the use of CRAMM, because it is considered 
an effective and reliable method that has been extensively used since 1987. It is the 
mandatory risk analysis method for governmental organisations in the United Kingdom 
and has, therefore, been thoroughly tested. The CRAMM methodology involves three 
stages, namely: 
· Asset identification and assessment; 
· Threat and vulnerability identification and assessment; 
· Countermeasure selection. 
 
5.5.2 OCTAVE 
This methodology was developed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) of the 
Carnegie Mellon University. The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability 
Evaluation (OCTAVE) method provides a process complete with guidelines, checklists, 
time-estimates and process descriptions for its three-phased process. The three phases 
include (Landoll, 2006): 
· Asset-based threat profiles; 
· Infrastructure vulnerability identification; 
· Security and strategy plan development. 
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Sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 discussed the various risk analysis approaches, strategies and 
methodologies respectively. Before explaining the risk analysis process in detail, it is 
necessary to address some of the common problems in risk analysis, as highlighted in 
Section 5.6. 
 
5.6 Common Problems in Risk Analysis  
Risk analysis is regarded as the point where the most difficulty arises within risk 
management. The measurement of risk is not a simple task because, it invariably 
includes the subjective judgment of an ana lyst. Risk analysis often forces the analyst to 
estimate or predict future events, which are uncertain. It is important, therefore, to 
consider these uncertainties associated with judgments made by the analyst.  
 
Research has shown that many of the problems in risk analysis derive from an 
inadequate analysis of the elements of risk. Generally, surveys on risk analysis practice 
produce a pattern of complaints, including  (Anderson, 1991): 
· Formal risk analyses are time-consuming and expensive exercises and of 
dubious benefit; 
· Methodologies always need to be adapted to fit a particular model, i.e., models 
are inappropriate; 
· Quantitative methods are unsuitable for general data processing and 
communications analysis; 
· Where quantitative methods are suitable, they are best conducted by employees 
with expertise in the application rather than in computer security; 
· Risk analysers would be best served by tools that allow informal, qualitative 
analyses to be executed rapidly  to compare several scenarios at a high level; 
· The task of data collection is unacceptably time-consuming and represents a 
heavy investment in resources for the organisation; 
· Risk analysis has to be performed by experienced IT staff, trained in the 
methodology and at least knowledgeable about computer security; 
· System specification and documentation tools do not currently produce the 
“information about information” in an appropriate form for risk analysis; 
· Most methodologies do not attempt to model the human environment of the 
system, although people pose the greatest risks; 
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· The notion of risk is applied at too high a granularity (entities like “file” and 
“data set” are too vague). 
 
Cho and Ciechanowicz (2001) suggest that imprecise inputs, too much focus on 
numerical values, and the tendency to use the same inputs over several years, are some 
of the factors that bring into doubt the value of risk analysis. However, despite all the 
problems mentioned, risk analysis is critical for preserving security, and the benefits of 
a well-performed risk analysis fa r outweigh any drawbacks (Cho and Ciechanowicz, 
2001). 
 
For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to reiterate the distinction between risk 
analysis and risk management. Whereas risk analysis is concerned with the 
identification, assessment and prioritisation of risk, risk management focuses on the 
selection and implementation of security safeguards. Bearing in mind that a risk is 
directly related to a threat that has the ability to exploit a vulnerability, thereby 
impacting the associated asset. Section 5.7 describes the risk analysis process in detail.  
 
5.7 The Risk Analysis Process 
Risk analysis is a useful tool for organisations to identify possible security holes in 
information systems and assist in providing appropriate countermeasures. It is an 
essential tool for the systematic management of information security.  It provides useful 
information to management by identifying the potential risks, and forms the basis for 
improved decision-making with respect to security investment. It is therefore, for any 
business or organisation, important to have a clear understanding of the assets that need 
to be protected, the threats against which those assets must be protected, the 
vulnerabilities associated with the assets, and the overall risk to the assets from those 
threats and vulnerabilities. 
 
There are a number of possibilities to reduce risk. ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998) 
specifically refers to the following alternatives: 
· Avoid the risk; 
· Transfer the risk (for example, insurance); 
· Reduce the threats; 
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· Reduce the vulnerabilities; 
· Reduce the possible impacts; 
· Detect, react to, and recover from unwanted events. 
Which of these possibilities, or combination of them, is most appropriate depends on the 
circumstances. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: The Conventional Model used in Risk Analysis (Anderson, 1991) 
 
This dissertation follows the guidelines of the detailed risk analysis approach as 
advocated by ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998). This approach requires the detailed 
consideration of assets, threats and vulnerabilities, which ultimately will facilitate the 
selection of effective safeguards appropriate to the assessed risks. This approach is 
evident in the conventional model used in risk analysis, depicted in Figure 5.2. 
 
The following sub-sections address the typical stages of the  detailed risk analysis 
process, as described in ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998), namely: 
· The identification of assets; 
· The valuation of assets; 
· The threat assessment; 
· The vulnerability assessment; 
Assets 
Threats Vulnerabilities Impacts 
Safeguards 
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· The assessment of risks; 
· The selection of safeguards; 
· The implementation of safeguards. 
 
5.7.1 The identification of assets  
An asset is a component or part of a total system to which an organisation directly 
assigns value and, therefore, it requires protection. A key step in the risk analysis 
process is to identify the assets to be protected. From an information security 
perspective, the following assets may need protection (Bertine et al, 2004): 
· Communications and computing services; 
· Information and data, including software and data relating to security services;  
· Equipment and facilities. 
The information of an organisation is among its most valuable assets and is critical to its 
success. For the purposes of this study, the focus is on the protection of software 
applications and their associated information assets. The persons carrying out the risk 
analysis must be able to list the most important assets after consultation with the owners 
and users of the information. 
 
The listing assets based on checklists and judgment should, according to Landoll 
(2006),  yield an adequate identification of the critical assets of the organisation. If there 
are no documents or previous activities that have already classified the organisational 
assets, the process may be shortened by simply determining whether information is 
sensitive or not. It can then be stated that sensitive information requires protection and 
public data does not. This, however, may be an oversimplification for some 
organisations, especially those that must comply with information security regulations, 
such as HIPAA or the GLBA. 
 
Another approach, that Landoll (2006) supports, is the categorisation of assets at three  
levels, namely critical, important and supportive. These levels are defined as: 
· Critical assets – those assets that would prevent the organisation from 
accomplishing its core business functions if not protected; 
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· Important assets – those assets whose compromise would not prevent the 
organisation from accomplishing its core business in the short term, but would if 
the assets were not restored; 
· Supportive assets – those assets whose compromise would not prevent  the 
organisation from accomplishing its core business functions, but would affect 
the effectiveness or efficiency of day-to-day operations. 
 
The next step in the risk analysis process, after having identified the assets requiring 
protection, is to assign some form of value to each of them.  
 
5.7.2 The valuation of assets   
The valuation of assets is an essential step in the overall risk analysis process. The next 
step in the risk analysis process, after having identified the assets requiring protection, is 
to assign some form of value to each of them. This value should be expressed in terms 
which are relevant to the asset and to the business entity involved. These values 
represent the importance of the assets to the business or organisation. According to 
ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998), the values assigned should be related to: 
· The cost of obtaining and maintaining the asset; 
· The potential adverse business impacts resulting from its loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity and reliability. 
An example for such a valuation scale could be a distinction between: 
· A 3-point scale (low, medium and high); 
· A 5-point scale (negligible, low, medium, high and very high);  
· A 7-point scale (negligible, very low, low, medium, high, very high and critical). 
An organisation can define its own scale for determining its asset values. Landoll 
(2006) suggests, to simplify the process, that all critical assets are considered of high 
value, important assets have a medium value and supportive assets have a low value. 
This simplistic method comprises the classic qualitative approach. 
 
Whitman and Mattord (2003) further recommend that the following data gathering 
questions be used to assist with the asset identification and valuation process: 
· Which information assets are the most critical to the success of the organisation? 
· Which information assets generate the most revenue? 
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· Which information assets generate the most profitability? 
· Which information assets would be the most expensive to replace? 
· Which information assets would be the most expensive to protect? 
· Which information assets would be the most embarrassing or cause the greatest 
liability if revealed? 
Other organisation-specific questions can add value to this process. 
 
The next step in the risk analysis process involves a threat assessment  because assets are 
subject to many kinds of threats, and threats have the potential to cause them harm. 
 
5.7.3 The threat assessment  
Peltier (2005) defines a threat as an undesirable event that could have an impact on the 
organisation. It is essential that no significant threat is overlooked in carrying out a 
threat assessment, since this could result in the failure or a weakness in the information 
system.  A list of the most likely threats is helpful in performing a threat assessment, 
although one must be aware that threats are continually changing.  
 
There are a number of different methods that can be used to create a complete list of 
threats. These include brainstorming, developing checklists and examining historical 
data. However, Peltier (2005) does caution that although the use of checklists is 
important, care must be taken that they do not negatively impact the free flow of ideas. 
 
It is important to consider that a threat may arise from within the organisation when 
carrying out a threat assessment, for example, sabotage  by an employee. The threat may 
arise from outside, for example, malicious hacking or industrial espionage. Common 
examples of threats include (Bertine et al, 2004): 
· Unauthorised disclosure of information; 
· Unauthorised destruction or modification of data, equipment or other resources; 
· Theft, removal or loss of information or other resources; 
· Interruption or denial of services;  
· Impersonation or masquerading as an authorised entity. 
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Peltier (2005) classifies threats into three major categories, namely: 
· Natural threats for example, floods, earthquakes, landslides and electrical 
storms; 
· Human threats, which may be further sub-divided into: 
o Unintentional acts for example, errors and omissions, which statistically 
accounts for the largest loss to information assets; 
o Deliberate acts for example, fraud, malicious software and unauthorised 
access; 
· Environmental threats for example, long-term power outages, pollution, 
chemical spills and liquid leakages. 
 
Natural threats include equipment failures or disasters, such as fire and floods that can 
result in the loss of equipment and information. Natural threats usually affect the 
availability of processing resources and information (Killmeyer, 2006). 
 
Corporate information can be easily accessed, compromised or destroyed by intentional, 
unintentional or natural threats. An intentional threat is one that is realised by someone 
committing a deliberate act. Intentional threats are unauthorised users who 
inappropriately access data and information that they are not granted permission to view 
or use. These unauthorised users can be internal or external to the organisation and can 
be classified as curious or malicious. Intrusion by malicious unauthorised users first 
results in a breach of confidentiality, which lead to breaches in integrity and possibly 
availability. An accidental threat is one with no premeditated intent, such as a system or 
software malfunction or a physical failure. Unintentional threats are typically caused by 
untrained or careless employees, who have not taken the necessary steps to ensure a 
secure environment. Such unintentional threats can include software developers who do 
not follow defined standards and procedures. This threat invariably exists in 
environments where no defined standards or procedures exist (Killmeyer, 2006). 
 
It is important to recognise the various threat characteristics, as highlighted by ISO/IEC 
13335-1 (2004) to perform a thorough threat assessment. These characteristics include: 
· The source i.e. insider or outsider; 
· The motivation (for example, financial gain or competitive advantage); 
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· The frequency of occurrence; 
· The likelihood; 
· The impact. 
After cons idering the threat source (who and what causes the threat) and the threat 
target (i.e., what information assets may be affected by the threat), it is necessary to 
assess the likelihood of the threats. This likelihood should indicate the probability that a 
potential threat may be exercised against the asset under review. It will be useful to 
determine the impact that the threat may have on the overall organisation. At the 
completion of the threat assessment, there will be a list of the threats identified, the 
information assets they will affect, and measures of the likelihood of threats occurring 
on a 3-point, 5-point or 7-point scale as referred to in Section 5.7.2. 
 
Threats are very real, and organisations are beginning to take the associated 
vulnerabilities, risks and potential losses to their information more seriously. Threats 
take advantage of vulnerabilities to cause destruction, interruption of operations, 
disclosure of information or denial of service, therefore, the next key step in the risk 
analysis process is the vulnerability assessment. 
 
5.7.4 The vulnerability assessment  
A threat needs to exploit an existing vulnerability to harm an asset. Nyanchama (2005) 
defines a vulnerability as a weakness in hardware or software that exposes an 
information system to attack, harm, interruption, or unauthorised exploitation. It may be 
a defect or weakness in system security procedure, design, implementation or internal 
control that an attacker can compromise. A vulnerability in itself, however, does not 
cause harm. It is merely a condition or set of conditions that will allow a threat to affect 
an asset.  
 
Bertine et al (2004) classify vulnerabilities into four categories, namely: 
· Threat Model vulnerabilities, which originate from the difficulty of foreseeing 
possible future threats; 
· Design and Specification vulnerabilities, which arise from errors or oversights in 
the design of a system or protocol that make it inherently vulnerable; 
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· Implementation vulnerabilities are typically introduced by errors during system 
or protocol implementation; 
· Operation and Configuration vulnerabilities originate from improper usage of 
options in implementations or weak deployment policies.  
 
New security vulnerabilities are found almost daily. Each newly discovered 
vulnerability results in a frantic patch that potentially creates new vulnerabilities. This 
game of catch-up is endless. According to Cenzic (2003), the critical place to address 
security vulnerabilities is in the software development process. 
 
Common development practices unfortunately leave software with many vulnerabilities 
(Task Force Report, 2004). These are generally caused by defective specification, 
design and implementation. McGraw and Verdon (2004) categorise software 
vulnerabilities as flaws (design- level problems) or bugs (implementation- level 
problems). Today, hackers attack software applications by seeking ways to manipulate 
input strings to gain super-user access, by stealing data or creating buffer overflows. 
They hunt for weaknesses in the many modules and components of complex systems, 
looking for hidden fields, embedded passwords, and available parameters to manipulate 
(Cenzic, 2003). 
 
Issues and complexities in the current software development world lead to problems, 
with security vulnerability being one of the more significant by-products. Many security 
vulnerabilities result from defects that are unintentionally introduced in the software 
during design and development. According to a preliminary analysis done by the 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Coordination Centre, over 90% of 
software security vulnerabilities are caused by known software defects, and most 
software vulnerabilities arise from common causes. The top ten causes account  for 
about 75% of all vulnerabilities. The overall specification, design and implementation 
defects in software must be reduced to significantly reduce software vulnerabilities, 
(Task Force Report, 2004). 
 
According to Nyanchama (2005), vulnerabilities occur in software due to various 
factors, including poor coding practices and the complex nature of software itself. He 
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warns, however, that while good coding practices can reduce the number of defects, 
they cannot eliminate coding errors altogether. This can be attributed to various other 
factors including: 
· Software engineering practices that predominantly emphasize functionality over 
safety; 
· The labour-intensive nature of software engineering which makes software 
products susceptible to human error; 
· The ongoing need to reduce software development costs; 
· The practice of module reuse. An error impact is amplified whenever a faulty 
module is reused in a different application or different parts of an application. 
 
The presence of a vulnerability does not cause harm in itself because there must be a 
threat present to exploit it. This relationship becomes clear when considering the 
following examples of common software vulnerabilities, as provided by ISO/IEC TR 
13335-3 (1998): 
· Unclear or incomplete specifications for developers which can be exploited by, 
for example, the threat of software failure; 
· None or insufficient software testing which can be exploited by, for example, 
the threat of use of software by unauthorised users; 
· A complicated user interface which can be exploited by, for example, the threat 
of user error; 
· Lack of identification and authentication mechanisms, like user authentication 
which can be exploited by, for example, the threat of masquerading of user 
identity; 
· Lack of audit-trail which can be exploited by, for example, the threat of use of 
software in an unauthorised manner; 
· Well-known flaws in the software which can be exploited by, for example, the 
threat of the unauthorised use of software; 
· Unprotected password tables which can be exploited by, for example, the threat 
of masquerading of user identity; 
· Poor password management which can be exploited by, for example, the threat 
of masquerading of user identity; 
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· Incorrect allocation of user rights which can be exploited by, for example, the 
threat of use of software in an unauthorised manner; 
· Uncontrolled downloading and using software which can be exploited by, for 
example, the threat of malicious software; 
· Lack of effective change control which can be exploited by, for example, the 
threat of software failure; 
· Lack of documentation which can be exploited by, for example, the threat of 
user error. 
According to ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998), it is important to assess how severe the 
vulnerabilities are, or how easily they may be exploited. A vulnerability should be 
assessed in relation to each threat that might exploit it in a particular situation. 
 
It is clear, from this discussion,  that a vulnerability assessment is necessary to identify 
any potential weaknesses. It identifies vulnerabilities that may be exploited by threats 
and assesses their likely level of weakness. A vulnerability, which has no corresponding 
threat, does not require the implementation of a safeguard, but should be recognised and 
monitored for changes. It is important to realise that an incorrectly implemented 
safeguard, or a safeguard being used incorrectly, could itself be a vulnerability.  
 
It is necessary to address the assessment of risks as the next stage in the risk analysis 
process before discussing the selection and implementation of safeguards,  
 
5.7.5 The assessment of risk 
There would be no risk without vulnerabilities,  A security risk, as defined by Landoll 
(2006), is the potential loss to organisational assets that will likely occur if a threat is 
able to exploit a vulnerability. The objective of this step is to identify and assess the  
risks to which the software application and its associated information assets are exposed 
to identify and select appropriate and justified security safeguards.  
 
The basic equation for risk calculation is:  Risk = Asset × Threat × Vulnerability.  
 
This simple equation illustrates the principle that risk is calculated, based on an 
understanding of the asset value, the extent of the threat, and the likelihood of the threat 
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exploiting an existing vulnerability. It is tempting to think that determining risk is a 
simple calculation. However, the determination of the value of assets, the frequency of 
the threat, and the likelihood of a vulnerability existing is clouded by uncertainty 
(Landoll, 2006). 
 
The result of this step should be a list of measured risks for each of the impacts of 
disclosure, modification, non-availability and destruction for the information system 
under consideration according to ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998).  The specific measures 
of risk will help identify which risks should be dealt with first when selecting 
safeguards.  
 
5.7.6 The selection of safeguards   
Safeguards must be selected, based on their effectiveness in addressing the indicated 
security risks (Landoll, 2006). The results of the risk assessment should be considered 
to select safeguards, which effectively protect against these risks. It is useful to consider 
the vulnerabilities that are to be protected against to identify the safeguards. Catalogues 
may prove helpful in the identification and selection of safeguards, although these will 
need to be customised to meet the specific security needs of the software application 
under consideration. Safeguard catalogues generally recommend a set of safeguards to 
protect against the most common threats.  
 
The selection of safeguards should, according to ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998),  include 
a balance between operational (non-technical) and technical safeguards. Operational 
safeguards are those which provide physical, personnel and administrative security. 
Physical security safeguards include, for example, key-coded door locks, fire 
suppression systems and security guards. Technical security comprises hardware, 
software and communications safeguards. These safeguards are selected, according to 
the risks identified, to provide security functionality and assurance. Security 
functionality includes identification and authentication, logical access controls, audit 
trail/security logging, dial-back security, message authentication and encryption. 
Assurance documents the level of trust needed in security functions, and therefore, 
specifies the amount of checking and security testing required to confirm that level of 
trust (ISO/IEC TR 13335-3,1998). 
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The ISO/IEC TR 13335-4 (2000) suggests that the process of safeguard selection 
requires some knowledge of the type and characteristics of the information system 
under consideration, because this has a significant influence on the safeguards selected 
to protect it. A standalone workstation, for instance, clearly requires the implementation 
of different safeguards to that of a server or workstation connected to a network. The 
compatibility of the existing safeguards with the selected ones must be considered when 
selecting safeguards,. A particular safeguard may conflict with another or hinder its 
successful operation and the protection provided. 
 
The ISO/IEC TR 13335-4 (2000) refers to the selection of safeguards according to 
security concerns and threats in the following ways: 
· Identify and assess the security concerns. The requirements for confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity and reliability are considered. 
The strength and number of safeguards selected should be appropriate to the 
assessed security concerns; 
·  Typical threats are listed for each of the security concerns. Appropriate 
safeguards are suggested for each threat listed, according to the information 
system under consideration. 
 
There are basically four aspects that a safeguard can address, namely impacts, threats, 
vulnerabilities and the risks themselves. The risk itself is addressed when the decision is 
made to transfer the risk rather than accept it. The impacts, threats and vulnerabilities 
are the main targets of safeguards. According to ISO/IEC TR 13335-4 (2000),  they are 
addressed as follows: 
· Safeguards can reduce the likelihood of a threat occurring. For example, 
consider the threat of data loss because of user errors - a training course can 
reduce the number of user errors; 
· Safeguards can remove a vulnerability or make it less serious. For example, if an 
internal network is vulnerable to unauthorised access from an external network, 
the implementation of a firewall could make the connection less vulnerable; 
· Safeguards can reduce or avoid the impact. For example, the adverse impact of 
non-availability of information can be reduced by making a copy of that 
information and storing it safely elsewhere. 
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The ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998) suggests that various factors be considered when 
selecting safeguards for implementation, including: 
· The ease of use of the safeguard; 
· Transparency to the user; 
· The help provided to the users to perform their functions; 
· The relative strength of the safeguards; 
· The types of functions performed (prevention, deterrence, detection, recovery, 
correction, monitoring, and awareness). 
A further important aspect is cost. It is inappropriate to recommend safeguards which 
are more expensive to implement and maintain than the value of the information assets 
they are designed to protect (ISO/IEC TR 13335-3, 1998). Peltier (2006) proposes that a 
cost-benefit analysis be carried out to assist in identifying those safeguards that offer the 
maximum amount of protection at a minimum cost. How and where a safeguard is used 
will have a significant influence on the benefits gained from its implementation. 
 
5.7.7 The implementation of safeguards   
The proposed safeguards should be compared with the existing safeguards, prior to 
implementation,  to assess whether they can be extended or upgraded. This can be less 
expensive than introducing new safeguards (ISO/IEC TR 13335-4, 2000). 
 
Technical constraints, such as performance requirements, manageability and 
compatibility issues may hamper the use of certain safeguards. It could even be the case 
that a particular safeguard may decrease system performance. Aspects such as privacy 
legislation may demand that certain safeguards be in place (ISO/IEC TR 13335-4, 
2000). 
 
The documentation of safeguards is an important part of the information security 
documentation to ensure continuity and consistency. Much of the documentation, 
particularly on threats, vulnerabilities and risks, is very sensitive and must be protected 
from unauthorised disclosure. Therefore, it can be argued that security documentation is 
kept separate from the typical systems documentation developed during software 
development. 
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5.8 Criteria for Effective Risk Analysis  
The perceived importance of security assessment in most information systems is such 
that risk analysis is, at best, a cyclic and, at worst, a once-off activity. Therefore, 
methodologies are needed to control and direct data collection and interpretation and to 
test completeness in the form of some “deliverable”. Risk analysis, as an estimating 
task, has several major, independent sources of uncertainty.  
 
The suitability of a methodology can be assessed, according to Anderson (1991),  using 
a series of criteria with associated metrics, including: 
· The ability to produce consistent results when applied to the same case by 
different analysers; 
· Usability which is measured by the effort to learn and use as compared to the 
results obtained; 
· Adaptability to different types of system configuration; 
· Feasibility of acquiring input data economically; 
· Completeness which is the acknowledgement of all relevant aspects of risk; 
· Validity  which is  the correspondence of the output model to reality; 
· Credibility which is the extent to which users feel they can rely on the results. 
 
5.9 Conclusion  
When developing a software solution, it is imperative that the first and driving factor for 
implementing a secure solution is the business need.  An information security point of 
view requires that the particular business need is determined by performing some form 
of risk analysis. Technical security measures (for example, passwords), and non-
technical measures (for example, secure operating procedures for personnel), are needed 
to meet these demands.  
 
It has been determined that information security is concerned primarily with the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. This implies that a secure 
software development environment should ensure that only authorised users have access 
to sensitive information, that the information is processed, stored and communicated 
correctly and that it is available when necessary. This will, when correctly maintained, 
result in a greater degree of assurance to the users of the information. The easier it 
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becomes for software applications to exchange information, the more difficult it is to 
protect them from various security risks. 
 
A security risk is a measure of the adverse effects that can result if a security 
vulnerability is exploited, i.e., if a threat is realised. Risk can never be eliminated, 
however,  one objective of security is to reduce risk to an acceptable level. This means it 
is necessary to understand the threats and vulnerabilities and to apply appropriate 
countermeasures (i.e., security services and mechanisms). Threats and threat agents 
change, but security vulnerabilities exist throughout the life of a system or protocol 
unless specific steps are taken to address vulnerabilities.  
 
Risk 
Identification 
Identification and valuation of information assets. 
Identification and assessment of threats. 
Identification of vulnerabilities. 
Risk 
Assessment 
Quantitative using mathematical and statistical tools. 
Qualitative using relative rankings or heuristic estimates. 
Risk 
Analysis  
Risk 
Prioritisation 
According to the risk value determined during the risk 
assessment. 
Safeguard 
Selection 
Identification and selection of the relevant security 
services and mechanisms. Risk 
Management Safeguard 
Implementation 
Selection of the appropriate tools and components. 
Table 5.1: The Distinctive Elements of Risk Analysis and Risk Management 
 
It is important that a simplified approach is used to educate software developers in risk 
analysis and risk management, specifically in the software development arena, but not 
to the detriment of the results achieved. Table 5.1 highlights the most important 
elements that should be inherent in the approach taken. A good approach may be to find 
a balance between minimising the time and effort spent in identifying the safeguards, 
whilst ensuring that the high risk assets are appropriately protected. The incorporation 
of an initial quick and simple approach is likely to gain greater acceptance and, 
therefore, be more widely used. 
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Many of the security vulnerabilities current ly found in software applications can be 
overcome by integrating a high- level approach to risk analysis into the SDLC. The 
following chapter proposes a model for secure software development, which integrates 
risk analysis into various stages of the SDLC. 
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Chapter 6 
The Secure Software Development Model 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 introduced various risk analysis approaches, strategies and methodologies, 
and described the process in detail. It addressed common problems in risk analysis and 
recommended criteria for consideration. This chapter describes the phases of the Secure 
Software Development Model (SecSDM). 
 
The problem of producing secure software is both a software engineering and security 
engineering problem. Software engineering addresses planning, tracking and 
measurement whilst security engineering addresses methods and tools needed to design, 
implement and test secure systems. Secure software development requires an integration 
of these two engineering approaches (Task Force Report, 2004). 
 
The complex and highly connected computing environment of today triggers several 
security concerns. Security problems involving computers and software are frequent, 
widespread, and serious. The number and variety of attacks by persons and malicious 
software from outside the organisation, particularly via the Internet, are increasing 
rapidly. The evident  separation between information security and software development 
has resulted in the production of vulnerable software applications. 
 
In a climate where the protection of information is increasingly tied to the integrity of 
an organisation, security must be strongly coupled to the software development process 
ensuring that the desired level of security is achieved (Tipton and Krause, 2006). 
Organisations expect the ir data to remain confidential, to be available when required, 
and not be subject to unauthorised modification. This makes the  security of information 
to be of the utmost importance (Tryfonas and Kiountouzis, 2002). It is necessary to 
develop an improved software development process to build better or more secure 
software. Security considerations must provide input into every phase of the SDLC. 
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Software developers generally ignore the idea of security. This leads to software  
applications that have many avoidable  security weaknesses. Jurjens (2002) argues that 
software developers rely on their intuition in developing secure software and do without 
much systematic help or guidance. Therefore, it is unsurprising that security breaches 
continue to occur in software applications. Cenzic (2003) states that this is due to the 
lack of attention to various core problems, namely insecure software development and 
the lack of security testing. Cenzic (2003) suggests that human error, as a result from 
the lack of education or skill, has caused these issues to surface. 
 
It is argued that building secure software begins with the effective education of software 
developers. These professionals need be educated to put security at both the heart of 
software design and at the foundation of its development process. This implies that 
software developers need to use improved processes that consistently produce secure 
software. The Task Force Report (2004) notes that there do not currently exist software 
development processes or practices that consistently produce secure software. They 
recommend that software producers adopt practices that can measurably reduce 
software specification, design and implementation defects and, therefore, minimise any 
potential risk. 
 
The key to meeting the current demand for improved security, for the software industry, 
is to implement repeatable processes that reliably deliver measurably improved security.  
Therefore, a more stringent software development process that focuses on security is 
required. It should minimise the number of security vulnerabilities present in the SDLC 
and detect and remove these vulnerabilities as early in the life cycle as possible (Lipner 
and Howard, 2005). Tryfonas and Kiountouzis (2002) are in agreement, and suggest 
that new ways of addressing and resolving security issues, early within the SDLC, must 
be introduced in the software development arena.  
 
This chapter describes a model for incorporating security into the SDLC. It proposes a 
more stringent software development methodology that both detects and removes 
vulnerabilities early in the life cycle, thereby minimising the number of security 
vulnerabilities in the live system. The SecSDM aims to draw attention to the importance 
of security in the SDLC and it is designed as an extension, not a replacement to pre-
existing software development methodologies. Software developers should incorporate 
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the concepts from each phase of the SecSDM into the corresponding phases of the 
existing SDLC to ensure that security is appropriately considered and built into the 
software application. This type of inclusion should result in a robust end product that is 
more secure, easier to maintain and less costly to own. It is argued that although many 
researchers advocate that security needs to be integrated into the SDLC, few are able to 
describe a process to achieve this goal. Chapter 6 motivates an incremental process for 
incorporating information security into all phases of the SDLC, as illustrated in Figure 
6.1. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Security in the SDLC 
 
6.2 Why the Need for a Secure Software Development Model? 
Application security has been largely overlooked by many organisations protecting their 
assets, despite the fact that software applications have been a primary target for many 
hackers. It has been estimated, for instance, that nearly 90% of Web applications 
contain major security holes (Landoll, 2006). They are still vulnerable, regardless of the 
fact that most of these applications sit behind a firewall, and in some cases behind 
hardened operating systems.  
 
Applications currently are networked and used in highly distributed environments. The 
current state of application security, however, reflects the fact that security has been an 
afterthought. Recently, protecting the confidentiality and integrity of data in transit and 
storage was the primary concern, and cryptography successfully addressed this problem. 
However, the provision of security within networked information systems extends 
beyond protecting data and cryptographic keys. Main (2004) argues that it is not enough 
to build perimeter defences around the network. The approach to application security 
must be driven by a clear and thorough understanding of the potential threats to the 
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application. Application security must, therefore, extend beyond traditional network and 
data security to address the attacks against the software itself. According to Main 
(2004), the design of security that is intrinsic and inseparable from the application is 
essential. Developers can weigh the investment required in providing adequate 
application security against the anticipated threats by planning for software protection 
as part of the creation of an application (Main, 2004). 
 
Landoll (2006) states that organisations need to protect their information systems from 
unscheduled changes, third-party access, system-level and application- level 
vulnerabilities. Any of these threats could lead to disclosure or corruption of sensitive 
information, subversion of network systems or fraud (Landoll, 2006). It is important to 
provide software developers with an understanding of the vulnerabilities and exposures 
that could introduce security risks into software applications. The intended goal is to 
enable developers to write more secure code and to provide a greater level of assurance 
that software applications are not exposed to vulnerabilities when integrated with other 
systems and applications. 
 
Common development practices, unfortunately, leave software with many 
vulnerabilities. These are caused primarily by defective specification, design and 
implementation processes. An inappropriate implementation may, for instance, contain 
vulnerabilities facilitating attacks, and an insecure design or life cycle model may allow 
Trojan horses in the source code (Leiwo, Kwok, Maskell & Stankovic, 2005). These 
software specification, design, and code defects are unknowingly injected by 
developers. This could be attributed to the fact that developers often use methods of 
coding that are inherently insecure. Logic modules, for example, are typically written in 
a manner that creates security issues when they are integrated. Applications are often 
installed that create vulnerabilities rather than eliminate them (Cenzic, 2003).  
 
The supporting software must contain few, if any, vulnerabilities to have a secure 
infrastructure. This requires that software is built to sound security requirements and 
contain few specification, design or code defects. Software development processes must 
change to produce software with few defects. The Task Force Report (2004), reports 
that this requires that developers use methods that consistently produce secure software. 
This, in turn, requires development organisations to: 
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· Acquire a high- level of security expertise; 
· Identify and adopt processes for producing low-defect, secure software;  
· Consistently use this security expertise and these processes when they produce, 
enhance, maintain and rework software. 
 
Procedures should be implemented which ensure that software development adheres to 
approved development and maintenance methodologies, to guarantee secure software 
development. A formal methodology for secure software development is necessary to 
ensure that appropriate controls are built into the application to provide confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of the information.  
 
6.3 Support for Secure Software Development 
Security is perhaps the final frontier for developers as they build applications for the 
modern enterprise. Microsoft has stated that it will deliver tools that enable developers 
to broadly cover the application life cycle, including tools that address design, coding, 
issue tracking, source code control and various forms of testing. Rick Samona, product 
manager for the .Net framework and developer tools at Microsoft, was quoted as saying 
that every organisation, small or large, must have an existing security design life cycle 
to ensure that security occurs during all phases. Organisations must provide their 
developers with the adequate training to write secure applications. According to Taft 
(2004), a recent Microsoft study demonstrated that 64% of developers are not confident 
in their ability to write secure applications. This is despite the fact that the .Net 
framework and Visual Studio.Net provide developers with the necessary tools and 
information to write secure applications. 
 
Jones and Rastogi (2004) define a software development methodology that starts with 
an understanding of business objectives and security requirements. It ensures that 
security is designed into the application and thoroughly tested throughout the SDLC. 
Their methodology has interwoven security into every stage of the SDLC, however, the 
SecSDM provides a more structured approach to achieving a secure software product. 
The methodology of Jones and Rastogi (2004), like the SecSDM, is based on existing 
risk management practices. The following should be considered in the process of 
integrating security into the SDLC (Jones and Rastogi, 2004): 
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· Gain support from the highest levels within the organisation; 
· Assess the current capability of the organisation with respect to secure coding; 
· Develop a phased approach for integrating security into the SDLC; 
· Ensure developers, project managers and system architects undertake formal 
training to secure coding; 
· Ensure that secure coding reference materials are available; 
· Establish internal metrics and key performance indicators. 
 
Similarly, the Task Force Report (2004) suggests that any software development  
process must meet the following requirements to effectively produce secure software, 
namely: 
· Coverage - a secure process must cover the full software life cycle, from the 
earliest requirements through design, development, delivery, maintenance, 
enhancement and retirement; 
· Definition - the process must be precisely defined so that it can be taught, 
supported, verified, maintained, enhanced and certified; 
· Integrity - the process must establish and guard the integrity of the product 
throughout its life cycle ; 
· Measures - the process must include measures to verify that the developers are 
capable of consistently and correctly using the process, that the correct process 
was properly used to develop the product, and that the process consistently 
produces secure software products; 
· Tailoring - the process must permit tailoring and enable verification that such 
tailoring does not compromise the security of the resulting products; 
· Usability - the process must be usable by properly trained and qualified software 
developers, security specialists, managers and other professionals. It must be 
economical and practical to use for developing a wide and defined range of 
software product types; 
· Ownership - the process must be owned, supported, widely available, and 
regularly updated to reflect changing threat conditions and improvements in 
knowledge and technology; 
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· Support - the process must be fully supported with training programs, course 
material, instruction guides and supporting tools; 
· State of the Practice - the process must include the use of quality practice 
methods for design, deve lopment, test, product measurement, and product 
documentation. 
 
Gregory (2003) advocates that one of the key steps to integrating security into the 
SDLC is to ensure that all the stakeholders who need security information has it 
available, in a useful, phase specific format. The improvement of software engineering 
practices and processes will lead to secure software; software released with fewer 
defects; lower development and maintenance costs and an enhanced reputation for the 
final product. 
 
6.4 Phases of  the Secure Software Development Model 
A key notion underlying the creation of the SecSDM, is the inclusion of security 
activities throughout the SDLC. Various security design principles, as recommended by 
Tipton and Krause (2006), were taken into account in developing this model. These 
include: 
· Avoid security for its own sake and focus on the overall capability and the 
associated risk factors; 
· Address the key security areas of identification, authentication, authorisation, 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability and non-repudiation; 
· Build multiple layers of controls; 
· Strive for transparent security; 
· Keep security simple; 
· Consider the life cycle of the software application; 
· Favour mature and proven security technologies. 
 
These principles clearly support the need to ensure that appropriate security concerns 
are addressed throughout the SDLC to minimise the associated risks. The main security 
concerns to be addressed at each phase of the SDLC, according to the SecSDM, are as 
follows: 
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· Investigation Phase: This determines the security requirements of the software 
application by executing a simple risk analysis exercise; 
· Analysis Phase: This determines the security services to be used to satisfy the 
security requirements; 
· Design Phase: This determines how the security services will be implemented; 
· Implementation Phase: This identifies and implements the tools and 
components; 
· Maintenance Phase: This educates users in the correct operation of  the software 
application in a secure manner. 
 
This section describes the SecSDM as a simple, ten-step process for integrating secur ity 
into each phase of the SDLC as depicted in Appendix A. These key steps include: 
· Investigation Phase; 
o STEP 1: Information asset identification and valuation; 
o STEP 2: Threat identification and assessment ; 
o STEP 3: Risk (asset/threat) identification; 
o STEP 4: Determine the level of vulnerability; 
o STEP 5: Risk assessment ; 
o STEP 6: Risk prioritisation. 
· Analysis Phase; 
o STEP 7: Identify the relevant security services and level of protectio n 
required to mitigate each risk. 
· Design Phase; 
o STEP 8: Map security services to security mechanisms; 
o STEP 9: Summary of findings. 
· Implementation Phase; 
o STEP 10: Map security mechanisms to .Net and other security 
components. 
· Maintenance Phase; 
o The maintenance of software is made easier and more manageable 
through the structured approach provided by the SecSDM.  
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An important consideration in developing this incremental process has been to develop 
a useable process that will lessen the burden for software developers who are not 
specialists in information security. 
 
The investigation phase, as described next, incorporates six of the ten steps. This 
highlights the fact that the security requirements of a software application need to be 
defined early in the life cycle. 
 
6.4.1 The investigation phase 
One of the primary concerns with traditional software development methodologies is 
that the security needs of a given system are often not determined until into the 
implementation phase. This results in late and expensive attempts to incorporate 
security into the work in progress. Security requirements are normally stated in terms of 
how to achieve security and not in terms of the problem to be solved. This leaves it 
unclear how the security requirements may affect functional requirements (Haley, 
Laney & Nuseibeh, 2004). 
 
Early determination of the security requirements assists in the development of software 
applications which better meet the needs of all the stakeholders. The question posed is 
how to state the security requirements of a particular system or software application? 
ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998) suggests that information security requirements are stated 
in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity and 
reliability of information. It is necessary to perform some form of a risk analysis to 
determine the security requirements of a particular system. The conducting of a security 
risk analysis determines the security vulnerabilities and shortcomings of the proposed 
software application. It identifies countermeasures that will ensure that the security of 
the information is maintained under all circumstances (Booysen and Eloff, 1995). It is 
assumed,  for the purposes of the proposed risk analysis approach, that the software 
application being developed is at a relatively high risk. The guidelines of the detailed 
risk analysis approach, as recommended by ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998) are followed 
and were described in Chapter 5. 
 
The proposed risk analysis process carried out during the investigation phase takes the 
form of a step-by-step process. Its purpose is to identify the information assets, their 
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associated threats and vulnerabilities, and rank them according to those assets that need 
the most protection.  
 
The primary aim of the risk analysis is to ensure that the most important information 
assets that require protection from potentially harmful threats are identified early in the 
SDLC. Existing security policies should be analysed during the investigation phase, and 
any legal issues that can impact the design of the software examined. The outcome of 
this phase is a set of security requirements that describes the risks that need to be 
addressed throughout the rest of the life cycle. 
 
STEP 1 : Information asset identification and valuation 
A key step in preparing for a risk analysis is to identify the assets to be protected. The 
first step, according to the SecSDM, is to identify the key information assets pertaining 
to the software application being developed. It provides a foundation to the risk analysis  
process and simultaneously initiates an awareness and understanding of the information 
assets that need protection.  
 
An asset is, by definition, a component or part of a total system to which an 
organisation directly assigns value and, therefore, requires protection. Critical assets can 
be the data stored, processed and transmitted by IT facilities, such as software and 
hardware products, systems or applications. Information is among the most valuable 
assets of an organisation and is, therefore, critical to its success. All information is 
valuable to an organisation, but some is more critical and sensitive than others. 
Information must be available to be useful. Connectivity makes information available 
when and where it is needed and is the nature of doing business today. This very 
availability puts information at risk. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the most 
important information assets so that additional controls or safeguards can be 
implemented to provide adequate protection.  
 
Software developers need to both determine and understand what information assets 
require protection to develop secure software applications. Different industries and 
different systems have varying information protection requirements. For example, 
healthcare organisations stress the confidentiality of patient records, whereas banking is 
more concerned about the integrity of monetary transactions. The software development 
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team needs to understand and capture what the adequate protection of information is, in 
their specific context (Tipton and Krause, 2006). 
 
INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 1a : Information Asset Identification 
1. Customer orders 
2. Product specifications 
Which information assets are the most 
critical to the success of the proposed 
software application?  3. Supplier contract details 
1. Customer orders 
2. Product specifications 
Which information assets pertaining to the 
proposed software application generate the 
most revenue? 3. Supplier product details 
1. Customer orders 
2. Product specifications 
Which information assets pertaining to the 
proposed software application generate the 
most profitability? 3. Supplier product details 
1. Product specifications 
2. Supplier contract details 
Which information assets pertaining to the 
proposed software application would be the 
most expensive to replace? 3. Customer orders 
1. Product specifications 
2. Supplier contract details 
Which information assets pertaining to the 
proposed software application would be the 
most expensive to protect? 3. Customer orders 
1. Customer orders 
2. Employee salary details 
Which information assets pertaining to the 
proposed software application would be the 
most embarrassing or cause the greatest 
liability if revealed? 3. Product specifications 
Table 6.1: Investigation Phase - Information Asset Identification 
 
The listing of assets, according to Landoll (2006), based on checklists and judgement, 
yields an adequate identification of the important assets of the organisation. These 
information assets can include, for example, personal information, employee salary 
information, customer contact information or financial information. Software 
developers are required to list, to assist with the asset identification process and in 
consultation with the relevant stakeholders, the three information assets that apply to 
each of the data gathering questions, as recommended by Whitman and Mattord (2003). 
For example, Table 6.1 illustrates that customer orders, product specifications and 
supplier contract details are the three information assets identified as the most critical to 
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the success of the software application in question. This list of questions can be updated 
to include other organisation-specific questions that will add value to this process. 
 
Those information assets that pertain to the questions posed in Table 6.1 require special 
consideration. It is recommended that the five most important information assets that 
need protection be identified to simplify the process. These can be confirmed through 
consultation with the owners of the  information assets identified. Once an agreement  is 
reached, on the five most important information assets, these need to be listed and 
labelled Asset A, Asset B, Asset C, Asset D and Asset E respectively, as illustrated in 
Table 6.2. According to this example, the five most important information assets are 
customer orders, product specifications, supplier contract details, supplier product 
details and employee salary details. 
 
INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 1b : Information Asset Valuation 
Asset Impact Value   
Information Assets 0 
Negligible  
1 
Low 
2 
Medium 
3 
High 
4 
Critical 
Asset A 
Customer Orders 
    X 
Asset B  
Product Specifications 
    X 
Asset C 
Supplier Contract Details 
   X  
Asset D 
Supplier Product Details 
   X  
Asset E 
Employee Salary Details 
   X  
Table 6.2: Investigation Phase - Information Asset Valuation 
 
The next step in the process is to assign values to each of these five information assets. 
Ideally, the value assigned is expressed in terms which are relevant to the asset and to 
the business entity involved. These values represent the business importance of the 
assets and will typically be obtained by interviewing the information owners and its key 
users. This is necessary to determine the impact value and sensitivity of the information 
in use,  stored, processed or accessed. Although for many organisations it could be more 
appropriate to establish this value in monetary terms, for simplicity it is recommended 
that a 5-point Lickert scale is used to establish this value.  The SecSDM requires that an 
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asset impact value between 0 and 4 (where 0=negligible and 4=critical) is assigned to 
each of the five information assets, based on its financial value or worth to the 
organisation. Landoll (2006) refers to this as classification-based valuation, whereby 
assets are classified into one of several levels that indicate their qualitative value. For 
many organisations the qualitative approach provides adequate asset valuation with less 
effort than quantitative asset valuation approaches. The 5-point Lickert scale used by 
the SecSDM is based on the classification levels as recommended by Landoll (2006). 
These are defined as follows: 
· 0 (NEGLIGIBLE) indicates an insignificant or no impact on human life or the 
continuation of the operation of critical business functions; 
· 1 (LOW) indicates a slight impact on human life or the continuation of the 
operation of critical business functions; 
· 2  (MEDIUM) indicates that compromise of the asset would have moderate 
consequences that would impair the operation of a critical business function for 
a short time; 
· 3 (HIGH) indicates that the compromise of the asset would have serious 
consequences that could impair the operation of a critical business function; 
· 4 (CRITICAL) indicates that compromise of the asset would have grave 
consequences leading to a loss of life or serious injury to people and/or long-
term disruption to the operation of a critical business function. 
The SecSDM provides a table which maps the most critical assets (rows) against the 
asset impact values (columns). For each of the information assets (A, B, C, D and E) 
identified, software developers are required to indicate its asset impact value by simply 
ticking the appropriate cell in the table provided. Only five cells (i.e., one asset impact 
value per information asset), must be marked off as illustrated in Table 6.2. 
 
The identification and classification of information assets in this manner helps 
determine the value of the most important information assets, and provides an 
awareness with respect to their value. The classification of certain information assets in 
this way brings about awareness of its value to users authorised to handle that 
information. The most important information assets are identified and assigned values 
to each, based on their worth to the organisation, the next step requires the identification 
of the various threats that may cause harm to these assets. 
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 STEP 2 : Threat identification and assessment 
A threat can be defined as any undesirable event that can have a negative impact on an 
organisation. Threat identification, in the software development context, addresses those 
threats with the potential of causing the maximum damage to the information assets 
pertaining to the particular software application. It is necessary to perform the 
identification and assessment of threats during the investigation phase of the SDLC, 
because it is used to identify risks and to guide subsequent design, coding and testing 
decisions.  
 
A wide variety of threats face the information systems of an organisation. Each has the 
potential to attack any of the information assets identified in Step 1. Experts find it 
increasingly challenging to accurately address all relevant threats due their volume and 
their ever-changing nature. The following questions , as proposed by Whitman and 
Mattord (2003), need to be considered to assist with the identification of threats,: 
· Which threats represent the most danger to the information assets pertaining to 
the proposed system? 
· How much would it cost to recover from a successful attack? 
· Which of the threats would require the greatest expenditure to prevent? 
The answers to these questions can help identify those threats that will have the most 
severe impact on the information assets identified in Step 1. 
 
Checklists help software developers with the recording of items to be checked or 
remembered. Therefore, a checklist of the most likely threats is helpful in performing a 
threat assessment, although one must be aware that threats are continually changing. In 
order to simplify the threat identification and assessment process, a checklist of the 
most common threats is provided by the SecSDM, based on those referred to in 
ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998). These questions are provided in Table 6.3 and include: 
· Theft of information for example,  the illegal disclosure of information; 
· Use of system by unauthorised users for example,  the unauthorised access by 
competitors; 
· Use of system in an unauthorised manner for example,  the unauthorised 
collection  of data; 
· Masquerading of user identity for example,  malicious hacking; 
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· Malicious software attacks for example, viruses, worms and denial of service 
attacks; 
· User errors for example,  invalid or inaccurate data entry; 
· Repudiation for example,  the denial of having performed a transaction; 
· Technical software failures or errors for example, bugs, code problems and 
unknown loopholes. 
Software developers can add any additional threats to the standard list provided. 
However, it is important that software developers are informed that security-related 
checklists must be used with a corresponding process, such as the one described in this 
chapter, to be useful (Task Force Report, 2004). 
 
Danger of a threat is something difficult to assess. Danger may be simply the likelihood 
of a threat attacking the information asset, or it may represent the amount of damage the 
threat could create. It may also represent the frequency with which an attack can occur 
(Whitman and Mattord, 2003). It is necessary, as part of the threat assessment process, 
to determine the likelihood, frequency and potential impact that each of the common 
threats may have on the software application in question. This may be performed, 
according to the SecSDM, by assigning each of the threats listed above to one of  the 
following likelihood/frequency/impact levels, namely: 
· LOW if the loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability could be expected to 
have a limited adverse affect on the organisational operations, assets or 
individuals. For example, an interruption with no financ ial loss. This could also 
indicate a low likelihood and low frequency of occurrence; 
· MEDIUM if the loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability could be 
expected to have a serious adverse affect on the organisational operations, assets 
or individuals. For example, a short interruption that results in a limited financial 
loss to a single business unit. This could also indicate a medium likelihood and 
medium frequency of occurrence; 
· HIGH if the loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability could be expected to 
have a severe or catastrophic adverse affect on the organisational operations, 
assets or individuals. For example, the shutdown of a critical business unit that 
leads to a significant loss of business, corporate image or profit. This could also 
indicate a high likelihood and high frequency of occurrence. 
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INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 2 : Threat Identification and Assessment 
Level of 
Likelihood/Frequency/Impact 
Common Threats 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-3:1998) 
LOW MED HIGH N/A 
Theft of information (Deliberate e.g. Illegal 
information disclosure) 
  X  
Use of system by unauthorised users 
(Deliberate or Accidental e.g. Unauthorised 
access by competitors) 
 X   
Use of system in an unauthorised manner 
(Deliberate or Accidental e.g. Unauthorised 
data collection) 
 X   
Masquerading of user identity (Deliberate e.g. 
Malicious Hacking) 
 
  X  
Malicious software attacks (Deliberate or 
Accidental e.g. viruses, worms, DoS) 
 
  X  
User errors (Deliberate or Accidental e.g. 
Invalid/inaccurate data entry) 
 
  X  
Repudiation (Deliberate e.g. Denial of having 
performed transaction) 
 
 X   
Technical software failures or errors 
(Deliberate or Accidental e.g. Bugs, code 
problems, unknown loopholes) 
  X  
Other  
……………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………….. 
    
Other  
……………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………….. 
    
Table 6.3: Investigation Phase - Threat Identification and Assessment 
 
The SecSDM provides a table, as illustrated in Table 6.3, mapping the most common 
threats (rows) against the likelihood, frequency and potential impact (columns). 
Software developers are required,  for each of the most common threats listed, to 
indicate the likelihood, frequency and potential impact of the threat in question by 
checking the appropriate cell in the table provided. Threats that are deemed to be not 
applicable, requires software developers to check an ‘X’ in the ‘N/A’ column. Only 
eight cells (i.e., one level per threat) must be checked on this table unless additional 
threats as identified by the software developers are added. 
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Having identified and assessed the various threats that may have a negative impact on 
the information assets of the organisation, it is then necessary to identify the most 
critical risks for which the software application must provide protection. This is 
described in Step 3. 
 
STEP 3 : Risk (asset/threat) identification 
Risk identification requires that the most critical asset/threat relationships are identified 
to ascertain which risks are most likely to impact the proposed system (Whitman and 
Mattord, 2003). This is done by simply considering the five most important information 
assets, as identified in Step 1, and the most common threats listed in Step 2. Those 
assets with high or critical asset impact values (i.e., 3 or 4) and those threats recognised 
to have a potentially high impact will contribute significantly to the criticality of the 
risk. 
 
The SecSDM provides a table, as illustrated in Table 6.4, which maps the most common 
threats listed in Step 2 (rows) against the most important information assets, identified 
in Step 1 (columns). Software developers are required to determine the eight most 
critical risks (i.e., asset/threat relationships) by checking a letter from ‘a’ to ’h’ in the 
appropriate cell. Each of the asset/threat relationships (‘a’ to ‘h’) refer to the 
corresponding risk (‘A’ to ‘H’) in the steps that follow. Software developers,  in 
determining these eight risks (‘A’ to ‘H’), must consider both the asset impact value of 
the particular asset (as indicated in Step 1) and the likelihood, frequency and potential 
impact of the particular threat (as indicated in Step 2). For example, if Asset A has an 
asset impact value of 4 and the likelihood, frequency and potential impact of the ‘theft 
of information’ on Asset A is HIGH, then the corresponding cell is labelled ‘a’. Only 
eight cells (labelled ‘a’ to ‘h’) must be checked on this table unless additional threats, as 
identified by the software developers, are added. 
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INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 3 : Risk (Asset/Threat) Identification 
ASSET/THREAT RELATIONSHIP 
Information Assets  
(refer to Step 1) 
Common Threats 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-3:1998) 
(refer to Step 2) Asset 
A 
Asset 
B 
Asset 
C 
Asset 
D 
Asset 
E 
Theft of information  
 a b   e 
Use of system by unauthorised users 
 
 f    
Use of system in an unauthorised 
manner      g 
Masquerading of user identity 
 
c     
Malicious software attacks 
 d     
User errors 
 
 h    
Repudiation 
      
Technical software failures or errors 
 
     
Other  
……………………………………      
Other  
…………………………………… 
     
Table 6.4:  Investigation Phase - Risk (Asset/Threat) Identification 
 
This step results in the identification of at least eight of the most prominent risks. The 
following step in the process requires that the level of vulnerability for each critical risk 
be determined. 
 
STEP 4 : Determine the level of vulnerability 
A vulnerability is a weakness or fault in a system that an attack exploits. However, the 
presence of a vulnerability does not cause harm in itself, because there must be a threat 
present to exploit it. Jurjens (2002) states that in practice, security is not compromised 
by breaking the dedicated security mechanisms, but by exploiting the weaknesses or 
vulnerabilities in the way they are used. Therefore, as part of the risk analysis process, it 
is important to be able to determine the level of vulnerability for each risk. 
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INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 4 : Determine Level of Vulnerability 
Level of Vulnerability 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Risks  
(refer to Step 3) 
The asset is quite well 
protected against the 
threat, therefore the 
vulnerability is low. 
The asset is exposed 
to some degree and is 
not that well 
protected, therefore 
the vulnerability is 
medium. 
The asset is exposed 
to a large degree and 
is not well protected 
at all, therefore the 
vulnerability is high. 
Risk A 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘a’ ) 
X   
Risk B  
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘b’) 
 X  
Risk C 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘c’) 
X   
Risk D 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘d’) 
X   
Risk E 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘e’) 
 X  
Risk F 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘f’) 
 X  
Risk G 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘g’) 
 X  
Risk H 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘h’) 
 X  
Table 6.5: Investigation Phase – Determine Level of Vulnerability 
 
It is necessary to consider the likelihood that the risk may materialise, taking the current 
situation and controls into account, to determine the level of weakness or vulnerability 
for each risk (‘A’ to ‘H’), as identified in Step 3. The SecSDM provides a table, as 
illustrated in Table 6.5, which simply maps each risk (rows) against the various levels 
of vulnerability (columns). The three main levels of vulnerability provided by this 
model are defined as: 
· LOW indicates that the asset is fairly well protected against the threat, therefore, 
its vulnerability is low; 
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· MEDIUM indicates that the asset is exposed to some degree and is not that well 
protected, therefore, its vulnerability is medium;  
· HIGH indicates that the asset is exposed to a large degree and is not well 
protected at all, therefore, its vulnerability is high. 
For example, if Risk A is associated with Asset A which is relatively well protected 
against the associated threat (for example, ‘theft of information’) then the level of 
vulnerability may be low and the corresponding cell should be checked. Only eight cells 
(one per risk ‘A’ to ‘H’) must be checked on this table. 
 
This step identifies the vulnerabilities related to each asset/threat relationship. The 
following step in the risk analysis process requires that a risk assessment be carried out 
to determine the specific extent of each risk (‘A’ to ‘H’), identified in Step 3. This value 
is determined, according to the SecSDM, by taking into account the asset impact value, 
level of vulnerability and potential likelihood for each risk identified. This process is 
described in more detail in Step 5. 
 
STEP 5 : Risk assessment 
The asset impact value of the particular information asset, the level of vulnerability and 
the likelihood, frequency and potential impact of the particular threat must be 
considered, for each risk identified, to carry out a risk assessment. These are matched in 
a table to determine the specific measure of risk on a scale of 1 to 8. These specific 
values are placed in the matrix as illustrated in Table 6.6, according to those 
recommended by ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998). The appropriate row in the table  is 
identified by the asset impact value of the particular information asset, as identified in 
Step 1. Similarly, the appropriate column is identified by the likelihood, frequency and 
potential impact of the threat and corresponding level of vulnerability. The risk- level is 
determined by the likelihood, frequency and potential impact of the threat (as 
determined in Step 2) and the corresponding level of vulnerability (as determined in 
Step 4). For example, if the particular information asset, associated with the risk in 
question, has an asset impact value of 3, the likelihood, frequency and potential impact 
of the threat is ‘high’, and the level of vulnerability is ‘low’, then the measure of risk is 
5. In the example provided in Table 6.6, the information asset ‘Customer Orders’ has an 
asset impact value of ‘4’, a likelihood of the threat ‘Theft of information’ is ‘high’, and 
the level of vulnerability is ‘low’, therefore the measure of risk is ‘6’. 
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INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 5 : Risk Assessment  
 
RISK A (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘a’ in Step 3):  
Customer Orders/Theft of information  
Likelihood/Frequency/Potential Impact of Threat 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability 
 
LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH 
Negligible 
0 0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
Low 
1 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
Medium 
2 
2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
High 
3 3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
A
ss
et
 im
pa
ct
 v
al
ue
 
Critical 
4 4 5 6 5 6 7 6 X 7 8 
Table 6.6: Investigation Phase – Risk Assessment 
 
The specific risk values, as determined for each risk (‘A’ to ‘H’), are valuable in 
assessing and prioritising those risks that require individual attention throughout the rest 
of the SDLC. The process of prioritising risks is discussed in Step 6. 
 
STEP 6 : Risk prioritisation 
The prioritisation of risks during the investigation phase serves as a guideline for the 
analysis, design and implementation phases of the SDLC. This is achieved, according to 
the SecSDM, by simply listing each risk (‘A’ to ‘H’), identified in Step 3, and its 
corresponding risk value as determined in Step 5. The description of each risk must 
refer specifically to the particular asset/threat relationship, as identified in Step 3. Table 
6.7 illustrates an example of the risk values that have been determined for each risk 
ident ified. The primary goal of the following phases is to document a method through 
which these risks may be reduced to an acceptable level.  
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INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 6 : Risk Prioritisation 
 Risk Description (Asset/Threat relationship) Risk Value 
Risk 
A 
Customer orders/Theft of information 6 
Risk 
B Product Specifications/Theft of information 7 
Risk 
C 
Customer orders/Masquerading of user identity 6 
Risk 
D Customer orders/Malicious software attacks 6 
Risk 
E 
Employee salary details/Theft of information 6 
Risk 
F Product specifications/Use of system by unauthorised users 6 
Risk 
G 
Employee salary details/Use of system in unauthorised manner 5 
Risk 
H Product specifications/User errors 7 
Table 6.7: Investigation Phase – Risk Prioritisation 
 
At the end of the investigation phase, the software developer would have identified, 
assessed and prioritised all potential risks pertaining to the important information assets 
to the software application being developed. During the analysis phase, the prioritised 
list of risks (‘A’ to ‘H’), determined during the investigation phase, are mapped to the 
appropriate security services. This process is described in more detail in Step 7. 
 
6.4.2 The analysis phase 
The risk sensitivity of a particular software application determines the extent of the 
security services employed. It is meaningful for the analysis phase to focus on the 
security risks (‘A’ to ‘H’), identified during the investigation phase. During the analysis 
phase, the appropriate security services are selected that would most likely mitigate the 
security risks identified.  It is important, however, that this is carried out independently 
of any implementation details. The output of this phase is a refined set of security 
requirements. 
 
The ISO 7498-2 (1989) standard provides the basis for information security in software 
applications through five basic security services, namely:  
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· Identification and authentication, which refers to the ability to identify and 
uniquely authenticate all users of a system; 
· Authorisation/access control, which refers to the ability to allow or prohibit 
users from accessing the information assets of an organisation; 
· Confidentiality, which refers to the ability to ensure that information assets are 
only available to those who are authorised to access them; 
· Integrity, which refers to the ability to ensure that information is complete and 
uncorrupted and that it has not been altered in any way; 
· Non-repudiation/non-denial, which refers to the ability to ensure that users do 
not deny their actions. 
 
These five security services provide the basis for ensuring the security of any software 
application and it is important to relate them to the risks (‘A’ to ‘H’) identified during 
the investigation phase. 
 
STEP 7 : Identify the relevant security services and level of protection required to 
minimise each risk 
The analysis phase, according to the SecSDM, requires that appropriate security 
services be selected that will help reduce the risks (‘A’ to ‘H’), as identified during the 
investigation phase, to an acceptable level.  
 
Typically, the common threats listed in Step 2, will require the following security 
services (listed in brackets): 
· Theft of information (identification and authentication, access control); 
· Use of system by unauthorised users (identification and authentication, access 
control); 
· Use of system in an unauthorised manner (access control, data confidentiality); 
· Masquerading of user identity (identification and authentication, access control); 
· Malicious software attacks (access control, data integrity); 
· User errors (access control, data integrity); 
· Repudiation (identification and authentication, non-repudiation); 
· Technical software failures or errors (data integrity). 
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The software developers are required to map each of the eight risks (‘A’ to ‘H’), as 
identified during the investigation phase, to the envisaged security services. For each 
risk, multiple security services can be identified. The particular level of protection 
required must be indicated by placing a B (for Basic), S (for Standard) or ES (for Extra 
Strong) in the relevant cells, as illustrated in Table 6.8. It must be noted, however, that 
not all the security services are required to address each individual risk, nor are all 
security services applicable to all risks. 
 
ANALYSIS PHASE 
STEP 7 : Identification of Security Services 
Security Services 
Risks  Identification & 
Authentication  
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Risk A S S    
Risk B ES ES    
Risk C S S    
Risk D  S  S  
Risk E S S    
Risk F S S    
Risk G  S S   
Risk H  ES  ES  
Table 6.8: Analysis Phase – Identification of Security Services 
 
Step 7 results in the appropriate level of protection being selected to reduce the risks 
(‘A’ to ‘H’), identified during the investigation phase, to an acceptable level. Section 
6.4.3 describes the process of selecting the appropriate security mechanisms through 
which the security services identified in Step 7, should be implemented. 
 
6.4.3 The design phase 
A primary source of security problems is often an excessively complex design that 
cannot be easily or correctly implemented, maintained nor audited. The purpose of the 
design phase is to convert the information security requirements into information 
security specifications that can be used by programmers to develop the security-relevant 
code (Tompkins and Rice, 1985). 
 
It is during the design phase of the SecSDM that the security services need to be 
translated into security mechanisms. These mechanisms are determined according to the 
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security services identified in the analysis phase. For example, if confidentiality is a 
required security service, then encryption can be used as the security mechanism. It is 
determined, during the design phase, through which security mechanisms the security 
services identified in the analysis phase will be implemented. 
 
It is important to note the distinction between a security service and a security 
mechanism in considering the various activities of the design phase. A security service 
is a measure which can be put in place to address a threat (for example, the provision of 
confidentiality) and a security mechanism is a means to provide a service (for example, 
encryption). This distinction becomes more apparent when the relationship between the 
various security services and mechanisms is considered. 
 
The five security services referred to by X.800 and the ISO 7498-2 (1989) standard are 
supported by eight security mechanisms, previously discussed in Chapter 3, namely: 
· Encipherment mechanisms are commonly known as encryption or cipher 
algorithms. These mechanisms can help provide identification and 
authentication, data confidentiality and data integrity services;  
· Digital signature mechanisms can be used to provide non-repudiation, origin 
authentication and data integrity services; 
· Access control mechanisms can be used to provide access control services; 
· Data integrity mechanisms can be used to provide data integrity, non-
repudiation and origin authentication services; 
· Authentication exchange mechanisms, known as authentication protocols, can be 
used to provide entity authentication; 
· Traffic padding describes the addition of ‘pretend’ data to conceal the volumes 
of real data traffic. It can be used to help provide traffic flow confidentiality but 
is only effective when the added padding is enciphered; 
· Routing control mechanisms may be used to provide data confidentiality and 
integrity; 
· Notarisation mechanisms may be used to guarantee the integrity, origin and/or 
the destination of transferred data. They provide for non-repudiation. 
Security mechanisms cannot be ‘blindly’ inserted into a software application in the hope 
of providing the required level of security. The overall system development process 
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needs to take the various security concerns and risks into consideration to ensure the 
appropriate use of the selected security mechanisms.  
 
The mapping of security services to the appropriate security mechanisms is required for 
all eight risks (‘A’ to ‘H’), identified during the investigation phase. This process is 
described in Step 8. 
 
STEP 8 : Map security services to security mechanisms 
 
DESIGN PHASE 
STEP 8 : Mapping of Security Services to Security Mechanisms  
 
RISK A (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘a’ in Step 3):  
Customer Orders/Theft of information 
Security Services 
Security 
Mechanisms 
Identification 
& 
Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Encipherment/ 
Encryption S     
Digital 
Signatures 
     
Access 
Control 
Mechanisms  
 S    
Data Integrity 
Mechanisms  
     
Authentication 
Exchange  S     
Traffic 
Padding      
Routing 
Control 
     
Notarisation 
      
Table 6.9: Analysis Phase – Mapping of Security Services to Security Mechanisms 
 
The software developers, with this basic knowledge and understanding of security 
services and mechanisms, for each risk (‘A’ to ‘H’), as identified during the 
investigation phase, are required to indicate the specific security mechanisms (rows) 
that would be implemented to support the security services (columns), as identified in 
Step 7. The specific level of protection required must be indicated by checking the level 
protection identifier in the corresponding cells, as illustrated in Table 6.9.  
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It is important to note that not all security services and mechanisms are required to 
address each individual risk (‘A’ to ‘H’) , and it is not necessary to plot each cell in the 
table provided.  A table, as illustrated in Table 6.9, must be completed for each of the 
risks identified during the investigation phase. 
 
Step 9 describes the process of consolidating the security services and mechanisms 
identified in Steps 7 and 8 respectively to provide input into the implementation phase 
of the SDLC.  
 
STEP 9 : Summary of findings 
 
DESIGN PHASE 
STEP 9 : Summary of Findings 
Security Services 
Security 
Mechanisms 
Identification 
& 
Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality Data Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Encipherment/ 
Encryption E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Digital 
Signatures E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Access Control  
E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Data Integrity 
Mechanisms  E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Authentication 
Exchange  E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Traffic 
Padding E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Routing 
Control E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Notarisation 
 E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
Table 6.10: Analysis Phase – Summary of Findings 
 
The SecSDM provides a table, as illustrated in Table 6.10, which permits the 
consolidation of the findings of Steps 7 and 8. Software developers are required to map 
the various security mechanisms (rows) to the appropriate security services (columns) 
for each risk (‘A’ to ‘H’), as identified during the investigation phase. This is done by 
highlighting the relevant cells. For example, if Risk B requires the security service of 
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‘identification and authentication’ through the security mechanism ‘encryption’, then 
this cell is highlighted. At least one cell must be highlighted for each risk (‘A’ to ‘H’), 
indicating the security mechanism through which the selected security service will be 
implemented. Table 6.10 illustrates that for Risk A, the security service of 
‘identification and authentication’ will be implemented through the encryption and 
authentication exchange mechanisms. Similarly, it illustrates that ‘access control’ is 
implemented through access control mechanisms. 
 
The risk sensitivity of the system is determined and the most appropriate security 
services and mechanisms to be employed are identified. These mechanisms need to be 
implemented. The security mechanisms identified can be implemented through 
appropriate software security tools and components, for example, those inherent in the 
.Net framework. The .Net framework, according to Taft (2004), provides developers 
with the necessary tools and information to write secure applications. A detailed 
discussion of the implementation phase is provided in the following section. 
 
6.4.4 The implementation phase 
The implementation phase can be referred to as the ‘build and test phase’. The high-
level objectives of this phase should include (Tipton and Krause, 2006): 
· Build secure environments to foster system development integrity and to protect 
organisational assets; 
· Promote secure coding practices to ensure the security quality of the end 
product; 
· Enforce formal code review procedures to introduce checks and balances into 
the code development process; 
· Thoroughly test all security components to validate the security design and to 
ensure they meet the necessary security requirements. 
 
It is during the implementation phase that all software components are coded by the 
developers. Jones and Rastogi (2004) stress the importance of ensuring that the 
developers are knowledgeable about security risks and skilled in secure coding 
standards. Landoll (2006) refers to a coding standard as a set of rules and guidelines that 
programmers are expected to follow to increase the quality and the security of the code 
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produced. Any organisation that writes software applications should have a coding 
standard, and ensure that their employees have the necessary training to use such 
standards. The absence of a coding standard,  according to Landoll (2006), greatly 
increases the likelihood that the code produced will contain security flaws. These 
coding standards should be reviewed for clarity, completeness and consistency. 
 
The choice of programming language can impact the security of a software product. The 
best programming languages are ones where all actions are defined and reasonable 
features are included to reduce mistakes, where memory is managed appropriately, and 
where the use of pointers is discouraged. Languages like C and C++ have inherent 
characteristics that can lead to security vulnerabilities. Languages such as JAVA and C# 
have been proven to be better for developing secure software. It must be noted, 
however, that the use of a particular language does not guarantee or deny security. 
Secure applications can in theory be written in C with due care and substantial effort, 
and insecure applications can be written in Java and C# (Task Force Report, 2004). 
 
The implementation of security mechanisms depends on the programming language 
used, the coding standards and best practices adhered to, and the personal programming 
style of the programmer. The programmer must ensure that all security-relevant code is 
understandable, auditable, maintainable and testable (Tompkins and Rice, 1985). The 
SecSDM does not currently recommend the use of specific .Net security components to 
implement the various security mechanisms but it does describe the process of mapping 
the security mechanisms summarised in Step 9 to the various .Net and other security 
components as recommended by the software developer. This is carried out in Step 10. 
 
STEP 10 : Map security mechanisms to .Net and other security components 
Siponen et al (2005) suggest that an implementation priority list is needed which 
indicates the priority of the security mechanisms to be implemented to ensure that the 
correct security features are implemented. This model provides a table, as illustrated in 
Table 6.11, where for each security mechanism (rows),  its relevant risks must be 
indicated by checking the appropriate risk (‘A’ to ‘H’). This can be transferred directly 
from Step 9. Software developers are encouraged to indicate the specific .Net or other 
components through which the various security mechanisms will be implemented. For 
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the purposes of this example, the security mechanism ‘notarisation’ has been excluded 
from the table because of space constraints. 
 
An important part of the implementation phase is testing. Testing is often seen as a way 
of ‘testing in’ security which is unacceptable. The role of security testing is to verify 
that the system design and code can withstand attack. Testing ensures that 
countermeasures are correctly implemented and that code is developed following coding 
standards and best practices. Security testing should follow a security test plan. This test 
plan should include unit testing, integration testing, quality assurance testing and 
penetration testing (Jones and Rastogi, 2004). The testing of the software to validate 
that it meets the security requirements as determined during the investigation phase is 
essential to produce secure software. This testing should include serious attempts to 
attack and break its security and scan for common vulnerabilities (Task Force Report, 
2004). 
 
The dilemma arises about when to stop testing. Testing can stop when there are no  
known security vulnerabilities that compromise the security goals as determined during 
the investigation, analysis and design phases. Tipton and Krause (2006) argue that 
security testing differs from functional testing in the SDLC. Security testing should  
focus on the functions that invoke security mechanisms  and on the least-used aspects of 
the mechanisms. This is because the least-used functions often contain flaws that can be 
exploited. Security testing usually includes a number of negative tests, whose expected 
outcomes demonstrate unsuccessful attempts to circumvent system security. Functional 
testing focuses on those functions that are most commonly used.  
 
Testing procedures must be consistent, repeatable and reusable. This ensures that 
software can be considered to be reliably secure. Currently, reliability of a software 
application means that  it will function as planned and will attempt to ensure the 
security of the application, the data, and the computing environment as a whole (Cenzic, 
2003).  
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IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 
STEP 10 : Mapping of Security Mechanisms to .Net and other components 
Security 
Mechanisms  Risks .Net security components  
Other components  
 (including own) 
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Encipherment/ 
Encryption 
Risk H 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Digital 
Signatures 
Risk H 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Access 
Control 
Mechanisms  
Risk H 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Data Integrity 
Mechanisms  
Risk H 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Authentication 
Exchange 
Mechanisms  
Risk H 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Traffic 
Padding 
Risk H 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Routing 
Control 
Risk H 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………….. 
Table 6.11: Implementation Phase – Mapping of Security Mechanisms  
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Operations staff are typically responsible for the entire computing environment, while 
developers must consider security throughout the software development process. The 
introduction of a new software application can create significant risk to this 
environment. Security testing is one way of ensuring that applications are developed in 
a way to minimise this risk, so that they can be implemented with a higher degree of 
confidence. Developers must test and retest for security to learn new coding techniques 
and quickly gain the benefits associated with strong security development procedures 
(Cenzic, 2003). 
 
6.4.5 The maintenance phase 
Gregory (2003) views the maintenance phase as another iteration of the entire life cycle. 
During this phase, it is important to find ways to evaluate the security of the system to 
ensure that the system is as secure as intended. New exposures may develop as users, 
data and equipment change. Those users affected by the security features that have been 
implemented must be educated and trained to ensure their commitment. 
 
The goal state defined for the software application must be audited to ensure that it 
complies with policies, standards and regulations used by an organisation. A security 
report should contain findings of the audit and security tests. System documentation is 
created during any software development process. This is particularly necessary for 
security related code. It is advisable to keep the documentation of the security related 
code in a separate development document, owing to its sensitivity. The sensitivity of 
this code and documentation is such that it should be well protected and access to it 
restricted  (Booysen and Eloff, 1995).  
 
The SecSDM ensures that all relevant security-related information is kept in a security 
portfolio, as provided in Appendix A. This helps improve the auditability of the 
software application in question, because security-related decisions are traceable to the 
appropriate phase as proposed by this secure software development approach. The 
integration of information security into the SDLC as described in this section, and the 
tight integration between the various phases will help ensure that the final product meets 
the information security requirements, identified during the initial phases. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
There are very few structured approaches to effectively integrate information security 
and software development. It is not easy for a software developer to have an expert 
knowledge of all the available security tools and their particulars, so as to choose the 
most appropriate ones for a specific software application under development. There is, 
therefore, an evident need for a framework to help determine the most appropriate 
security features and components to be incorporated into software applications 
(Tryfonas and Kiountouzis, 2002). 
 
Organisations and companies are starting to recognise the importance of security in the 
life cycle as an integrated end-to-end process. In the past, integrating security into the 
software life cycle process has typically been haphazard. It requires both trained experts 
and dedicated resources. Securing software requires an extensive body of knowledge 
unknown to developers. Good programmers try to produce high quality software but  
they most often lack the knowledge and training necessary to develop, assess and/or 
improve the reliability, safety and security of software. A software development team 
that is not aware about delivering secure systems, will not deliver a secure product. 
Similarly, a software development team that follows a process that does not encompass 
good security discipline will not deliver a secure product.  
 
It is necessary to build an improved software development process that integrates 
security during all stages to build better and more secure software. McGraw (2003), 
states that the key to building secure and reliable software lies in developing software 
under an iterative risk management process and applying tools and processes in a 
manner that is consistent with the business purpose of the software itself. Changing the 
process to deliver more secure software, however, is not the most difficult challenge. 
The real challenge is changing the perceptions and attitudes of all those involved in the 
software development process. 
 
Software development does not occur in isolation. It is necessary to involve concerned 
users, system developers and information security specialists. Security is tightly 
interwoven in the software development process by applying the SecSDM. Software 
Chapter 6 - The Secure Software Development Model 
131 
developers are encouraged to consider security from the earliest point of the SDLC, and 
to build critical security milestones and events into their development timelines.  
 
Security, as with quality, should be viewed as an integral part of the SDLC and not just 
as an add-on at the end of the development process. It is imperative that security is a 
well-thought-out process at all stages, from system inception and design through 
implementation and deployment. Any failure to consider information security 
adequately during the design phase of systems development can result in 
implementation vulnerabilities. The types of controls that will ultimately be 
incorporated into a software application should be determined based upon the potential 
loss or harm that could be suffered if the data or application were modified, destroyed or 
disclosed or is caused to become unavailable due to unauthorised or undesirable events 
(Tompkins and Rice, 1985). 
 
Tipton and Krause (2006) stress the importance of software developers being educated 
in secure coding practices to ensure that the end product has the required security 
functionality. However, it is argued that this alone will not guarantee the security of a 
software application. Software developers need to be educated in information security to 
avoid adding security features for its sake. Security is a feature and will have an impact 
on both the cost and schedule of the project. However, Howard and LeBlanc (2003) 
suggest that like any feature, the later it is added in, the higher the cost and the higher 
the risk to the project schedule. It is possible to predict the schedule impact by 
performing a security risk analysis early in the SDLC.  
 
Meaningful security is easier to achieve when security issues are considered as part of a 
routine development process, and safeguards are integrated into the software application 
during its design. A retrofit security is undoubtedly more expensive than its integration 
into the software development process from the beginning. Similarly, safeguards that 
are integral to a software application, are usually easier to use and less visible to the 
user (Booysen and Eloff, 1995).  
 
The SecSDM, as discussed in this chapter, was tested at a South African university 
using third-year Information Technology students to establish its effectiveness. These 
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students were encouraged to integrate the various steps, as described by this model, into 
their software development projects. Chapter 7 addresses some of the key findings. 
 
 
133 
Chapter 7 
Secure Software Development in Practice 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Over the years, it has become increasingly concerning that software developers tend to 
ignore the idea of integrating security into software applications. For this reason, the 
Secure Software Development Model (SecSDM), as described in Chapter 6, was 
developed. However, for any new model, it is necessary to determine whether it actually 
facilitates the achievement of the primary goal for which it was established. In this case, 
the development of more secure software applications. 
  
To establish the effectiveness of  the SecSDM, results were gathered from both 2005 
and 2006 third year Information Technology (IT) project students at a South African 
university. The study took the form of a questionnaire and was completed by two 
groups of students. The first group consisted of 2005 project students, while the second 
group consisted of 2006 project students. All variables were kept consistent as far as 
possible, except for the fact that the 2006 project students were introduced to, and 
worked through, the SecSDM. Therefore, the study attempted to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the SecSDM. 
 
Some of the typical applications developed by the 2005 and 2006 project students, as 
part of their practical course component, included: 
· Managing Bookings and Information Online (for example, the tourism industry, 
computer laboratories, sports clubs); 
· Student Accommodation System; 
· Managing Patient Information and Appointments for Health Services; 
· Biometric Security System; 
· Stock Control and Tracking System; 
· Supply Chain Management System; 
· Workflow System for Handling Petitions; 
· Event Planning System; 
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· Online Payment System; 
· Online Voting System; 
· Online Applications for Tertiary Institutions; 
· Online Gaming System; 
· Online Information System for the Department of Environmental Health; 
· Internet-Enabled Robotics Laboratory; 
· Small Business Application (Point-of-Sale, Debtors, Creditors, Stock Control); 
· Retail Management System; 
· Spatial Information Management Systems; 
· Facilities Management System. 
 
A total of 31 students participated in the study in 2005.  It is important to note, however, 
that for these students, information security was not specifically emphasized, or taught, 
during the requirements gathering, analysis, design nor implementation phases of their 
projects. The 2006 students, on the other hand, were introduced to the SecSDM during 
the course of the academic year. These students were encouraged to integrate the 
various steps, as described by the SecSDM, into their development projects. A total of 
20 students participated in the study in 2006.  
 
Although the projects developed at third-year level are typically group projects, each 
individual was required to take responsibility for a specific sub-system. Therefore, the 
perception and understanding of the various individuals within a group, with respect to 
the security of the application, could differ. Consequently, it was necessary that each 
individual, within each group, complete the information security questionnaire, as 
presented in Appendix B.  
 
The objective of the study was to establish whether the SecSDM, actually encouraged 
students to integrate information security into their software development projects, at 
the same time providing them with a deeper insight and understanding of the various 
security aspects that may have impacted their applications. 
 
The following section describes the questionnaire that was completed by both the 2005 
and 2006 students. 
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7.2 The Information Security Questionnaire 
The primary aim of the information security questionnaire was to establish the extent to 
which IT project students consider and incorporate information security into their 
development projects. 
 
The questionnaire was divided into five sections, with each section focussing on a 
particular phase, or phases, of the SecSDM as follows: 
· Section 1 focused on questions relating to the investigation phase; 
· Section 2 addressed the analysis phase; 
· Section 3 was concerned with both the design and implementation phases; 
· Section 4 dealt with the maintenance phase; 
· Section 5 aimed to determine general opinions of the students with respect to 
information security. 
 
The following sub-sections briefly describe each section of the questionnaire, as 
presented  in Appendix B. 
 
7.2.1 Section 1 – The investigation phase 
The purpose of this section was to determine whether the students performed any form 
of risk analysis, either formal or informal, during the life cycle of their projects. 
Therefore, the first three questions related to the identification and assessment of assets, 
threats and vulnerabilities. The fourth question pertained directly to the extent to which 
a risk analysis was carried out. Respondents simply indicated their answer by circling 
‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Not Sure’ for each of the questions posed. Those respondents who 
indicated that they had performed some form of risk analysis, were encouraged to 
provide brief details in this regard. 
 
7.2.2 Section 2 – The analysis phase 
The primary aim of this section was to determine whether the students included any of 
the five security services within their applications. Respondents simply indicated their 
answer by circling ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Not Sure’ for each of the questions posed. For those 
respondents who indicated that they had included a specific security service, it was 
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necessary to determine whether this was purely for the sake of including the service, or 
whether the reason for inclusion related to a specific risk anticipated. If based on a 
formal reason, respondents were encouraged to provide brief details in this regard. 
Otherwise, respondents were required to provide a motivation for its inclusion. 
 
7.2.3 Section 3 – The design and implementation phases 
The main intention of this section was to determine whether the students incorporated 
any of the eight security mechanisms within their applications. Respondents simply 
indicated their answer by circling ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Not Sure’ for each of the questions 
posed. For those respondents who indicated that they had included a specific security 
mechanism, it was necessary to determine whether this was implemented through the 
use of a .Net component, some other component, or whether they wrote their own 
component. This was indicated by circling either ‘a’, ‘b’ or ‘c’ respectively. For those 
respondents who indicated that they had included a specific security mechanism, it was 
necessary to determine whether they perceived the selected component to be “strong” 
enough to protect the associated assets, or not.  
 
7.2.4 Section 4 – The maintenance phase 
Section 4 specifically addressed questions pertaining to user procedures,  documentation 
and auditing. Respondents simply indicated their answers by circling ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or 
‘Not Sure’ for each of the questions posed. Those respondents who indicated that they 
had some form of user education process in place, with respect to using the application 
in a secure way, were required to provide relevant details. The same applied to those 
students who indicated that they had produced any form of security-related 
documentation.  
 
7.2.5 Section 5 – General opinions  
The questions posed in this section were of a general nature. The respondents were 
required to indicate their opinion with respect to the extent to which security services 
and components had been considered and integrated into their software applications. 
This was indicated by simply circling ‘a’ for ‘too few’, ‘b’ for ‘too many’ or ‘c’ for 
‘adequate’. Lastly, respondents were asked whether they believed there to be a need for 
a new or improved methodology for integrating information security into their software 
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development projects. Once again, respondents simply indicated their answers by 
circling ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Not Sure’. 
 
7.3 Results of Information Security Questionnaire 
The results of the questionnaire, as discussed in Section 7.2, provides important 
information to support the need for a new or improved methodology for integrating 
information security into software development projects, and to motivate improvements 
to the SecSDM. In interpreting the results, it is important to bear in mind that, whereas 
the 2005 students simply followed the more traditional SDLC, the 2006 students were 
provided with an overview to information security and introduced to the SecSDM. In 
addition, the hand- in of  an information security portfolio (see Appendix A), reflecting 
each security deliverable as defined by the SecSDM,  formed an essential part of their  
system documentation. The detailed results, comparing the results from the 2005 and 
2006 project groups, are provided in Appendix C. 
 
7.3.1 The investigation phase 
During the investigation phase, it was necessary to determine the security requirements 
of the software application under development. According to the SecSDM, this may be 
achieved by identifying the most important information assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities pertaining to the application in question. The results relating to the 
investigation phase are illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1 clearly illustrates an increase of 56% from 2005 (39%) to 2006 (95%), in the 
number of  respondents who indicated that they had  identified and assessed the 
important information assets associated with the application under development. 
Similarly, increases of 35% and 28% were recorded for the identification of threats and 
vulnerabilities respectively. Despite these significant increases, however,  the number of 
respondents who indicated that they had carried out some form of risk analysis, only 
increased by 14%. This possibly suggests that many of the respondents were not aware 
that the identification of assets, threats and vulnerabilities, actually formed part of a risk 
analysis.  
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Figure 7.1: Integration of Security into the Investigation Phase 
 
7.3.2 The analysis phase 
The questions pertaining to the analysis phase were aimed at determining the extent to 
which students incorporated the five security services into their software applications. 
The results relating to this phase are illustrated in Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2: Integration of Security into the Analysis Phase 
 
From Figure 7.2, it can be seen that significant increases were recorded from 2005 to 
2006 for the following security services: 
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· Confidentiality (31%); 
· Identification and authentication (19%); 
· Authorisation and access control (17%). 
This suggests that many more students incorporated these three security services into 
their software applications in 2006 than in 2005. However, the results for integrity and 
non-repudiation were not significant.  In addition, the identification of each of the 
security services could be related to a specific reason ident ified in the investigation 
phase. 
 
7.3.3 The design and implementation phases 
The questions relating to the design and implementation phases aimed to establish the 
extent to which the students included the eight security mechanisms within their 
software applications. For those students who indicated that they had included a 
particular security mechanism, it was necessary to determine whether it was 
implemented using a .Net or other component. The results relating to the investigation 
phase are illustrated in Figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3: Integration of Security into the Design and Implementation Phases 
 
Significant increases were recorded from 2005 to 2006 for the following security 
mechanisms: 
· Routing control (40%); 
· Encryption and encipherment (34%); 
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· Data integrity (25%);  
· Traffic Padding (17%). 
It is necessary, however, to interpret these results in relation to the figures recorded in 
2005. The figures recorded in 2005 for traffic padding (3%) and routing control (0%) 
were significantly low. This contributed towards the significant increases of  17% and 
40% respectively. 
 
On the other hand, if one considers the access control and authentication security 
mechanisms, a decrease of 1% and an increase of 4% was recorded from 2005 to 2006 
for each respectively. These insignificant results may be contributed to the fact that 
these are the two security mechanisms that students traditionally include in their 
software applications, with figures of 71% being recorded for each in 2005.  
 
The figures recorded for digital signatures and notarisation for both 2005 and 2006 was 
0. The reason for the non- inclusion of these two security mechanisms, could possibly be 
attributed to the nature of the software applications that the students develop, and the 
lack of knowledge that students may have with respect to these particular security 
mechanisms. 
 
For encryption and encipherment, the results suggest that students tend to implement 
this security mechanism  using .Net components. However, a number of students 
indicated that they wrote their own components for many of the other security 
mechanisms. In terms of the actual implementation of  the various security mechanisms, 
the results suggest that when using .Net components, the students are fairly confident 
that the selected components are “strong” enough to protect the associated information 
assets. 
 
7.3.4 The maintenance phase  
The questions relating to the maintenance phase were concerned primarily with whether 
any user procedures had been defined for using the software application in a secure 
manner, whether any security-related detail had been documented, and whether or not it 
would be possible to audit the information security aspects of the software application 
developed. The results relating to the maintenance phase are illustrated in Figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.4: Integration of Security into the Maintenance Phase  
 
The main concern in terms of the figures recorded, was that very few students tend to 
pay attention to including user procedures for using the application in a secure way. 
Figures recorded in this regard were 6% in 2005 and 10% in 2006. This could be 
attributed to the fact that very few of the applications developed are actually 
commercialised nor used in a “live” environment upon completion. 
 
In addition, the number of respondents who indicated that they had documented some 
security-related detail with respect to their applications, was 10% in 2005 and 25% in 
2006. The main concern was that many of the 2006 students responded negatively in 
this regard, although all groups comple ted the information security portfolio, as shown 
in Appendix A. This suggests that students did not take into account the fact the 
information security portfolio is a security-related document within itself. 
 
However, a significant increase of 32% was recorded from 2005 to 2006 for the 
question relating to auditing. This suggests that many more students felt confident that 
the information security aspects of their applications were auditable to determine 
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whether too few, too many or adequate security services and components had been 
considered and integrated into their applications. 
 
7.3.5 General Opinions  
The general security questions posed were based on the students’ opinions as to whether 
they perceived there to have been too few, too many or adequate security services and 
components considered and integrated into their software applications. In addition, they 
indicated whether they recognised the need for a new or improved methodology for 
integrating information security into their software development projects. The results 
relating to these opinions are illustrated in Figure 7.5. 
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Figure 7.5: General Opinions  
 
A significant decrease of 43% was recorded from 2005 (68%) to 2006 (25%) for those 
students who perceived there to be too few security services and components considered 
and integrated into their projects. Consequently, there was a significant increase of 47% 
for those students who perceived their projects too have adequate security services and 
components. Although the increase from 2005 (68%) to 2006 (69%) was insignificant, 
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it is encouraging that a relatively high percentage of students recognised the need for a 
new or improved methodology for integrating information security into their projects. 
 
7.4 Significant Findings 
Some of the key findings with respect to how each step of the model was carried out by 
the respondents include: 
§ STEP 1: Information asset identification and valuation; 
Respondents were not specific with respect to the identification of information 
assets. Several respondents, for instance, indicated the database, in totality, as a key 
information asset. This would imply that all tables within the database have the 
same security requirements. This is not normally the case since encrypting the entire 
database, for instance, would have severe performance implications. The valuation 
of the information assets identified, on the other hand, was well understood by the 
respondents. 
§ STEP 2: Threat identification and assessment; 
Respondents could identify well with the various threats, and therefore were able to 
complete this section with relative ease. No additional threats were identified by the 
students. 
§ STEP 3: Risk (asset/threat) identification; 
It is clear that several respondents misinterpreted this step as, in many cases, more 
than eight blocks were labelled (‘a’ to ‘h) when identifying the most critical risks 
(i.e., asset/threat relationships). This resulted in duplicate labels which negatively 
impacted on the steps that followed. 
§ STEP 4: Determine the level of vulnerability; 
The key problems here resulted primarily from the problems inherited from Step 3. 
For instance, where duplicate labels were provided when identifying the key 
asset/threat relationships in Step 3, it was difficult for students to correctly transfer 
these to Step 4. 
§ STEP 5: Risk assessment; 
A number of respondents neglected to consider the asset as an essential part of the 
risk identified. For these respondents, they were then unable to transfer the 
appropriate asset value from Step 1. 
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§ STEP 6: Risk prioritisation; 
As with Step 5, a number of respondents neglected to consider the asset as an 
essential part of the risk identified. However, respondents generally understood the 
concept of simply transferring the risk and risk value from Step 5. 
§ STEP 7: Identify the relevant security services and level of protection required to 
mitigate each risk; 
The tendency here was for respondents to haphazardly label blocks B (for Basic), S 
(for strong) and ES (for extra strong), without taking the typical mappings, as 
supplied in the table provided, into consideration. 
§ STEP 8: Map security services to security mechanisms; 
As with Step 7, the tendency was for respondents to haphazardly label blocks B (for 
Basic), S (for strong) and ES (for extra strong), without taking the typical mappings, 
as supplied in the table provided, into consideration. 
§ STEP 9: Summary of findings; 
Respondents who had worked logically through the model, were able to complete 
this section with ease since it simply required them to transfer the recommendations 
from Step 8. 
§ STEP 10: Map security mechanisms to .Net and other security components; 
Although most respondents were able to indicate the specific risks for which each 
security mechanism should be implemented, very few actually listed the 
components used. 
 
It is clear that the use of ‘A’, ‘B, ‘C’, ‘D’ and ‘E’ to indicate the most important 
information assets and the use of ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, ‘d’, ‘e’, ‘f’, ‘g’ and ‘h’ to indicate the most 
critical asset/threat relationships caused some confusion for the respondents. This was 
made increasingly confusing by referring to each risk as ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’ 
and ‘H’. Therefore, it is recommended that in further improvements to the model, that 
assets be referred to as A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5 respectively. Similarly, that the common 
threats be referred to as T1, T2, T3, etc. and the most critical risks as R1, R2, R3, etc. 
This would mean that a particular risk (for example, R1) would be associated with a 
specific asset (for example, A1) and a common threat (for example, T3). 
 
Very few respondents provided details where requested. However, the main areas of 
concern for most students, with respect to security, appeared to have been the 
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identification and authentication of users, as well as access control. This was generally 
implemented through the use of passwords to identify the particular users of the 
application. Access to various components or features was then restricted based on the 
role of these users. The tendency was for most students to store these passwords in the 
database in an encrypted form, and not in plain text. Although this is encouraging, it is 
important that students consider other aspects of security as promoted by the SecSDM. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The results from the information security questionnaire, as discussed in this chapter, 
clearly suggest that by following the SecSDM, developers were forced into a more 
structured approach to incorporating security into their software applications. In 
addition, most security-related decisions taken during the SDLC could be related back 
to the previous phases. Although problems do exist with the SecSDM in its current 
form, it is believed that with a few improvements, it could become very effective in 
ensuring that security concerns are not added as an afterthought during the 
implementation phase, but rather based on a specific risk anticipated during the 
investigation phase. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The increasing growth and use of the Internet to conduct business has brought about 
great changes in the computing environment for businesses, organisations and 
individuals. The risks to all have increased by these new technology enriched 
environments which have become part of our everyday lives. 
 
Intense time-to-market requirements has put very real pressure on organisations to 
produce software faster, which reduces the opportunity and incentive to ensure the 
software is robust and reliable. The real source of the software security problem, 
however, is the lack of integration between security and development. This means that 
typically developers do not understand security and security professionals do not 
understand software development. Developers see security as a hurdle, while security 
professionals see software development as reckless (McGraw and Viega, 2001). 
 
Information security is typically defined as the preservation of confidentiality, integrity 
and the availability of information. While confidentiality ensures that information is 
accessible only to those authorised to have access, integrity is concerned with 
safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of such information and any related 
processing methods. Information is an asset which, like other business assets has value 
and therefore needs to be suitably protected. Information security protects information 
from a wide range of threats to ensure business continuity, minimise business damage 
and maximise return on investments and business opportunities. 
 
The Task Force Report (2004) states that the security of software may be increased by: 
· Enhancing the education and training of present and future software developers 
to put security at the heart of software design and at the foundation of the 
development process; 
· Developing, sharing and skilfully using processes and practices to improve the 
quality and security of software, so that systems are more resilient to attack. 
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Therefore, the quality of software applications depends on an adequate supply of 
proficient and up-to-date software developers. Professional software developers must 
learn to create software that is sufficiently trustworthy to be used by non-professionals. 
To prepare software developers for successful careers in software development, they 
must not only be skilled in the various aspects of software development, but also in 
information security. In this way software developers will be better equipped to produce 
secure software applications that end users will be able to trust and use with confidence. 
The SecSDM, as described in this dissertation,  will provide software developers with a 
structured approach to integrating security into their software applications. 
 
8.2 Summary 
Software plays a key role in the modern world and is expected to perform at high levels 
of reliability and security. However, it is evident that there exists a lack of trust with 
respect to software applications, especially in the highly networked environment that 
has become part of our everyday lives. Since people are increasingly concerned about 
the security and reliability of current information systems, they are reluctant to entrust 
them with their personal information. Not surprisingly, users are demanding more 
secure software applications. 
 
The reality, however, is that information security is an afterthought for many software 
developers. This means that information security does not normally form an integral 
part of the software development process. From the discussion in Chapter 2, it is clear 
that security must be strongly coupled with the software development process to ensure 
that the desired level of quality is achieved. This, in turn, should result in people 
becoming more confident to use these applications. Therefore, by carefully considering 
the security aspects of software applications, one can increase their safety and 
effectiveness in meeting the expectations of their users. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the various standards and best practices relating to information 
security and software development (for example ISO 7498-2, ISO/IEC 17799 and  
ISO/IEC TR 13335). The ISO 7498-2 (1989) standard played a key role in the 
development of the SecSDM as it specifically describes the Basic Reference Model for 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI). This standard provides the basis for information 
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security through five security services. These, in turn, are supported by eight security 
mechanisms. The ISO/IEC 17799 (2005) standard, on the other hand, provides best 
business practice, guidelines and general principles for implementing, maintaining and 
managing information security. Although ISO/IEC TR 13335 also provides guidelines 
for the management of IT security, ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998) specifically advocates 
a structured approach to performing a detailed risk analysis. This approach forms the 
basis of the investigation phase of the SecSDM. 
 
Chapter 4 addresses the fact that existing software development methodologies neglect 
to provide a structured approach to integrating security into each stage of the software 
development process. This severely impacts the quality and trustworthiness of the final 
product. Therefore, it is important that reliability, security and performance be 
considered throughout all phases of the SDLC. Small changes in the SDLC could 
substantially improve the security, reliability and trustworthiness of the software 
application without incurring significant overhead.  
 
To secure software applications, it is important to adopt a disciplined approach that 
incorporates all aspects of software development, from requirements gathering through 
to design, implementation and maintenance. An important feature of the SecSDM, as 
described in Chapter 6, is that it provides a comprehensive process that not only 
encompasses the five basic phases of software development, but it also provides a 
formal approach to integrating security into each of these phases.  
 
Chapter 5 further suggests that the earlier in the SDLC that risks are identified, the 
better. A detailed risk analysis involves the identification and valuation of assets, the 
assessment of threats to those assets, and an assessment of the associated vulnerabilities. 
The results of these risk analysis activities are then used to assess the specific risks 
pertaining to the particular  software application, and consequently justify appropriate 
safeguards to minimise these risks. The SecSDM, as described in Chapter 6, explicitly 
dictates that a risk analysis be performed during the investigation phase of the SDLC. 
The results of this activity provide critical input to the further phases of the SDLC, 
thereby facilitating a more secure software product. 
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To conclude this research project, it was necessary to carry out an initial study to test 
the effectiveness of the SecSDM in ensuring the development of a secure software 
product. This study took the form of a questionnaire. The results of this study are 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
8.3 Meeting the Objectives 
A literature study was carried out to develop an understanding of software quality and 
Trustworthy Computing and, in particular, how these relate to information security and 
software development. In this way, the secondary objective pertaining to this research 
topic was achieved in Chapter 2. 
 
Similarly, a literature study was undertaken to ga in the knowledge required to support 
the development of  the SecSDM, and to ensure that it conforms to current standards 
and best practices. Based on the standards and best practices studied, a set of criteria for 
secure software development was established. Chapter 3 addresses those pertaining to 
information security and software development, with a specific focus on the ISO 7498-2 
(1989) standard, the ISO/IEC 17799 standard and the ISO/IEC TR 13335 technical 
report. Therefore, it can be argued that the secondary objective relating to standards and 
best practices was realised.  
 
To develop a model for secure software development, it was necessary to undertake an 
assessment of current software development methodologies. Special attention was given 
to the inherent weaknesses of the methodologies studied, especially in terms of the way 
in which they provide for security. Therefore, the secondary objective pertaining to the 
SDLC was met through the discussions provided in Chapter 4. 
 
The identification and valua tion of assets, the assessment of threats to those assets, and 
an evaluation of the associated vulnerabilities is necessary to ensure the security of a 
software application. Therefore, a further literature study was undertaken to gain an 
understanding of risk analysis and its importance as the first and most critical stage of a 
secure software development model. Therefore, it can be argued that this secondary 
objective was met through the risk analysis discussion in Chapter 6. 
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An information security questionnaire, as provided in Appendix B, was completed by 
2005 and 2006 students at a South African university. Chapter 7 reports on these results 
and provides evidence that the SecSDM can work in practice. The secondary objective 
pertaining to this analysis was therefore achieved through the evidence provided. 
 
It is argued that the primary objective of this research project was met through the 
development of  a secure software development model as described in Chapter 6. The  
secondary research objectives afforded essential input into the development of this 
model. The SecSDM is based on the ISO 7498-2 (1989) standard, which deals with the 
underlying security services and mechanisms that form an integral part of the model. 
The risk analysis advocated by this model is based on the approach as suggested by the 
ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998) technical report. In addition, the SecSDM conforms to 
various guidelines and principles as advocated by ISO/IEC 17799 (2005) and ISO/IEC 
TR 13335-3 (1998).  
 
8.4 Future Research 
Future research is required to further test the effectiveness of the SecSDM. It is 
recommended that this be carried out at other tertiary institutions, and within the 
software development industry itself. The results of this research will provide the input 
required to make further adjustments and enhancements to this model. It is hoped that 
the final result will be a secure software development model that can be used both for 
educating software developers in secure software development, and in the actual 
development of secure applications. 
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INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 1 : Information Asset Identification and Valuation (Whitman & Mattord, 2003). 
For example: customer orders, service requests, employee salaries, EDI documents, etc. 
STEP 1a : Information Asset Identification 
1. 
2. 
Which information assets are the most 
critical to the success of the proposed 
software application?  3. 
1. 
2. 
Which information assets pertaining to the 
proposed software application generate the 
most revenue? 3. 
1. 
2. 
Which information assets pertaining to the 
proposed software application generate the 
most profitability? 3. 
1. 
2. 
Which information assets pertaining to the 
proposed software application would be the 
most expensive to replace? 3. 
1. 
2. 
Which information assets pertaining to the 
proposed software application would be the 
most expensive to protect? 3. 
1. 
2. 
Which information assets pertaining to the 
proposed software application would be the 
most embarrassing or cause the greatest 
liability if revealed? 3. 
STEP 1b : Information Asset Valuation 
From the information provided above, select and prioritise the FIVE most important 
information assets pertaining to the proposed software application and indicate their 
respective Asset Impact Values (where 0=negligible, 1=low, 2=medium, 3=high, 
4=critical) by placing an ‘X’ in the appropriate cells (one ‘X’ per asset). 
Asset Impact Value   
Information Assets 0 
Negligible  
1 
Low 
2 
Medium 
3 
High 
4 
Critical 
Asset A 
…………………... 
     
Asset B  
…………………... 
     
Asset C 
…………………... 
     
Asset D 
…………………... 
     
Asset E 
………………….. 
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INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 2 : Threat Identification and Assessment (Whitman & Mattord, 2003) 
A wide variety of threats face an organisation’s information and it’s information 
systems. Each of these threats has the potential to attack any of the information 
assets previously identified. The following questions need to be addressed: 
· Which threats represent the most danger to the  information assets 
pertaining to the proposed software application? 
· How much would it cost to recover from a successful attack ? 
· Which of the threats would require the greatest expenditure to prevent ? 
In order to answer these questions, for each of the common threats listed below, 
estimate it’s level of likelihood, frequency and potential impact to the information 
assets pertaining to the proposed software application (by placing an ‘X’ in the 
appropriate cell). 
Level of 
Likelihood/Frequency/Impact 
Common Threats 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-3:1998) 
LOW MED HIGH N/A 
Theft of information (Deliberate e.g. Illegal 
information disclosure) 
    
Use of system by unauthorised users 
(Deliberate or Accidental e.g. Unauthorised 
access by competitors) 
    
Use of system in an unauthorised manner 
(Deliberate or Accidental e.g. Unauthorised 
data collection) 
    
Masquerading of user identity (Deliberate e.g. 
Malicious Hacking) 
 
    
Malicious software attacks (Deliberate or 
Accidental e.g. viruses, worms, DoS) 
 
    
User errors (Deliberate or Accidental e.g. 
Invalid/inaccurate data entry) 
 
    
Repudiation (Deliberate e.g. Denial of having 
performed transaction) 
 
    
Technical software failures or errors 
(Deliberate or Accidental e.g. Bugs, code 
problems, unknown loopholes) 
    
Other  
……………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………….. 
    
Other  
……………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………….. 
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INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 3 : Risk (Asset/Threat) Identification (Whitman & Mattord, 2003) 
By identifying the most critical asset/threat relationships one is able to ascertain the 
risks most likely to impact the proposed software application. 
Identify the EIGHT most critical risks (asset/threat relationships) by placing a letter 
from ‘a’ to’ h’ in the appropriate cell. 
ASSET/THREAT RELATIONSHIP 
Information Assets  
(refer to Step 1) 
Common Threats 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-3:1998) 
(refer to Step 2) Asset 
A 
Asset 
B 
Asset 
C 
Asset 
D 
Asset 
E 
Theft of information  
 
     
Use of system by unauthorised users 
 
     
Use of system in an unauthorised 
manner  
     
Masquerading of user identity 
 
     
Malicious software attacks 
 
     
User errors 
 
     
Repudiation 
 
     
Technical software failures or errors 
 
     
Other  
……………………………………… 
     
Other  
……………………………………… 
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INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 4 : Determine Level of Vulnerability 
In order to determine the level of vulnerability for each risk (asset/threat  
relationship ‘a’ to ‘h’) as identified in Step 3, you need to consider the likelihood 
that the risk may materialise, taking the current situation and controls into account. 
This can be done by plotting the level of vulnerability for each risk (asset/threat 
relationship ‘a’ to ‘h’)  by placing an ‘X’ in the appropriate cell. 
Level of Vulnerability 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Risks  
(refer to Step 3) 
The asset is quite well 
protected against the 
threat, therefore the 
vulnerability is low. 
The asset is 
exposed to some 
degree and is not 
that well protected, 
therefore the 
vulnerability is 
medium. 
The asset is exposed 
to a large degree and 
is not well protected 
at all, therefore the 
vulnerability is high. 
Risk A 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘a’ ) 
   
Risk B  
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘b’) 
   
Risk C 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘c’) 
   
Risk D 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘d’) 
   
Risk E 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘e’) 
   
Risk F 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘f’) 
   
Risk G 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘g’) 
   
Risk H 
(Asset/Threat 
Relationship ‘h’) 
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INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 5 : Risk Assessment (matrix from ISO/IEC TR 13335-3:1998) 
In order to determine the actual measure of risk,  the relevant Asset Impact Value, 
level of vulnerability and the likelihood of the threat must be considered for each risk 
identified in Step 3. The appropriate row in the matrix is identified by the Asset 
Impact Value of the particular asset (simply carry this over from  Step 1). The 
appropriate column is identified by the likelihood, frequency and potential impact of  
the particular threat and the level of  vulnerability. Simply transfer the level of 
vulnerability as determined in Step 4, and the likelihood, frequency and potential 
impact of the particular threat, as determined in Step 2. This must be performed for 
each risk as identified in Step 3 by placing an ‘X’ in the appropriate cell. 
 
RISK A (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘a’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Likelihood/Frequency/Potential Impact of Threat 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability 
 
LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH 
Negligible 
0 
0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
Low 
1 
1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
Medium 
2 
2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
High 
3 
3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
A
ss
et
 Im
pa
ct
 V
al
ue
 
Critical 
4 
4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
 
RISK B (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘b’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Likelihood/Frequency/Potential Impact of Threat 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability 
 
LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH 
Negligible 
0 
0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
Low 
1 
1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
Medium 
2 
2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
High 
3 
3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
A
ss
et
 Im
pa
ct
 V
al
ue
 
Critical 
4 
4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
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RISK C (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘c’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Likelihood/Frequency/Potential Impact of Threat 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability 
 
LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH 
Negligible 
0 
0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
Low 
1 
1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
Medium 
2 
2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
High 
3 
3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
A
ss
et
 Im
pa
ct
 V
al
ue
 
Critical 
4 
4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
RISK D (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘d’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Likelihood/Frequency/Potential Impact of Threat 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability 
 
LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH 
Negligible 
0 
0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
Low 
1 
1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
Medium 
2 
2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
High 
3 
3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
A
ss
et
 Im
pa
ct
 V
al
ue
 
Critical 
4 
4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
RISK E (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘e’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Likelihood/Frequency/Potential Impact of Threat 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability 
 
LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH 
Negligible 
0 
0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
Low 
1 
1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
Medium 
2 
2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
High 
3 
3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
A
ss
et
 Im
pa
ct
 V
al
ue
 
Critical 
4 
4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
 
APPENDIX A - The Secure Software Development Model (SecSDM) 
 
 163  
 
 
RISK F (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘f’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Likelihood/Frequency/Potential Impact of Threat 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability 
 
LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH 
Negligible 
0 
0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
Low 
1 
1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
Medium 
2 
2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
High 
3 
3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
A
ss
et
 Im
pa
ct
 V
al
ue
 
Critical 
4 
4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
RISK G (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘g’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Likelihood/Frequency/Potential Impact of Threat 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability 
 
LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH 
Negligible 
0 
0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
Low 
1 
1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
Medium 
2 
2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
High 
3 
3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
A
ss
et
 Im
pa
ct
 V
al
ue
 
Critical 
4 
4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
RISK H (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘h’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Likelihood/Frequency/Potential Impact of Threat 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability Level of Vulnerability 
 
LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH LOW MED HIGH 
Negligible 
0 
0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
Low 
1 
1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
Medium 
2 
2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
High 
3 
3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
A
ss
et
 Im
pa
ct
 V
al
ue
 
Critical 
4 
4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
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INVESTIGATION PHASE 
STEP 6 : Risk Prioritisation  
For each risk identified in Step 5, transfer the risk description and the risk value to 
the table below. This step completes the risk analysis part of the Investigation Phase. 
 Risk Description (Asset/Threat relationship) Risk Value 
Risk 
A 
 
 
 
Risk 
B 
 
 
 
Risk 
C 
 
 
 
Risk 
D 
 
 
 
Risk 
E 
 
 
 
Risk 
F 
 
 
 
Risk 
G 
 
 
 
Risk 
H 
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ANALYSIS PHASE 
STEP 7 : Identification of Security Services 
Typically the following threats would require the services as indicated in the table below.  
Security Services 
Threats Identification & 
Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Theft of 
information 
 
X X    
Use of system by 
unauthorised users X X    
Use of system in an 
unauthorised 
manner  
 X X   
Masquerading of 
user identity 
X X    
Malicious software 
attacks  X  X  
User errors 
 
 X  X  
Repudiation 
 X    X 
Technical software 
failures or errors    X  
STEP 7 : Identification of Security Services 
With this knowledge, map each of the EIGHT risks (asset/threat relationships) identified in the 
Investigation Phase to the envisaged services. For each risk, more than one service may be 
identified. Indicate the level of protection required by placing a B (for Basic), S (for Standard) 
or ES (for Extra Strong) in the relevant cells. Not all services will be required to address each 
individual risk. 
Security Services 
Risks  Identification & 
Authentication  
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Risk A 
 
     
Risk B 
 
     
Risk C 
 
     
Risk D 
 
     
Risk E 
 
     
Risk F 
 
     
Risk G 
 
     
Risk H 
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DESIGN PHASE 
STEP 8: Mapping of Security Services to Security Mechanisms (according to ISO 7498-2) 
Typically the security services are implemented through the security mechanisms as indicated 
in the table below. 
 
Security Services 
 
Security 
Mechanisms 
Identification & 
Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Encipherment/ 
Encryption X  X X  
Digital 
Signatures X   X X 
Access Control 
Mechanisms  X    
Data Integrity 
Mechanisms    X X 
Authentication 
Exchange 
Mechanisms 
X     
Traffic  
Padding   X   
Routing 
Control   X X  
Notarisation 
    X X 
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DESIGN PHASE 
STEP 8 : Mapping of Security Services to Security Mechanisms (according to ISO 7498-2) 
For each risk, identify the specific mechanisms that would be implemented to support the 
security services required. Indicate the level of protection required by placing a B (for Basic), 
S (for Standard) or ES (for Extra Strong) in the relevant cells. Not all security services and 
mechanisms will be required to address each individual risk. 
 
RISK A (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘a’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Security Services Security 
Mechanisms Identification & Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Encipherment/ 
Encryption 
     
Digital 
Signatures 
     
Access Control 
Mechanisms  
     
Data Integrity 
Mechanisms  
     
Authentication 
Exchange  
     
Traffic 
Padding 
     
Routing 
Control 
     
Notarisation 
 
     
 
RISK B (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘b’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Security Services Security 
Mechanisms Identification & Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Encipherment/ 
Encryption 
     
Digital 
Signatures 
     
Access Control 
Mechanisms  
     
Data Integrity 
Mechanisms  
     
Authentication 
Exchange 
     
Traffic 
Padding 
     
Routing 
Control 
     
Notarisation 
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RISK C (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘c’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Security Services Security 
Mechanisms Identification & Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Encipherment/ 
Encryption 
     
Digital 
Signatures 
     
Access Control 
Mechanisms 
     
Data Integrity 
Mechanisms 
     
Authentication 
Exchange  
     
Traffic  
Padding 
     
Routing 
Control 
     
Notarisation 
 
     
 
RISK D (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘d’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Security Services Security 
Mechanisms Identification & Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Encipherment/ 
Encryption 
     
Digital 
Signatures 
     
Access Control 
Mechanisms 
     
Data Integrity 
Mechanisms 
     
Authentication 
Exchange  
     
Traffic  
Padding 
     
Routing 
Control 
     
Notarisation 
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RISK E (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘e’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Security Services Security 
Mechanisms Identification & Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Encipherment/ 
Encryption 
     
Digital 
Signatures 
     
Access Control 
Mechanisms 
     
Data Integrity 
Mechanisms 
     
Authentication 
Exchange  
     
Traffic  
Padding 
     
Routing 
Control 
     
Notarisation 
 
     
 
RISK F (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘f’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Security Services Security 
Mechanisms Identification & Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Encipherment/ 
Encryption 
     
Digital 
Signatures 
     
Access Control 
Mechanisms 
     
Data Integrity 
Mechanisms 
     
Authentication 
Exchange  
     
Traffic  
Padding 
     
Routing 
Control 
     
Notarisation 
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RISK G (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘g’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Security Services Security 
Mechanisms Identification & Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Encipherment/ 
Encryption 
     
Digital 
Signatures 
     
Access Control 
Mechanisms 
     
Data Integrity 
Mechanisms 
     
Authentication 
Exchange  
     
Traffic  
Padding 
     
Routing 
Control 
     
Notarisation 
 
     
 
RISK H (as per Asset/Threat Relationship ‘h’ in Step 3): 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Security Services Security 
Mechanisms Identification & Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
Encipherment/ 
Encryption 
     
Digital 
Signatures 
     
Access Control 
Mechanisms 
     
Data Integrity 
Mechanisms 
     
Authentication 
Exchange  
     
Traffic 
Padding 
     
Routing 
Control 
     
Notarisation 
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DESIGN PHASE 
STEP 9 : Summary of Findings 
In the table below indicate which security services and mechanisms would be required to address 
the specified risks (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H). Simply place an ‘X’ in the appropriate cells. 
Security Services Security 
Mechanisms Identification & Authentication 
Access 
Control 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Integrity 
Non- 
repudiation 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Encipherment/ 
Encryption E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Digital 
Signatures E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Access Control 
Mechanisms E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Data Integrity 
Mechanisms E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Authentication 
Exchange  E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Traffic  
Padding E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Routing 
Control E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Notarisation 
 E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H E F G H 
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IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 
STEP 10 : Mapping of Security Mechanisms to .Net and Other Components  
For each security mechanism, indicate the risks (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) for which it is relevant, by 
placing an ‘X’ next to the appropriate risk (transferred directly from Step 9). In addition, identify the 
specific .Net or other components through which the security mechanisms will be implemented. 
  .Net security components  Other components    
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Encipherment/ 
Encryption 
Risk H 
 
 
 
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Digital 
Signatures 
Risk H 
  
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Access Control 
Mechanisms  
Risk H 
  
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Data Integrity 
Mechanisms  
Risk H 
  
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Authentication 
Exchange 
Mechanisms  
Risk H 
  
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Traffic 
Padding 
Risk H 
  
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Risk G 
Routing 
Control 
Risk H 
  
Risk A 
Risk B 
Risk C 
Risk D 
Risk E 
Risk F 
Se
cu
rit
y 
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
Notarisation 
Risk G 
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INFORMATION SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Purpose : The aim of this questionnaire is to establish the extent to which information 
technology project students at the NMMU consider and incorporate information security into 
their 3rd year development projects.  
Use of Results : The results of this questionnaire will provide essential information required 
to support the need for a new methodology for integrating information security into software 
development projects. 
Instructions : Answer(as honestly as possible) all questions in each of the sections below as 
pertaining to your 3rd year development project. Simply circle YES or NO or NOT SURE in 
the appropriate column. In some sections you are required to circle option a, b or c. Please 
provide additional detail where possible. 
STUDENT INFORMATION 
 
Student Name : ………………………… Student Number :.……………………………. 
 
Signature :……………………………….. Date completed :         …………/………/20….. 
Stream (TA = technical applications, SD = software development) TA SD 
Brief Project Description ……………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
SECTION 1 (Investigation Phase) 
1.1 Did you identify and assess the importance of all the information 
assets  associated with the application you developed? 
YES NO NOT 
SURE 
1.2 Did you identify any of the threats  that may compromise your 
application, specifically the information assets ? 
YES NO NOT 
SURE 
1.3 Did you identify any vulnerabilities  within the deployment 
environment that may negatively impact on the efficient running of 
your application? 
YES NO NOT 
SURE 
1.4 Did you perform any other form of risk analysis , either formal or 
informal? 
· If yes, provide brief details  
………………………………............................................................ .......... 
………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………… 
YES NO NOT 
SURE 
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SECTION 2 (Analysis Phase) 
2.1 Did you include any identification/authentication  service (e.g. passwords)  in 
the application? 
· If yes, did you include this service as a result of a specific risk anticipated?  
Ø If yes, was this based on any formal reason (provide details)  
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
Ø If no, why did you include it? 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
YES 
 
YES 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
 
NO 
NOT 
SURE 
NOT 
SURE 
2.2 Did you include any authorisation/access control  service (e.g. access rights 
depending on role of users) in the application? 
· If yes, did you include this service as a result of a specific risk anticipated?  
Ø If yes, was this based on any formal reason (provide details)  
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
Ø If no, why did you include it? 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
YES 
 
YES 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NOT 
SURE 
NOT 
SURE 
2.3 Did you include any confidentiality service (e.g. encryption) in the 
application? 
 
· If yes, did you include this service as a result of a specific risk anticipated?  
Ø If yes, was this based on any formal reason (provide details)  
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
Ø If no, why did you include it? 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
YES 
 
YES 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NOT 
SURE 
NOT 
SURE 
2.4 Did you include any integrity service (e.g. hashing) in the application? 
 
· If yes, did you include this service as a result of a specific risk anticipated?  
Ø If yes, was this based on any formal reason (provide details)  
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
Ø If no, why did you include it? 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
YES 
 
YES 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NOT 
SURE 
NOT 
SURE 
2.5 Did you include any non-repudiation service (e.g. digital signatures ) in the 
application? 
· If yes, did you include this service as a result of a specific risk anticipated?  
Ø If yes, was this based on any formal reason (provide details)  
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
Ø If no, why did you include it? 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
YES 
 
YES 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NOT 
SURE 
NOT 
SURE 
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………………………………………………………………………………… 
SECTION 3 (Design and Implementation Phases) 
3.1 Did you include any form of encryption/encipherment? 
· If yes, did you  
 a) use a .NET component,  
 b) use some other component, or 
 c) write your own? 
· If yes, are you confident that the component is “strong” enough to 
protect the associated information assets? 
YES 
 
a 
b 
c 
 
YES 
NO 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
NOT 
SURE 
 
 
 
NOT 
SURE 
3.2 Did you include any form of digital signatures? 
· If yes, did you  
 a) use a .NET component,  
 b) use some other component, or 
 c) write your own? 
· If yes, are you confident that the component is “strong” enough to 
protect the associated information assets? 
YES 
 
a 
b 
c 
 
YES 
NO 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
NOT 
SURE 
 
 
 
NOT 
SURE 
3.3 Did you include any form of access control? 
· If yes, did you  
 a) use a .NET component,  
 b) use some other component, or 
 c) write your own? 
· If yes, are you confident that the component is “strong” enough to 
protect the associated information assets? 
YES 
 
a 
b 
c 
 
YES 
NO 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
NOT 
SURE 
 
 
 
NOT 
SURE 
3.4 Did you include any form of data integrity? 
· If yes, did you  
 a) use a .NET component,  
 b) use some other component, or 
 c) write your own? 
· If yes, are you confident that the component is “strong” enough to 
protect the associated information assets? 
YES 
 
a 
b 
c 
 
YES 
NO 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
NOT 
SURE 
 
 
 
NOT 
SURE 
3.5 Did you include any form of authentication? 
· If yes, did you  
 a) use a .NET component,  
 b) use some other component, or 
 c) write your own? 
· If yes, are you confident that the component is “strong” enough to 
protect the associated information assets? 
YES 
 
a 
b 
c 
 
YES 
NO 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
NOT 
SURE 
 
 
 
NOT 
SURE 
3.6 Did you include any form of traffic padding? 
· If yes, did you  
 a) use a .NET component,  
 b) use some other component, or 
 c) write your own? 
· If yes, are you confident that the component is “strong” enough to 
protect the associated information assets? 
YES 
 
a 
b 
c 
 
YES 
NO 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
NOT 
SURE 
 
 
 
NOT 
SURE 
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3.7 Did you include any form of routing control? 
· If yes, did you  
 a) use a .NET component,  
 b) use some other component, or 
 c) write your own? 
· If yes, are you confident that the component is “strong” enough to 
protect the associated information assets? 
YES 
 
a 
b 
c 
 
YES 
NO 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
NOT 
SURE 
 
 
 
NOT 
SURE 
3.8 Did you include any form of notarisation? 
· If yes, did you  
 a) use a .NET component,  
 b) use some other component, or 
 c) write your own? 
· If yes, are you confident that the component is “strong” enough protect 
the associated information assets ? 
YES 
 
a 
b 
c 
 
YES 
NO 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
NOT 
SURE 
 
 
 
NOT 
SURE 
 
SECTION 4 (Maintenance Phase) 
4.1 Did you define any user procedures  for using the application in a secure 
way? 
· If yes, did you specify any user education processes  in this regard? 
· If yes, provide brief details : ………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
YES 
 
YES 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NOT 
SURE 
NOT 
SURE 
4.2 Did you document any information security related detail during the 
analysis, design or implementation phases ?  
· If yes, provide brief details : ………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
YES NO NOT 
SURE 
4.3 Would it be possible to audit the information security aspects of the 
application you developed, to determine whether too few , too many or 
adequate security services and components were considered and integrated 
into the application? 
YES NO NOT 
SURE 
 
SECTION 5 (General Opinions) 
5.1 In your opinion, would you say that : 
a) too few 
b) too many 
c) adequate  
security services and components were considered and integrated into your 
application? 
5.2 Do you believe that there is a need for a new, or improved, methodology for 
integrating information security into software development projects? 
 
a 
b 
c 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOT 
SURE 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire! 
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Note to reader:  
When examining the results of the information security questionnaire as reported in this 
Appendix, it is necessary to refer back to Appendix B for the applicable questions. Each 
question number used in this Appendix refers to the particular question as provided in 
Appendix B. 
 
 
SECTION 1 (Investigation Phase) 
Question as per 
Appendix B 2005 (%) 2006 (%) DIFF (%) 
1.1 Information Assets  
  Yes   39 95 56 
  No   23 5 -18 
  Not Sure   38 0 -39 
1.2 Threats 
  Yes   45 80 35 
  No   35 15 -20 
  Not Sure   20 5 -14 
1.3 Vulnerabilities  
  Yes   42 70 28 
  No   32 25 -7 
  Not Sure   26 5 -21 
1.4 Risk Analysis 
  Yes   6 20 14 
  No   77 50 -27 
  Not Sure   17 30 14 
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SECTION 2 (Analysis Phase) 
Question as per 
Appendix B 2005 (%) 2006 (%) DIFF (%) 
2.1 Identification and Authentication 
  Yes   81 100 19 
  Yes 72 85 13 
  No 12 10 -2 
  Not Sure 16 5 -11 
  No   19 0 -19 
  Not Sure   0 0 0 
2.2 Authorisation and Access Control 
  Yes   58 75 17 
  Yes 67 87 20 
  No 11 13 2 
  Not Sure 22 0 -22 
  No   39 25 -14 
  Not Sure   3 0 -3 
2.3 Confidentiality 
  Yes   19 50 31 
  Yes 50 90 40 
  No 0 10 10 
  Not Sure 50 0 -50 
  No   74 50 -24 
  Not Sure   7 0 -7 
2.4 Integrity 
  Yes   13 10 -3 
  Yes 75 100 25 
  No 0 0 0 
  Not Sure 25 0 -25 
  No   81 90 9 
  Not Sure   6 0 -6 
2.5 Non-repudiation 
  Yes   0 0 0 
  Yes 0 0 0 
  No 0 0 0 
  Not Sure 0 0 0 
  No   90 85 -5 
  Not Sure   10 15 5 
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SECTION 3 (Design and Implementation Phases) 
Question as per 
Appendix B 2005 (%) 2006 (%) DIFF (%) 
3.1 Encryption and encipherment 
  Yes   16 50 34 
   a (.Net) 80 70 -10 
   b (other) 20 30 10 
   c (own) 0 0 0 
   Yes 0 60 60 
   No 0 0 0 
   Not Sure 100 40 -60 
  No 84 45 -39 
  Not sure 0 5 5 
3.2 Digital signatures 
  Yes   0 0 0 
   a (.Net) 0 0 0 
   b (other) 0 0 0 
   c (own) 0 0 0 
   Yes 0 0 0 
   No 0 0 0 
   Not Sure 0 0 0 
  No   97 95 -2 
  Not sure   3 5 2 
3.3 Access control 
  Yes   71 70 -1 
   a (.Net) 41 50 9 
   b (other) 9 0 -9 
   c (own) 50 50 0 
   Yes 18 57 39 
   No 18 14 -4 
   Not Sure 64 29 -35 
  No   23 25 2 
  Not sure   6 5 -1 
3.4 Data integrity 
  Yes   35 60 25 
   a (.Net) 64 50 -14 
   b (other) 9 0 -9 
   c (own) 27 50 23 
   Yes 45 58 13 
   No 9 8 -1 
   Not Sure 46 33 -13 
  No   42 40 -2 
  Not sure   23 0 -23 
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SECTION 3 (Design and Implementation Phases) (continued) 
Question as per 
Appendix B 2005 (%) 2006 (%) DIFF (%) 
3.5 Authentication 
  Yes   71 75 4 
   a (.Net) 23 27 4 
   b (other) 4 26 22 
   c (own) 73 47 -26 
   Yes 14 40 26 
   No 18 13 -5 
   Not Sure 68 47 -21 
  No   23 20 -3 
  Not sure   6 5 -1 
3.6 Traffic padding 
  Yes   3 20 17 
   a (.Net) 0 0 0 
   b (other) 0 0 0 
   c (own) 100 100 0 
   Yes 0 0 0 
   No 0 50 50 
   Not Sure 100 50 -50 
  No   58 60 2 
  Not sure   39 20 -19 
3.7 Routing control 
  Yes   0 40 40 
   a (.Net) 0 0 0 
   b (other) 0 50 50 
   c (own) 0 50 50 
   Yes 0 75 75 
   No 0 0 0 
   Not Sure 0 25 25 
  No   81 45 -36 
  Not sure   19 15 -4 
3.8 Notarisation 
  Yes   0 0 0 
   a (.Net) 0 0 0 
   b (other) 0 0 0 
   c (own) 0 0 0 
   Yes 0 0 0 
   No 0 0 0 
   Not Sure 0 0 0 
  No   68 45 -23 
  Not sure   32 55 23 
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SECTION 4 (Maintenance Phase) 
Question as per 
Appendix B 2005 (%) 2006 (%) DIFF (%) 
4.1 User procedures 
  Yes   6 10 4 
  Yes 50 100 50 
  No 50 0 -50 
  Not Sure 0 0 0 
  No   77 70 -7 
  Not Sure   17 20 3 
4.2 Documentation 
  Yes   10 25 15 
  No   81 70 -11 
  Not Sure   9 5 -4 
4.3 Auditing         
  Yes   23 55 32 
  No   35 35 0 
  Not Sure   42 10 -32 
      
SECTION 5 (General Opinions) 
Question as per 
Appendix B 2005 (%) 2006 (%) DIFF (%) 
5.1 Security of system 
  a (too few)   68 25 -43 
  b (too many)   4 0 -4 
  c (adequate)   28 75 47 
5.2 Need for a secure software development methodology? 
  Yes 68 69 1 
  No   0 6 6 
  Not Sure   32 25 -7 
 FINAL THOUGHT 
 
 
What lies behind us and what lies before us 
are tiny matters compared to what lies 
within us! 
 
-William Morrow- 
 
 
